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Executive
summary
The youth category in Australia and throughoutthe industrialised world has been subject to arange of fundamental changes over the past two
centuries. This process of change is continuing. While
many things in the lives of young people in 15 years
time will be similar to what they are now, a funda-
mental shift in the structure of the youth category is
already in the wind. 
This report documents key social and economic
changes for young people in Australia over the past ten
to 20 years, tracking movements in key social
indicators like population changes, education,
employment/unemployment and the labour market,
incomes, family and household structure, health, and
crime and justice. Consultations have been held with
key youth affairs practitioners, who have been asked to
project these trends into the future and to identify key
implications for policy and for service delivery to
young people in the future. 
The study understands youth as a social category,
rather than a natural, biological one, in which accredi-
tation as adult is withheld from young people for
several years beyond their biological adulthood. In this
state, they are excluded from a range of activities,
rights and powers, generally on the presumption that
they are not ready to be trusted with them. While this
is often protective in intent, such exclusion is often
arbitrary, inconsistent and unfair, and often works
against the interests of young people.
Youth is therefore understood as a category of
exclusion. Consequently, the core criterion for
evaluating social processes in this report is whether
they intensify this exclusion or lead in more inclusive
directions.
The study found the following:
Population
The youth population will decrease as a proportion of
the population as a whole, but will be maintained in
terms of overall numbers. However, more Australians
are likely to be seen as “youth”, as the youth category
reaches further up the age range, implicating young
people into their late twenties. Because Australia has a
younger population than Europe, we are unlikely to
suffer the difficulties associated with an ageing
population and a declining productive labour force.
The labour force in Australia will continue to grow. 
Birth rate trends are in steep decline at the moment,
and if this decline were to be maintained, this would
be a cause for concern. Authorities assume that they
will level out, but this may need some intervention,
especially in defraying the costs of motherhood for
young women. Migration trends are stable in terms of
overall numbers, but a changing mix means that the
population profile will be increasingly multicultural.
More young people may emigrate to take advantage of
employment opportunities in the ageing nations of the
northern hemisphere.
Education
Trends indicate that more young people will be
involved in educational institutions, and for longer.
Full-time education to the age of 18 will be almost
universal, and tertiary education will also continue to
grow. A large number of students will also be working
part time. Education is likely to use electronic tech-
nologies and materials more intensively, but traditional
classroom schooling is likely to be maintained. Schools
are likely to become more diverse, with private schools
increasing in number and market share. Schools will
need to be more integrated with their communities,
including industry, and the curriculum will need to be
geared to the no-job entrepreneurial cultures of the
New Economy. 
As possession of educational qualifications becomes
more essential to young people’s life chances,
education systems will need to work harder at retaining
non-mainstream students, and towards meeting their
needs. There is an emerging need to develop better
strategies for teaching boys. At the bottom line, we
need to avoid the polarisation of student population
between those who are able to succeed in well
resourced schools in wealthy neighbourhoods, and
those who are excluded at an early age from poor
schools in blighted neighbourhoods. Attention
especially needs to be given to the seriously unequal
education outcomes for Indigenous young people. Full-
service schools are a proven strategy for achieving these
goals, and a role for youth workers in schools is an
important component. Full privatisation and marketi-
sation of the education sector, on the other hand, is
likely to increase inequality.
Employment
Unemployment, the key youth issue of the past 20
years, is unlikely to become less significant in the
immediate future, although probably in the shape of
chronic underemployment rather than the absence of
work. Full-time permanent jobs are giving way rapidly
to temporary, casual and part-time employment, and
self-employment is becoming more common. Young
people will face a crowded labour market with
increasing participation rates. This complexity again
makes accreditation as adult more ambiguous. In the
future, young people will have to adapt to having a mix
of contracts and activities. In this environment, there is
again a strong risk of polarisation, with those young
people who are well-resourced in education, access to
capital, support through lean times, and desirable social
characteristics doing well, and less advantaged popula-
tions caught in spirals of poverty and exclusion. Active
brokering services will be needed in this environment,
with a strong outreach and client-focused approach.
Access to capital will need to be equitable.
Income
Youth incomes relative to adults have declined over
time, and the degree of protection for young people is
also declining. Current approaches to youth incomes,
whether youth wages or government income support,
is based on a number of assumptions about young
people’s level of need and levels of parental support.
Where these assumptions do not hold, young people
can be subjected to severe poverty. 
Incomes and wages policy is frequently designed to
pressure young people into approved forms of activity.
Youth incomes are therefore currently seriously
discounted, and are not consistent with independent
living. 
Increasing work force participation rates and a
declining youth population will mean that the state
will be able to afford to redress this in the future, both
in government allowances and income supplements, if
the will is there. Young people should also be included
in equal opportunity legislation, and the principle of
equal pay for equal work should be extended to them.
Family and household
Families are becoming smaller, more diverse, and more
mobile. Single parent families are more common,
blended families are on the rise. Young people are
marrying later, now well into their late 20s, and most
couples will have an extended period of cohabitation
before marriage. Teenage pregnancies are less common
– the birth of a first child is most often now in the late
20s or early 30s – but more children are being born
outside of marriage. 
Young people are leaving home on average later
than they used to, largely through economic necessity
and the requirements of extended education, though a
majority of 20- to 24-year-olds and an increasing
number of 15- to 19-year-olds are living independently.
Those people who have moved out of home are mostly
living in rented accommodation. They spend a high
proportion of their income on housing, which is often
substandard. Trends in government housing policy
away from public housing are likely to exacerbate these
problems, and may contribute to what is already a
worrying level of youth homelessness. 
Adequate provision is needed for those young
people who are living independently, both in terms of
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adequate housing stock, income and other supports.
We have also recommended increased support for
families, including a renewed emphasis on community
development processes which alleviate the need for
direct professional intervention in families by
increasing supports within the social environment.
Health
Young people have and will continue to enjoy good
physical health, with declining rates of death and
disease as road safety, preventative medicine and
general medical technologies improve. Broader
measures of health show a more complex picture. The
transmission of sexually transmitted diseases is
generally under control, teenage pregnancies are down.
Trends in youth suicide are reasonably stable and
suicide rates are not significantly higher than for other
groups of adults. Trends in drug use show a stable or
declining trend in the use of the legal recreational
drugs, but an increase in the variety and uptake of
illegal ones. Illegal drugs are being used younger, and
tend increasingly to be a part of mainstream youth
culture rather than specific drug subcultures. The
continued focus on enforcement as the key to drug
control runs counter to health priorities, and this is
likely to become more problematic in the future as the
variety and availability of recreational drugs increases. 
There is evidence that life is more stressful for
young people, and reported rates of depression are
increasing. Uncertainty, loss of faith in authorities of
all kinds, and a more fragmented life present young
people with challenges to hope and integrity that are
not well supported culturally. Young people vary in
their ability to develop responses, which are essentially
spiritual responses, to these challenges. In the future,
services will need to be available for information,
referral, and other linkage and brokerage services.
Schools will need to take an increasing role in main-
taining health outcomes.
Crime and justice
Young people are heavily implicated in the justice
system both as offenders and victims of crime, though
well over 90% of young people stay clear of the law in
any one year. Here again, evidence of a polarising trend
exists, in which general rates of offending are
declining, but a small core of offenders are implicated
in more offences and more serious and violent
offences. The decision to deal with recreational drug
use primarily through the criminal justice system
implicates young people more than other groups.
The trend in justice systems is inconsistent across
and within jurisdictions in Australia, with trends
towards restorative justice principles, but also increas-
ingly punitive and retaliatory responses, including
curfews, mandatory sentencing, increasing penalties and
initiatives such as boot camps. Prison populations are
increasing rapidly, with Indigenous young people most
affected, and overcrowding a major issue. The trend
towards private prisons will tend to cement incarcera-
tion as a standard response, and decrease the already
limited capacity for rehabilitation in prison. Continuing
the focus on inclusion, we advocate strongly for a more
consistent application of restorative justice principles,
which will decrease prison populations and, the
evidence shows, also decrease offending behaviour. 
As an overall picture, the data points consistently
towards people spending a longer time in the youth
category, and their graduation into adulthood and full
citizenship becoming more complex, indeterminate
and ambiguous. Services will therefore need to refocus
in order to cater for young people in their 20s, as well
as younger. 
Eisenstadt argued half a century ago (1956) that in
order for the youth category to be a positive and
functional structure, young people needed a clear role
and a clear and unambiguous pathway to accreditation
as adult. Action is needed to remove the inconsisten-
cies and arbitrariness of young people’s status. Hence,
we have recommended formal recognition of the status
of youth, and serious consideration of the age at which
various powers might be conferred on young people. 
Within the youth category itself, unless policy and
practice is able to reshape current social trends, we
expect a growing gap between young people who are
well-resourced, in favourable family settings, with a
range of social, cultural and educational advantages,
and young people for whom family has not been able
to supply the necessary supports, who were unable to
stay or succeed at school, and for whom poverty is a
present reality with an extended future. Indigenous
young people, already severely disadvantaged across all
the indicators we have looked at, must be a priority in
this. Across the various policy areas we have studied,
consistent attention needs to be given to creating
policies that increase levels of equality and inclusion.
Effective services across these areas will have a focus on
linkage, flexibility, and capacity-building in common.
A range of policy recommendations are implicit or
explicit in the report, many with implications for
services. This section outlines major recommendations
for services which are important to produce an envi-
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ronment closer to the optimum. In this section, we
would highlight a number of key areas that should
provide a focus for youth service development over the
next 15 years.
General recommendations
• That State and Federal Governments establish the
status of youth in legal and policy terms, with
clear and consistent rights and responsibilities,
and which balance obligations and privileges,
benefits and penalties for young people.
• That State and Federal governments consider the
primary paradigm for understanding youth
contained within the Report – i.e. as a social
category defined in terms of processes of exclusion
and accreditation – for use in developing, imple-
menting and evaluating policy and programs
concerning young people.
• That vigilance is maintained over the equity
impacts of policy and services to avoid a widening
gap between rich and poor, including among
young people.
• That State and Commonwealth Governments
support the development of professional youth
work practice, including effective training, and its
recognition and utilisation within service delivery
to young people, as well as training for other
professions to work within a more flexible and
diverse environment.
1: Education
1.1 Youth workers in schools
Schools will need to engage support staff skilled in
dealing with students subject to homelessness, family
conflict, drug use and other circumstances which raise
barriers to their successful enrolment. The assessment,
information, referral and advocacy skills of youth
workers make them appropriate for this role. Improved
training for youth workers is indicated towards this end.
1.2 Full service schools
Create an integrated environment on school campuses
with a range of services available, including:
• health services;
• dental services;
• counselling;
• various welfare services, including food clubs and
financial counselling;
• accommodation or accommodation brokerage;
• recreation;
• employment services, including job placement
and job creation services; and
• after-hours education, including vocational,
secondary and leisure-based education.
1.3 Integration with community and business enterprises
Relationships need to be developed between the school
and outside agencies. This needs to be a critical and
educative experience in which fundamental questions
for the enterprise are raised and problems addressed. 
1.4 Training for entrepreneurship/New Economy
Teaching and learning needs to be tuned to an envi-
ronment which is increasingly diverse, unregulated,
fragmentary and volatile. Students need to be trained
for self-employment and autonomous work practices.
1.5 Alternatives
Secondary schooling needs to move beyond a “one size
fits all” approach to embrace alternatives which may
include: 
• school employing different educational
philosophies;
• schools allowing Indigenous students to study
together;
• bicultural schools;
• small private schools of 12 to 15 students; and
• workplace-based schools.
1.6 Continued free, universal education
Moves towards reconstructing the education sector as a
commercial market is likely to increase inequity among
young people, with long-term effects for their futures.
Continued State responsibility for education is recom-
mended.
1.7 Access to technology
Students must have equitable access to information
and communications technology in their communities,
including after-hours access. 
1.8 Boys
Measures need to be put in place to develop teaching
and learning processes which are effective in helping
young men learn, including those which improve their
communication and linguistic skills.
1.9 Relentless opportunity for success
Failure at education must not be allowed to become a
permanent deficit. Second-chance access, access to
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alternative forms of schooling, and other strategies
must be employed to ensure the possibility for success,
particularly for educationally disadvantaged groups.
2: Work and unemployment
2.1 Employment discrimination
Young people should be included in equal opportunity
provisions, and a concerted public education campaign
about the productivity and value of young workers
needs to be undertaken. 
2.2 Access to advocacy
The demise of unions indicates the need for
mechanisms which are able to protect young workers
from exploitation, underpayment, breach of contract,
or unsafe working conditions.
2.3 Access to venture capital
Young people need equitable access to low-interest
start-up capital for enterprise initiatives.
2.4 Brokerage services
Services are required which connect young people with
work opportunities as they emerge, especially where
profitable brokerage is improbable. Such services need
also to broker non-work opportunities including
voluntary work, structured recreation, artistic endeavour,
and other cultural and community-building activities.
3: Incomes
3.1 Living wage
Young people need access to an income consistent with
the Harvester Judgement minimum standard of “living in
frugal comfort”. The more chaotic work/education/non-
work mix requires a more intelligent and flexible income
support structure that encourages endeavour and
initiative but avoids poverty. A Guaranteed Minimum
Income for young people should be considered.
3.2 Anti-discrimination policy for legal adults
Young people who are legally adult should not be
subject to discounted wages or income support. Wages
for young people should follow the principle of equal
pay for equal work.
3.3 Statutory claim on parental income
For young people who are not legally adult, and are
therefore presumed to be dependent on their parents,
there should be avenues for claiming support.
3.4 Claim on state support
Young people who are not legally adult should have a
claim for state-provided income support if parental
support cannot be made good. 
4: Families and households
4.1 Public housing
Given the dependence of young people on the private
rental housing market, and the particular exposure of
Indigenous families, the trend to sell off public housing
should be reversed. A significant reinvestment in
public housing, in a variety of forms including group
and community housing is required.
4.2 Support for families
Many families are unlikely to be completely self-
sufficient without state and community support.
Prevention of destructive forms of conflict and
damaging forms of communication, interaction and
patterns of behaviour is critical. Early intervention, and
open access to counselling, conflict management and
mediation are important, particularly as they struggle
to adjust to longer-term enforced dependency of young
adult members. 
4.3 Community development
A reinvestment in community development was seen as
essential to effective family support so that families,
whatever their size and form, are less isolated, better
connected and have access to lines of release or healing
that do not involve formal, state-mandated intervention
by professionals. This should include attention both to
the built environment through better town planning,
transport policy and environmental management and to
the social environment through active processes which
rebuild and sustain community life.
4.4 Family formation
The collapse in Australia’s birth rate indicates that
policies are needed which compensate young women
for the costs of bearing children. This may involve
strategies for limiting the career setback effects of
parenthood, income support strategies and access to
free or at least affordable child care.
5: Health
5.1 Provision within a school environment
Health services should be included as part of a strategy
for full-service schools. The role of youth workers in
Youth and the future: Effective youth services for the year 2015 5
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health promotion, including providing information
and effective referral, should not be ignored, and their
wider employment in schools is recommended. Roles
would include availability to young people who are
facing difficulties either within school or outside,
providing appropriate referral, and to provide personal,
social development and leisure activities for young
people out of school hours. 
5.2 Brokerage services within existing community 
service settings
These brokering roles extend to a range of contexts
within which youth health outcomes are being
pursued, including local government, where linkage
and referral roles would be paramount. This includes
linking young people to safe accommodation,
running youth accommodation services and
providing primary information and advice services to
young people. Such services are especially indicated
for hard-to-reach young people, and need a strong
outreach component.
5.3 Partnership in Aboriginal reconciliation
These roles should involve partnership between various
professionals working with young people and local
Aboriginal representatives to support community-based
reconciliation initiatives. Locally-based reconciliation is
an essential part of a broad-based approach to
improving Aboriginal health and well-being.
5.4 Group work with young people to address common
health determinants
Processes need to be in place to deal with key health
factors such as exclusion on the basis of race, gender,
sexual preference, and bullying and other violence.
Assistance needs to be available for self-help and
support groups, including incest survivor groups,
Aboriginal support groups, young women’s groups,
young men’s groups, and gay and lesbian support
groups for young people. Youth counselling needs to
be readily accessible to young people, both in terms of
location, mode of delivery and cost.
5.5 Assisted peer education
Young people need to be engaged as active partners in
health promotion. Youth workers have a role, in part-
nership with other agencies, to encourage peer
education programs, and to support young people to
become peer educators. Services need to be available to
enable young people to become involved in primary
health care training, for example, first aid training (as
in the ‘Save a Mate’ scheme offered by the Red Cross)
run as part of a youth health program.
5.6 Basic needs
Young people who do not have a safe place to live
must have access to a safe environment. Youth refuges
and women’s refuges remain important in this respect.
5.7 Advocacy
Youth advocates (including youth peak bodies) have a
role in relation to youth health issues which may need
government support: for example, in the domain of
safety issues where legislation, research, or other inter-
vention is required; or where enforcement may not be
adequate: for example, workplace safety. Such services
are needed even when criticism of current government
policy is the outcome.
5.8 Brokerage roles in hospital settings
Youth workers should be linked to hospital-based
services to improve service delivery to young people, to
encourage a holistic view of the young person and, in
conjunction with other professionals, to provide youth
work services to young people who are hospitalised for
long periods. 
Multi-disciplinary services should address youth
sexual health issues and drug and alcohol treatment
and these services should include youth workers and
community health workers. These services should plan
locally how services can be best delivered to young
people in ways that maximise accessibility and confi-
dentiality.
5.9 Harm minimisation
Approaches to young people’s health that deal with
problems primarily in categories of deviance, whether
moral or criminal, should be rethought. Such
approaches deny young people access to effective
means of health, in the fear of condoning the
behaviour in question. Rather, we need to equip young
people to make good choices on reliable information,
and to have access to ameliorative or rehabilitative
services when problems emerge.
6: Crime and punishment
6.1 Restorative justice
Youth justice systems should be reconfigured on
restorative justice principles.
6.2 Prison as last resort
Prison should not be used to achieve “community
protection” objectives early in a young person’s
offending career. Given the destructiveness and
counter-productivity of prison as punishment, it
should be avoided wherever possible. Alternative
punishments, using electronic technologies, should be
expanded. 
6.3 Private prisons
Authorities should avoid the establishment of a private
profit-making prison industry, or other systems with a
vested interest in increasing the rate and duration of
imprisonment and in minimising the cost of services to
people in prison without regard to costs on the state or
the community on release.
6.4 Victim supports
Services should be in place for the healing and restora-
tion of young people who are victims of crime and
who are facing loss, grief, humiliation and post-
traumatic stress
6.5 Youth courts
A specific youth court, separate from children’s and
adult courts, should be established for young people
below adult age under the jurisdiction of a single
cabinet level youth justice agency.
6.6 Judicial discretion
Mandatory sentencing should be avoided to maintain
the principle of prison as the last resort and to ensure
that punishment is able to be appropriate to the seri-
ousness of the offence.
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The economic and social position of young peoplehas been affected by extensive changethroughout the Western world over the past 200
years. Indeed, the modern understanding of youth in
terms of “adolescence” is a comparatively recent
phenomenon, emerging only at the beginning of this
century (Bessant, Sercombe & Watts 1998). Changes in
the conception of youth have gone hand in hand with
changes in their legal status, in the extent and nature
of their economic engagement, and in provisions for
their institutional education.
The rate of change continues to accelerate. Young
people have borne the brunt of the structural adjust-
ments of the industrial expansion during and
following World War II, then the long recession of the
1970s and the galloping changes associated with the
new technologies of the information and communica-
tions revolution. In tandem with these economic
transformations, there have been far-reaching social
transformations involving the changing roles of
women, the changing structure of the family, and
realignment of power between major cultural institu-
tions such as the church, schools and the media. In the
midst of this change, the position of young people has
become increasingly uncertain and contradictory.
Conceptions that assumed a linear transition to
adulthood are rapidly becoming obsolete. The pace of
change shows no sign of abating. 
It is in this environment that this report was
written. The brief for the project was to explore
conditions for young people in the new millennium,
in the year 2015, and to suggest what services they
might need. More specifically, the report aims to
provide an understanding of the services required by
young people in 15 years time, based on a thorough
analysis of recent trends and expert projections of
those trends to the year 2015. How these trends affect
and/or translate into appropriate rites of passage for
young people will be a major focus. This analysis will
form a strategic base for articulating “what is to be
done” in relation to types of future-oriented responses
to the needs of young people. 
The research process involved gathering as much
statistical data on the position of young people in
society as we could, across a range of important social
indicators, to try and determine where the trends were
heading. We have worked comprehensively with the
literature on the position of young people in societies
like ours. And we have consulted across the country
with a range of advocates, including youth representa-
tives, who have been identified by the youth affairs
field as people worth listening to on the future of
young people in this country.
Studying the future: the year 2015
The year 2015 is an interesting year to choose. Fifteen
years into the future is not a distant future: the report
ONE:
INTRODUCTION
is not a piece of science fiction, dreaming worlds that
do not exist except in imagination, with ways of living
and technologies that bear no relation to the way of
life today.  People who are young now will still be
reasonably young. Anybody older than 25 will be able
to remember the late 1990s and the turn of the
millennium. The relationship between now and 2015
would be like the relationship between 1985
(remember International Youth Year?) and now. Most
of the seeds of 2015 are already in the ground and
growing. Australia in 2015 will still be very recognis-
ably this society. 
But 15 years takes us way beyond the capacity of
accurate projection from the statistics (Little, G., ABS,
personal communication). Even with sophisticated
computer modelling, we can’t say accurately what
unemployment rates will look like in 2015. Or rates of
suicide, or crime, or age of leaving home. The limit for
reliable statistical forecasting on these kinds of
indicators is about two to three years, and for many
areas of inquiry the statistics are already three or four
or five years old. For many of them, like suicide or
specific crime rates, no positive forecasting is possible.
Either the numbers are too small, or the variables
affecting what happens are too unpredictable. Add to
that the idiosyncrasies of government policy decisions
(remember that in 1985 the Priority One youth policy
was in place) and any attempt at strict projection
becomes impossible.
This does not mean that we can’t say anything
sensible about how the world will be for young people
in the year 2015. The data that we do have gives us a
good idea about what kinds of things are likely to be
significant in the lives of young people. We know the
movements in youth unemployment and labour force
participation rates for young people over the past few
years. We know what institutions have been most
influential for young people, and we know some things
about how they have been changing and, perhaps, the
likely direction of change in the next ten years or so.
We know, for example, that change in secondary
schools will be pivotal to what happens for young
people, and that the conditions under which young
people leave home will also be important. Planning
and policy is already shaping change within peoples’
lives, and we can make some well-founded guesses
about the impact of decisions like the common Youth
Allowance and the trend towards user-pays approaches
for tertiary education. Working with people who have
useful things to say about the direction that things are
taking strengthens this approach.
Given this context, this research project has to be
interpretive. The figures cannot speak for themselves,
because the events are over the horizon. They can
indicate a particular direction, a tendency to increase
or decrease or change into something else. They can
establish the current extent of something (like drug
use, for example) and invite us to imagine what will
happen with it in years to come. But they cannot tell
us what will happen. The process of projecting
conditions for young people in the year 2015 requires
us to look at the state of affairs for young people now,
to see where the trends have gone in recent years, and
to do the active, creative work of interpreting those
trends for a largely unknown future. We do so
acknowledging that many of the forces shaping these
trends are currently unimagined.
Because of the active, creative, interpretive nature of
this task, we cannot pretend that the picture we give of
life for young people in the year 2015, or the recom-
mendations that we would make for services, are
“objective”. Indeed, we do not believe that such a
position is either possible or desirable. The study is
firmly grounded in what data is available, and we have
consulted a wide range of youth advocates in coming
to our conclusions, but our perceptions are strongly
based in our own histories of working with young
people, and in the theoretical perspectives and world
views that we hold. 
At a fundamental level, this research will always say
more about our understanding of the present than the
future. Any picture we paint now of life for young
people in the year 2015 will have built into it assump-
tions about what we think is good about the way we
deal with young people now, and what we think is bad.
It will carry our beliefs, and the beliefs of the people we
have talked to and whose work we have read, about the
key institutions and social processes that affect young
people in the present. 
Consequently, we make no claim that the world in
2015 will be as we describe it. We might get it right,
and we might not. Futures study is a graveyard of
wrong predictions, even from the most celebrated of
futurologists. The results of the study are based on a
large amount of data about young people, and a great
deal of collective wisdom about what is important in
shaping young people’s lives. But the world is a
complex place, and things can change very quickly
indeed. Alternatively, changes that seem to be
imminent can sit on the shelf for 30 years. 
It would be a mistake to judge this study on how
many of its predictions are proved right over the next
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15 years. The report should be read primarily as an
account of what the research indicates we need to do
about young people now, and the kinds of directions
that policy-making and service-provision should take.
As time goes on, we will obviously have to change and
adapt as the world changes in unexpected ways before
our eyes. In a sense, it is like going on a road trip with
very old maps, and through some country where the
roads aren’t marked at all. But, in the words of a phrase
now so widely quoted that its origins have been lost,
the best way to predict the future is to create it.
Theoretical framework:
inclusion/exclusion
There are generally two approaches to dealing with the
question of values in social research. One is to attempt
to “bracket out” the values of the researchers, and
present the data as “objectively” as possible. As we
have indicated, this study is expressly evaluative in its
intent, so this approach would seem not to be very
useful. The second is to declare the value base on
which the research is based, and to work with the data
in a disciplined and rigorous but engaged fashion. This
is the approach we have chosen.
This report grows out of a firm belief in human
equality, and that all competent members of a society
have an a priori claim for inclusion in its cultural,
political and economic processes (what we rather
loosely call the “common wealth”), with all their oblig-
ations and benefits. We do not deny that there are
often legitimate grounds for excluding some people
from certain parts of these processes, but believe that
the onus is on decision-makers to justify such
exclusion, rather than on people to prove that they
have a right to be involved. Australia is, or claims to be,
a liberal democratic society. Often, even the most basic
rights promoted by liberal democratic theory have not
consistently been extended to young people.
This belief bears directly on the way that we intend
dealing with the question of what things will be like
for young people in 2015 and what kinds of services
will be effective. In particular, it informs (and flows out
of) our core conceptual definition of “youth”, and it
provides a central criterion for measuring “effective-
ness”. It establishes which issues and which areas of
intervention are most critical. 
The study works with a conception of youth that
understands the relationship of young people to the
broader society in these terms: in terms of exclusion.
The degree of exclusion varies with a range of factors,
but there are for all young people sets of practices in
law, in social policy, and in everyday custom which
exclude them from full participation. While some of
these are protective in intent, many of them create a
range of difficulties for young people, especially in
combination with other factors which may add to their
alienation.
Youth, as it has often been noted, is not a
homogenous category. The lives of working-class
young people are different to those from wealthy back-
grounds. The same can be said for the lives of
Indigenous young people, or young people living in
remote areas, or young men and young women, young
people from non-English-speaking backgrounds, young
people with disabilities. Understanding the world in
2015 also surely means understanding the different
worlds of different groups of young people. Maybe it
means collating and cross referencing all the data
across all the social indicators we have looked at for all
these different populations.
Just to make things more interesting, the way we
classify young people, and the kinds of risk or disad-
vantage they are subject to, will itself change. For
example, it is already becoming rare to hear reports and
commentators talk of “working-class young people”.
Fifteen years ago, the language of class was at centre
stage. Maleness is increasingly emerging as a risk factor,
especially with regard to access to education, risk of
suicide and other causes of death and injury. Fifteen
years ago, maleness could only have been thought of in
terms of advantage. Over the next 15 years, new kinds
of classifications will emerge for understanding young
people, and we will see things through them that are
currently invisible to us.
It quickly becomes clear that the task of thinking
about how the world will change for young people over
the next 15 years is impossible if you try to cover all
the different groups of young people and all the
different social issues and movements in which they
are implicated. Perhaps it is better to try and
understand the core of the relationship between young
people and the wider society, and to work with what is
likely to happen with that core dynamic over time.
Then, it may be possible to suggest how changes in the
core dynamic will work out differently for different
groups of young people. Anyway, many of the funda-
mentals will apply across populations: if all young
people have to go to school, changes in schooling will
impact on all young people. They may impact differ-
ently on different populations, and we can talk about
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that, but understanding the core dynamic seems to be
the key. So, rather than describe the whole range of
situations within which young people will have to live,
we have tried to develop an idea of the core dynamic in
the relationship between young people and society,
and the social forces and institutions which will bear
most directly on that.
Youth: a social construction
There is now a strong body of literature which
indicates that “Youth” is not a “natural” category but a
socially defined and constructed one. This is indicated
by the fact that some societies don’t seem to feel the
need to define anybody as “youth” or “adolescent”
(Seig 1976), by the incontestable evidence that even in
societies which have always had a “youth” category, it
has not always meant the same thing as it does now
(Dyhouse 1981; Gillis 1974; Kett 1977). The age range
covering youth has changed, the traits attributed to
young people have changed, the nature of their
position and function within society has changed.
Even in the current environment, different professional
groups have strikingly different conceptions of what
“youth” is about, and different languages and theories
with which to describe them (Sercombe 1996).
What follows in this report is an analysis of the
nature of the youth category, especially the core
dynamics which shape the youth category. In other
words, we have focused on the way that young people
are understood, the kinds of beliefs that are held about
what they are like and what their capacities and capa-
bilities are, and the key institutions (school, family,
media, work, welfare, the justice system) which govern
them. Change in young people’s lives over the next 15
years will substantially be a function of changes in
these core institutions and the understanding of youth
from which they operate.
Defining “youth”
There is a broad range of psychological and anthropo-
logical evidence to demonstrate that once puberty has
settled down (usually by the age of about 14 to 16)
young people are biologically adult. In fact, there is no
substantial evidence to indicate that the inherent
capacities of young people, including cognitive and
moral capacities, are different to those of other adults,
as Melton’s exhaustive review of the literature (Melton
1983) indicates. Inexperience is an issue, of course, but
this is only incidentally age-related, and in many areas
young people may be more experienced than their
elders, particularly in an environment of rapid social
change (cf. Benedict 1935).
This raises an important question. If “youth” is a
social construction, what kind of construction is it?
How is it constructed, and why? Why do we have a
youth category?
Consistent with the overall approach of this report,
the youth category may be effectively defined as a
product of the practice of excluding certain biologically
adult members of a society (Bessant et al. 1998; Seig
1976; Springhall 1984) from full participation in
society, basically because they are judged to be “too
young”. What “too young” generally means is that it is
presumed that they have not yet assimilated the
dominant social codes, and are therefore deemed to be
“unsafe”. Our society deems young people to be unsafe
drivers, drinkers, tenants, financial managers, voters,
and marriage partners. This is not because of any
inherent lack of capacity: Young people have both the
physical and mental abilities necessary to make
perfectly competent drivers or financial planners, and
in many parts of the world, 14-year-olds are doing all
of these things. Inexperience may be an issue, but that
is not the logic of their exclusion. Young people are
excluded from engaging in these roles or practices
because it is assumed that they don’t yet have the right
“attitudes” on these things. 
From this perspective, becoming an adult is a
process of accreditation. Youth is not fundamentally a
stage that people grow out of. It is a status that they are
promoted out of. There are things that they can do to
facilitate this process of promotion or accreditation,
ways in which young people can signal to the society
at large that they are ready for recognition as adult. But
it is up to the society to recognise their status. 
Conversely, adulthood, in this sense, is a status, not
a biological state. Adulthood is conferred, a social state,
which carries with it the presumption of autonomy
and rationality, of individual sovereignty, and of citi-
zenship.
One of the things that is happening in the current
environment is that accreditation or recognition as
adult is becoming more difficult. Many of the
indicators which might once have guaranteed accredi-
tation as adult – marriage, job, leaving home,
parenthood – are now unavailable, temporary,
unreliable, or no longer pay off in terms of conferring
adult status. Accreditation as adult appears to be
something that emerges vaguely and unevenly across a
range of contexts in which the individual lives, rather
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than the product of a predictable and reliable set of
developmental tasks. It is influenced by strategic
choices made by the individual, but is also limited by
circumstances that are beyond his or her control. Our
findings indicate that this uncertainty is increasing,
not decreasing.
The brief provided for this research asks for
comment on the question of rites of passage for young
people. The ambiguity and indeterminacy of accredita-
tion as adult certainly sets up an environment for
young people where their status, and therefore their
rights and responsibilities are also ambiguous and inde-
terminate.
The suspension of adulthood, and the practices of
exclusion that go along with it, cash out differently for
different groups of young people. Exclusion from
employment for young people from upper-middle class
families, for example, may mean enforced retention in
education through to university level. For young
people from poor families, it may mean extended
periods of unemployment, accompanied maybe by
spending a lot of time on the street and frequent
contacts with the police. 
There are also clearly other categories of exclusion.
Women continue to be excluded because of various
assumptions about their capacity or role. Certain races
of people, notably Indigenous Australians, live daily
with practices of exclusion that deeply affect their
capacity to participate in the common wealth. Even
things like accent, or physical appearance, can translate
through to exclusion in various contexts. Poverty itself
excludes. 
These statuses obviously interact. If you are young,
but rich, the impact of your exclusion is significantly
reduced. If you are poor, black and young, you have a
fight to get in anywhere. Clearly, a focus on exclusion
leads us to be especially interested in the impact of
social change on young Indigenous people, young
women, young people from marginal economic groups
or other categories of young people for whom the
effects of exclusion are expected to be harsh.
Exclusion may also not be experienced as
oppressive, depending on different young people’s
aspirations. Again, this may be different for different
groups. For some young people, exclusion from the
right and obligation to vote may be incredibly frus-
trating, as they watch political events go by without
being able to have any say in their outcome (The West
Australian, 5/11/99, p.1). For others, it might be blessed
relief. For some, their inability to get a bank loan
because of their age may be a significant inhibition to
their economic ambitions. For others, it may be
completely irrelevant. Exclusion from adult prison is
probably welcome news to most young people affected
by it. Exclusion from military service likewise. 
One other implication of this perspective is that there
are degrees of exclusion. One can be more or less
excluded, and excluded from more or fewer areas of
social activity. It follows that if youth is a function of
exclusion by age, there are also degrees of youth,
depending or the relationship between biological
adulthood and the degree of exclusion experienced. In
other words, one can be very much a youth or only a
little bit: it isn’t a yes/no, in/out category. If young
people are excluded from driving at the age of 16 but not
17, then 16-year-olds are more “youth” than 17-year-
olds. Eighteen-year-olds, because of the right to be served
alcohol, to vote, and to sign legally binding contracts, are
less “youth” than 17-year-olds. Twenty-eight-year-olds
are hardly youth at all. Nor are 12-year-olds, not because
they are not excluded but because of the “biologically
adult” criterion referred to above: their biological
adulthood is only just beginning to emerge.1
We could summarise this with a definition.
Conceptually, “youth” is:
• a socially constructed category, in which
• biologically adult members of a society, 
• on the basis of their low relative age, are 
• deemed to have inadequately assimilated the
dominant social codes, and are
• excluded from full participation accordingly.
For the purposes of statistical analysis, we will need
to work with age ranges as a convenient shorthand for
what is essentially a political and sociological state.
Standard United Nations classifications prescribe 12 to
25 as the age range embracing youth. While some 12-
year-olds are indeed beginning to experience some
aspects of the tension between their emerging
adulthood and their continuing social status as
children, policy for youth is not well served by
including subjects who are still predominantly pre-
pubertal. We have followed the practice of other
researchers (e.g. Landt & Scott 1998) and the statistical
collection practices of the ABS in using 15 to 25 years
as the operational definition of youth, largely for
pragmatic and heuristic reasons. In doing so, we
describe a population which is post-pubertal, develop-
mentally adult, and subject to a range of exclusions on
the basis of their age.
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Inclusion, exclusion and
“effectiveness”
The research brief requires us to apply ourselves to the
question of “effective youth services for the future”.
Proposing “effectiveness” involves making value
judgments. Effective in terms of what? What criteria
should be used to measure it? What counts as more of
it, and what counts as less?
There are obviously quite a few candidates.
“Affluence” is an obvious one. A society in which
people are richer is better, all things being equal, than
one in which they are poorer. “Quality of life” could
work. “Equity” would get a few votes: that the benefits
and burdens of social life and cooperative living should
be shared out fairly. Maybe whether “basic needs” are
met. “Security”. “Social cohesion”. “Peace”. Maybe
“achieving your full potential”.
As we indicated above, we have also chosen
inclusion/exclusion as the core criterion to measure
effectiveness. The logic of this choice flows from the
definition of youth we developed above.2 The value
judgment we are making is that all competent
members of a society have an a priori claim for
inclusion in the common wealth, with all their obliga-
tions and benefits. It is good for people to be able, if
they choose, to be involved in the economic life of
their society, in the processes of production and the
rewards that work can bring. It is good for people to be
able to be involved in decision-making processes, in
deciding the direction that their communities will take.
It is good for people to be involved in cultural
expression, to be a part of shaping the way that a
community understands itself and the world in which
it lives. The more strongly people are connected, the
more links they have in their society, the healthier
they and their societies will be, all things being equal
(Bronfenbrenner 1979). 
Logically, if “youth” as a category is defined by
exclusion, as we have argued, then it seems reasonable
to say that “effective” youth services are those that
decrease the scope and extent of the exclusion that
young people experience. The connection to other core
criteria for people’s concern about young people in the
youth studies literature, like alienation, disaffection or
the sense of being “detached”, is obvious. 
Conclusion
Understanding the position of young people in
Australian society at any point in history is a complex
thing. To try and do it with any kind of detail, recog-
nising the impact of economic factors, cultural
difference, gender inequalities and the interplay of
these and other variables, is pretty well impossible. To
project this kaleidoscope into the future with any kind
of reliability…
The approach we have chosen, and outlined in this
chapter is to begin the task with a clear sense of the
central concepts involved: about youth, about effec-
tiveness, about the kinds of issues and services we are
interested in. In other words, we have attempted to
address the task analytically. Rather than describe the
range of young people’s experiences and the issues that
embrace them, we have identified the core dynamic
involved in the position of young people in society,
and to track likely changes in this core dynamic and
their implications for effective youth service delivery.
The concept of exclusion has been critical here. It
has provided the central dynamic to our understanding
of youth, which we have defined in terms of their
exclusion from participation in key social roles. It has
provided the key evaluative concept for measuring
effectiveness and for establishing what would count as
an improvement or otherwise in the social conditions
of young people. It has enabled us to identify the most
pertinent issues and social indicators that needed to be
factored into the analysis. It has highlighted the kinds
of services that we should be paying most attention to.
And it enables us to identify where we should be giving
most attention if there are specific groups of young
people that need specially targeted provision: that is, to
those most excluded.
The disadvantage of taking this approach is that
this study will not be capable of giving finely-grained
detail on service provision for all those subgroups of
young people with particular needs. For example, we
have not given a comprehensive survey of current
youth policy and provision, and some readers may be
frustrated by this lack of detail. The study is, and must
be, a broad-brush analysis, going for the broadest
trends, the movements in mainstream structures, the
situation for the general youth population. The general
thrust of a study like this will need to be appended by
more specific studies which address young people in
the particular case. Hopefully, however, it will provide
a foundation upon which further research can be
based.
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Introduction
The overarching methodology for the research was based
on the Social Impact Assessment (SIA) framework, which
is designed for systematically assessing and predicting
the social and economic consequences of projects,
programs and policies on people. Craig (1988, p.60), for
example, defined Social Impact Assessment as “an
attempt to predict the future effects of policy decisions
upon people, their physical and psychological health,
well-being and welfare, their traditions, lifestyles, institu-
tions and interpersonal relationships”. 
The first social impact assessments were conducted as
an adjunct to more formal Environmental Impacts
Assessments in the 1970s. Adoption of the methodology
became more widespread, and they are now a statutory
requirement in most Environmental Protection legisla-
tion (Burdge 1995). Over time, the methodology has
spread beyond environmental assessment issues to a
wide variety of settings including policy analysis (Craig
1988), where it has provided a comprehensive and
systematic approach to policy development, assessment,
implementation and evaluation. 
A number of general frameworks have been proposed
to embrace the SIA process (e.g. Burdge 1995;
Finsterbusch 1985; Wolf 1980, 1983). However, the
process described by Taylor, Bryan and Goodrich (1990)
has been the most extensively adopted in Australia, and
incorporates the best features of most available
approaches. 
It proposes six stages.
• Scoping: A preliminary investigation to identify key
issues and stakeholders.
• Profiling: A form of baseline study which describes
the initial conditions of a social impact scenario.
• Formulation of alternatives: Based on data collected
in the first two stages, identifies a number of
potential scenarios (or alternatives).
• Projection and estimation of effects: Identifies and
estimates the effects of each proposed
alternative.
• Monitoring, mitigation and management: Monitors the
effects of any change, mitigates (where possible) the
negative consequences (including unanticipated
effects) and manages the process of change.
• Evaluation: Evaluates the process and outcomes of
both the policy and the SIA process.
These stages are not necessarily implemented in a
linear fashion. In SIA research, techniques and processes
may serve more than one stage concurrently, and a stage
may be revisited at another time using a different data
gathering process. This was the case with this research.
We incorporated three core data-gathering techniques:
statistical analysis, literature search and expert forums,
which we will discuss in more detail below.
As we indicated above, consensus opinion suggests
that data cannot be projected with any degree of mathe-
matical certainty to anywhere near 2015. Most
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researchers in the area accept that statistical data cannot
be projected beyond around three to five years, and
most of the data is already three to five years old. This is
a core problem for researchers attempting to predict the
future. 
In this research we addressed these difficulties by
using a range of different research techniques to explore
possible futures for young people. To rely entirely on
linear statistical projections would obviously result in
conclusions that are inescapably flawed and often
ridiculous. Within the SIA process, the use of different
techniques gave us a look at the data from several
different directions, effectively triangulating our data
sources and so strengthening the conclusions we have
drawn. 
Social Impact Assessment 
of youth services
The methodological framework for the project followed
the first four stages of a Social Impact Assessment
approach. These stages are:
Stages 1 and 2: Scoping and profiling
These two stages were implemented concurrently to
document the key issues and social and economic
changes over the past 15 years. This stage included a
review of relevant social indicators, concentrating on the
period 1981–1998 but not limited to those years. This
was achieved through:
• a thorough survey of available statistical data
including that provided by our research partners at
the Australian Bureau of Statistics, and 
• a survey of the literature including previous statis-
tical analyses. The literature review also included
theoretical perspectives which informed our under-
standing of youth issues, policy and services.
Stage 3: Formulating alternatives
While the assumptions for indicators like demographic
changes are well established, there are a range of possible
alternative futures for young people based on different
sets of assumptions for policy settings and other envi-
ronmental conditions. In this stage we identified the
core indicators necessary for effective projection and
clarified the assumptions that formed the basis of Stage
4. Three sets of assumptions were required. These
assumptions were cast as scenarios and included: 
• a do-nothing scenario
• a worst-case scenario 
• a best-case scenario
Expert forums were convened to generate these
scenarios. We describe how we convened these groups
below.
Stage 4: Projection and estimation effects
Using data provided by the Australian Bureau of
Statistics National Youth Statistics Unit, and other
published and unpublished sources, we projected
selected critical social indicators to the year 2015. This
provided the basis of the quantitative information
required by the brief. While there is a wealth of statis-
tical data available on young people, projection into the
future requires statistics to be collected in the same way
for a number of years. There are far fewer indicators for
which that kind of data is available. In many cases, we
had to rely on non-statistical, qualitative factors. Many
issues are, of course, intrinsically more open to qualita-
tive assessment.
For these indices the expert forums were used to
make projections based on available data, other factors
not anticipated by the data, as well as the expertise of
forum participants. The expertise and experience of the
groups was used to:
• analyse the data; 
• evaluate the assumptions on which the projection
options are based; 
• project youth needs to 2015; and 
• indicate the kinds of services and policies that they
will require.
Given that the situation of young people in 2015 is
partly a function of policy settings now, the expert
forums were also asked to suggest immediate and
realistic policy directions which will minimise negative
social impact into the next millennium. 
The position of young people is also a function of
their own adaptation to changing circumstances. The
expert groups were asked to suggest ways in which
young people can position themselves to be able to
avoid risks and maximise opportunities in the next
decade.
Possibilities for future research
The brief for the project required us to address the four
stages described above. They are, however, only part of
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the SIA process. The final stages of a comprehensive SIA
lie outside the scope of this project, but are nevertheless
important elements of the process that could be (and,
we would argue, should be) implemented in the future.
SIA is a reflective/iterative process in which research and
action based on the research are played out in a
continuing cycle. The outcomes of policy and service
delivery are constantly monitored and any unantici-
pated effects are observed, learned from, and mitigated
if necessary. This process is not included within the
project, and falls to the hands of others to complete. We
do, however, strongly support the need for well-articu-
lated monitoring, mitigation and management plans in
this area, as well as evaluation.
Method
As we noted earlier, the data were collected using three
core data collection methods. 
1: Statistical analysis and projection
of data
The Australian Bureau of Statistics National Youth
Statistics Unit is currently based in Perth. The Unit
entered into a strategic partnership with the research
team to provide up-to-date advice, data and projections
available from census and other ABS data, published or
unpublished. The data formed the basis of the Project’s
scoping and projection procedures, and informed other
data collection processes. The statistical analyses
examined differences between the States where relevant.
The audit included: 
• Demographic changes: including the size of the
youth population; the proportion of the total
population that it represents; movements in
complementary populations such as the aged and
the “dominant” age group (45- to 65-year-olds),
noting that generational succession is a critical
factor in determining services for young people.
• Employment changes: including levels of unem-
ployment and part-time work; changes in the
industries in which young people are predomi-
nantly employed; and other movements in the
youth labour market.
• Education changes: including changes in the
average school-leaving age; participation rates in
non-compulsory education; qualitative changes in
education; and patterns of participation.
• Family changes: including family size and composi-
tion; breakdown and recombination of nuclear
families; age of marriage; alternative marriage
patterns (de facto/common law); patterns of child-
bearing and childrearing.
• Income support and social security changes,
including changes in rates of unemployment
benefits and changes in conditions of eligibility.
• Changes in crime rates and in the administration of
justice: including rates of arrest and conviction;
custodial populations; changing patterns of
sentencing; changing patterns of conviction;
changing policing levels and patterns of policing,
including private police services such as security
guards.
• Health status changes: including drug use, mental
health and suicide.
• Environmental changes: including depletion of
non-renewable resources, the acceleration of non-
renewable energy use, atmospheric changes, land
degradation, and the impact of these factors on the
services required for young people.
Of course, time series data was not available for
several of these indicators, and indeed for some of them
no data was available within the ABS’s collection.
Procedure
The ABS partners met with the NYARS Research Team
for an initial briefing on the aims and objectives of the
research. For the research team this constituted part of
the scoping exercise. The initial briefing clarified the
nature and extent of available data. 
Scoping interviews were also conducted with key
informants from the field to determine what data would
be required of the research team for participants in the
expert forums.  
Subsequent meetings with the ABS partners refined
the extent and dimensions of the data search. 
2: Literature search on young people and 
social change
As noted in the introduction an important dimension of
the theoretical framework for the project was the youth
exclusion literature. The notion of youth exclusion is at
the heart of the analysis for the project and has formed
a continuous theme throughout the report. 
As well as surveying the literature which analyses the
indicators above, an initial literature search was
conducted to document:
• the history of youth, noting that many of the
factors affecting young people over the next 15
years are part of longer-run cycles which may not
be evident from a statistical survey of the last 30
years;
• youth transitions, including rites of passage; and
• generations and generational succession.
Subsequent literature searches focused on the
emerging data. Of particular importance has been the
gathering of reports and study data not generally
available through conventional library sources. For
example, a number of studies have been conducted
concurrently with this research. The outcomes of those
studies, where appropriate, have been incorporated into
this report.
3: Expert forums 
Expert forums have been used extensively to project and
estimate the effects of a variety of projects, policies and
services. They have the distinct advantage of having
considerable face validity. Experts are chosen (see below)
using a purposive sampling technique, precisely because
they have the depth of knowledge and experience from
which they can project or predict future outcomes. In
this research, another strategic partner, the Youth Affairs
Council of Western Australia, selected potential partici-
pants for the forums using the sampling technique
described below. Expert forums were convened in
Canberra, Melbourne, Adelaide and Perth. 
It is critical to understand that there was no attempt
to draw a “representative” sample of informants. Expert
forum participants were chosen for their expertise, not
their representativeness: their capacity to offer expert
opinion on the issues at hand was needed, not their
membership or involvement in any particular
population group or institution. Their qualification to
comment was established through peer recommenda-
tion, in which the researchers had no hand. And while
we did in fact get a good spread of comment (a total of
64 people were involved in the forums), all participants
could, in principle, have come from one population
group or organisation. 
Participants
Participants were chosen by a form of snowball sampling
adapted for elite studies by Higley, Deacon and Smart
(1979), in which experts in a field are identified by their
peers. Known leaders in a field are asked for the names
of five others who they consider to be leaders in the
area. These five are asked for the names of five others.
These are also asked for five names. At the end of this
process, the persons who are named several times will be
invited to participate. The following question was asked:
We are currently working on research to identify the kinds
of youth services which will be needed in the year 2015.
Part of the methodology for this project is to bring together
forums of knowledgeable, experienced, intelligent and
wise persons to interpret and offer commentary on the
statistical data and to suggest what kinds of services
young people will need in 2015. 
We need you to suggest FIVE (5) names of persons in your
State/Territory who might bring their intelligence on
youth, youth issues and youth services to such a forum.
We would like a balance of youth workers, other youth
practitioners, academics and policy makers. They need
not be high status people, although several probably will
be. They probably won’t be novices, though some may be.
They do need to be creative and critical thinkers with a
practical bent and a good sense of what works.
Who do you suggest?
The selection process involved choosing an entry
point (in this case the Youth Affairs Council in each
State/Territory) and asking the Executive Officer to
provide five names of people whom they thought were
able to make a positive and authoritative contribution
to the project. These five were approached and so on as
detailed above. The process continued until a large
enough sample (20) had been generated. Participants
were selected on the basis of having been named at least
three times.
The final sample was an interesting group of people,
and in many ways an unexpected group. We expected
an “elite” group including high-ranking public servants,
leading youth researchers, executive officers of peak
bodies, and managers of large youth services organisa-
tions. 
We did get several of these kinds of people.
However, the process also pulled in face-to-face youth
workers, students, youth service coordinators, young
people who had been in care, Aboriginal people, South
East Asian refugees, local government workers, trainers,
academics (especially if you include members of the
research team who participated), secretariat staff and
office bearers from youth, student and migrant peak
bodies, police officers, youth accommodation workers,
health workers, members of the Youth Roundtable,
employment and training workers and private consul-
tants.
There were a number of features of the participants
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which made for an interesting profile. There was a good
balance of gender and age, with young people strongly
represented, especially in Western Australia and South
Australia. While there was representation from
culturally and linguistically diverse groups, the repre-
sentation did not include all major ethnic groupings.
Aboriginal people were represented, but not widely. 
Given that this methodology was not designed to
deliver a representative sample, but to draw a Delphi
kind of expert group, the actual composition of the
total sample is felicitous. We were especially pleased
with the numbers of young people who had been
selected. The forums were strong in the number of
youth work practitioners or people who had been prac-
titioners in the past. They were weak in representation
of other professional groups, and in this context,
especially school teachers or education department
officials, although there was no shortage of educators
generally. In the end, we made sure that the absence of
school teachers was not a problem by inviting review
and comment on the relevant chapter from experts in
education within the university. 
Procedure
Prior to the Forums each participant received a compre-
hensive briefing paper outlining the background to the
study and providing a summary of relevant theoretical
and statistical data. The expert forums were all co-facili-
tated by members of the research team. Each forum was
conducted using a standardised format to ensure consis-
tency. 
Limitations and reflections on the methodology
Overall, methodology achieved the stated aims and
objectives. The process has good face validity. There
was a high degree of consistency in the data gathered
from all sources, including the expert forums.
Nevertheless, reflection on the methodology of the
project yielded a number of insights and potential limi-
tations.
The limitations of the statistical data have already
been referred to above. Given the difficulty of
predicting from a limited range of time series that are
already old, the statistical data can only be seen as
indicative of the state of affairs in 2015. Indeed, as we
indicate in the Introduction, the choice of 2015 as a
point for analysis requires us to move beyond mere
mathematical projection.
The sample produced by the selection methodology
was not quite what we expected. There was a significant
number of practicing youth workers, and fewer partici-
pants (except in Canberra) from the government sector,
especially from education departments. Some high
profile figures in academia, the bureaucracy or the
community sector were not nominated at all, and that
was interesting. However, we felt that it was not appro-
priate to corrupt the methodological process by
compensating for these omissions by direct invitation.
In the case of the lack of teachers in the selection, we
triangulated our analysis by inviting Associate Professor
Bill Louden (School of Education, Edith Cowan
University) to review the chapter on Education and to
make suggestions, which were incorporated in the final
draft. Some individual interviews with Government
officials were also undertaken. The findings have also
been subject to extensive review by a range of stake-
holders involved in the NYARS review process, and
many of their suggestions and criticisms have been
incorporated in the Report.
Participants did not always understand the signifi-
cance of their selection, sometimes seeing the process
in representative terms, and in two or three cases,
where they could not attend, sent a colleague in their
place. In one other case, the participant invited a
colleague who was not selected. However, this partici-
pant, a leading Aboriginal voice on young people,
turned out to be a key informant in the process.
Attendance was a problem generally, with many
experts being unable to take the time out for the
workshops. This was a function partly of how well
participants understood the project and their place
within it, and was a particular problem in Melbourne.
However, notwithstanding these difficulties, the
final list across the states/territories was very useful, and
the data generated by the forums was of high quality.
While individual forums may not always have been
well-balanced, there was a balance across the whole
sample which we could not have engineered. Given that
the data is presented in a composite fashion, and that
differences between the views expressed in different
states were not significant, it is probably the makeup of
the sample as a whole that is most important.
In future, if we were to run a similar process, we
would select multiple entry points, including core
government departments, universities and perhaps the
major churches. This may need more iterations in order
to produce a common number of names. Running the
workshops in two sessions, the first to work with the
data and the second to project the data into future
scenarios and service projections, might have resolved
the difficulty for participants finding a whole day to
become involved.
PART TWO:
TRENDS2
3Youth and the future: Effective youth services for the year 2015 25
Logically, the process of projection into the futurefor an age-based population group like youthbegins with demographics: how many young
people there will be, how this relates to other
population groups, what kinds of dynamics we can
expect as a result. The Australian Bureau of Statistics
has done a lot of work in the area of population projec-
tions, probably because many other types of forecast,
such as economic forecasts, depend on those numbers. 
Part of the current situation for young people is
that, relatively speaking, there are a lot of them, and
have been for a few years. Birth rates increased steadily
from the end of the Second World War up until the
1960s (the contraceptive pill was introduced in 1965),
and this has produced a bulge in the teenage section of
the population which is only now starting to decline.
This oversupply of teenagers has been one of the major
causes of youth unemployment, and has arguably led
to a range of other tensions including competition for
university places and overcrowding in schools. 
The data on the population demographics and its
projections are also among the most comprehensive
and reliable of the sets of statistical data available to
this research. In the modern world, we don’t have to
worry so much about the population effects of plague
and famine, natural disaster or war, and can make
reasonably accurate assumptions on things like the
birth and death rates and the rate of immigration and
emigration.
Notwithstanding this, the Australian Bureau of
Statistics has a range of different population projec-
tions based on different combinations of birth and
death rates (natural increase) and immigration and
emigration (net migration). Generally, however, the
bureau works with three core projections: 
• Series 1: Immigration 90,000, low internal
migration, fertility rate – falls to 1.75 births per
woman around 2005–06 and then remains
constant.
• Series 2: Immigration 70,000, medium internal
migration, fertility rate – falls to 1.75 births per
woman around 2005–06 and then remains
constant.
• Series 3: Immigration 70,000, high internal
migration, fertility rate – falls to 1.6 births per
woman around 2005–06 and then remains
constant.
Generally we will be working with the moderate
immigration, moderate birthrate scenario predicted by
the Series 2 data.
In the recent past, about half of Australia’s
population growth has come from natural increase and
about half from immigration. Annual growth has been
variable, but generally in the range of 1%–1.5% per
annum.
THREE:
DEMOGRAPHICS
Existing trends in
population dynamics
Australia has an interesting demographic profile. Like
most other western industrial nations, Australia is a
low birthrate nation whose birthrate at any point is
below replacement level. Unlike the other nations,
however, Australia has a significant capacity for
population growth, which we have pursued over the
past 50 years through a tightly controlled immigration
policy. This has meant that we are not at the mercy of
factors like births and deaths for our population
profile. Because Australia is and is likely to remain
attractive to immigrants, our situation allows us to
manage population growth and population profile
(including age, gender, skill levels and cultural orienta-
tion) by managing the annual inflow of immigrants
(Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
1999; McLennan 1998). Immigration is not always
politically popular. But despite the sometimes fierce
level of public debate, the level of migration has stayed
remarkably stable over the past 15 years, even though
the ethnic profile of migrants has changed substan-
tially.
Like most western industrial nations, Australia’s
demographic profile is changing. These changes across
the West have been widely documented both in the
academic literature and in the popular press. The core
dynamic for most European countries comes from the
“baby boom” immediately after World War II, resulting
from deferred childbearing through the war years (and
to some extent the Depression preceding it), a sense of
urgency about re-populating countries affected by the
war, and increasing affluence throughout the post-war
years. The baby boom produced a significant bulge in
population associated with the generational cohort
that is now aged between 45 and 60, the “baby
boomers”. There were also flow-on effects in the so-
called “echo of the baby boom”, where there was a
corresponding bulge, albeit shallower and more diffuse,
in the next generation, the children of the baby
boomers.
The general anxiety for population planners in the
West is that as the baby boomers move into retirement
and old age, they will present an increasing burden on
economies both because the elderly are expensive in
terms of health care and income support, and because
the productive base of the economies will be shrinking.
In short, a smaller number of workers in their
productive years will be have to support, through
taxation, a larger number of unproductive members.
The population pyramid will be mushroom-shaped.
It is important to recognise that Australia’s profile is
quite different to countries in Europe and America (see,
for example, McLennan 1999; Young & Day 1995). In
Australia, there was a slight baby boom bulge, but it is
more accurate to say that birth rates rose pretty much
in a linear fashion up until the mid 1960s. After that,
they stabilised, and then started to decline quite
sharply.3
The bulge in population in the 65- to 77-year-old
cohort is perhaps the most significant feature of the
postwar situation, and appears to relate to the increase
the number of individuals who migrated to Australia as
adults immediately postwar. Their children contribute
to the immediate postwar peak and to the bulges in the
next generation. 
The diagram indicates that Australia has had a very
young population comparatively speaking, and our
elderly populations have always been small. This has
given us the classic “pyramid” shape indicated in
Figure 3.1. As a result, the ageing of Australia’s
population is likely to give us a much more “normal”
age profile, a “beehive-shaped” population pyramid in
which the numbers in each age range are reasonably
balanced, albeit with a constriction in the youngest age
groups (see Figure 3.2). This “beehive-shaped” profile is
the one that demographers prefer, because it is
reasonably stable and self-sustaining, and the resources
needed to be allocated to each age group are reasonably
constant over time. Australia has the luxury of being
able to engineer this profile, and to maintain it,
through managing immigration. The ageing of the
Australian population actually moves us closer towards
this ideal (Young & Day 1995). 
Figure 3.2 shows the changes in population
between 1997 and 2021 for each age group. The graph
also makes it possible to compare the size of each age
group over time. It indicates pretty clearly that the
youth population is not going to change that much,
and that while there will be an increase in the older
population, the number of people in their productive
years will be sustained.
However, this does still mean that Australia’s
population is ageing. The numbers of older people will
increase both numerically and as a proportion of the
population. 
This larger population will require more resources,
and make more demands both economically and politi-
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Figure 3.1  Population pyramid, Australia, 1911 and 1997
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cally on the public purse. While the numbers of young
people are expected to stay relatively constant, the
youth population will decline as a proportion of the
population – from around 17% at present to around
13% in the year 2015 (Carlton & Mobila 1997) – as the
population at large grows. 
This decline may have implications for issues like
youth unemployment. Because of the declining supply
of young workers, it may be easier for them to get jobs.
But the demographic profile may also mean that the
competitive position of young people within society
actually declines as young people compete with older
sections of the population for jobs, housing, educa-
tional places and political influence. 
The relative decline in the youth population also
may be compensated for by changes in the youth category
itself. The relative decline in the proportion of 15- to
25-year-olds in the population may be compensated for
by the increasing inclusion of 25- to 30-year-olds in the
youth population (see chapter 11). At the other end,
the earlier onset of puberty that has been a feature of
changes in human development in the West this
century may well also move the pointer down the
scale. Twelve and 13-year-olds are much more biologi-
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Figure 3.2  Population projections by age, 1997 to 2021 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics 1999 #718
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cally developed than they have been in the past. They
are increasingly seeing themselves, and are seen by
others, as “youth”. This downward extension of the
youth category may have significant implications for
service delivery, in both directions.
Migration
Australia, since colonisation, has been a country
founded on immigration. Since that time Australia has
assiduously managed immigration policy to achieve
social ends. One in five people in Australia was born
overseas, many from non-English-speaking origins
(Cohen, O’Connor & Bishop, in press) However it has
not always been that way. For most of this century,
immigrants have been mostly British born. Table 3.1
shows the UK born proportion of the Australian
population from 1861 to 1996.
The proportion of British born dropped dramatically
from 1861 to around 1947 and since has remained
relatively stable at around 7%. On the other hand, since
the White Australia policy was abandoned there has
been a steady increase in immigration from Asian
countries. This is indicated by Table 3.2, which shows
the top ten countries from which settlers have arrived.
Clearly, while the trend is for migration levels to be
reasonably stable, the composition of the migrant
intake has become more and more varied and multi-
cultural. Ethnic diversity, on current trends, is a core
feature of Australia’s future.
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Table 3.1 Australians born in United Kingdom as a
percentage of the total Australian population,
1861–1996 
Census Total Australian UK-born UK-born as % 
year population of total Australian 
population
1861 1145600 630107 54.7
1871 1647800 673517 40.5
1881 2231500 689642 30.6
1891 3151400 826419 26.0
1901 3774000 679159 18.0
1911 4425100 591729 13.3
1921 5411300 674471 12.4
1933 6629839 713422 10.8
1947 7579358 541961 7.2
1954 8986530 635035 7.1
1961 10508186 718345 6.8
1966 11599000 870548 7.5
1971 12755600 1046356 8.2
1976 13548500 1070232 7.9
1981 14926800 1086625 7.5
1986 15788300 1083150 6.9
1991 16852258 1107119 6.6
1996 17892423 1415419 7.9
Reproduced with permission from Cohen et al. (in press)
Table 3.2 Top ten source countries of settler arrivals
Country of birth 1965–66 Country of birth 1975–76 Country of birth 1985–86 Country of birth 1995–96
UK 74749 UK 16687 UK 14709 New Zealand 12265
Greece 15153 New Zealand 2921 New Zealand 13284 UK 11268
Italy 11420 Cyprus 2855 Vietnam 7168 China 11247
Yugoslavia 8081 Chile 1905 Philippines 4128 Hong Kong 4361
Malta 4298 Yugoslavia 1804 China 3138 India 3700
Germany 3751 Lebanon 1519 South Africa 3132 Vietnam 3567
USA 2326 Greece 1489 Hong Kong 3118 Bosnia-Herz. 3405
New Zealand 2200 USA 1432 Lebanon 2757 Philippines 3232
Netherlands 2146 Italy 1365 Malaysia 2284 South Africa 3190
Lebanon 1625 Malaysia 1201 India 2135 Iraq 2617
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1998
The Indigenous population
At the time of colonisation it is estimated that there
were some 300,000 to 350,000 Aboriginal people living
in Australia. In the period between British settlement
and 1900 the population dropped markedly to less
than 100,000. Since that time the numbers remained
relatively stable until the 1960s when there was a
gradual increase.
In 1996 census data reported the number of
Indigenous Australians at 386,048, slightly above the
estimates at the time of European settlement. Figure
3.3 provides a breakdown of the Indigenous population
by age in 1996.
The chart indicates a population with a much
younger profile than the general Australian population.
Younger populations also tend to be high-growth, and
this is certainly true for the Indigenous population. The
growth may well be even higher as more people of
Aboriginal descent identify as Indigenous. Plans for
youth service delivery will need to be especially
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attentive to the Indigenous population, and to be
aware that in dealing with Indigenous young people
they are dealing with a very sizeable proportion of that
population. Therefore, policy and service interventions
with young people, for better or worse, are likely to
have stronger flow-on effects to the Indigenous
community as a whole.
Future projections
The Australian Bureau of Statistics’ Series 2 projections
for the period 1997 to 2051 indicate continual growth
in the period to 2015 to a population of around 21.8
million persons. Differences in preferred location for
new immigrants and substantial internal migration are
expected to result in different levels of growth in state
populations. New South Wales is expected to remain
the most populous state, but Queensland is expected to
overtake Victoria as the second most populous state by
around 2030. The population of South Australia is
expected to start to decline sometime between 2006
and 2029. Tasmania is expected to decline continu-
ously through the period. All states except Tasmania
and South Australia are expected to grow continuously
in the period to 2015, with the highest growth in the
Northern Territory, Queensland and Western Australia.
Current trends in the drift from the country to the city
are expected to continue for at least the next 15 years,
though there may be a move back to semi-rural
communities close to the cities as telework and other
information technology based forms of work become
more significant.
With low numbers of children and not yet high
numbers of aged people, the bulk of Australia’s
population will continue to be of working age. While
this will mean that Australia is unlikely to face a serious
problem with the costs of maintaining an ageing
population, it will also mean that labour market partic-
ipation rates will remain high. As a result, depending
on movements in the economy, we would expect that
unemployment will continue to be on the agenda. 
Generational tension
In the introductory chapter, we indicated that genera-
tional relations are a significant dynamic in
understanding the position of young people in society
and in planning for youth services. Analysis of the
demographics does give some indications of what we
might expect in terms of relationships between genera-
tions. Demographically, the future for young people
depends on the population changes in and between:
• the 15- to 24-year-old cohort;
• the 45- to 65-year-old cohort (those with whom
much of the control of access to resources and
power resides); and
• the over-65 cohort (those who depend on
personally accrued or government funded
resources provided by the working age
population).
We have charted the relative changes in popula-
tions of different generations in Figure 3.4.
As we noted earlier, the total numbers of 15- to 24-
year-olds is expected to remain substantially constant.
The number of persons of working age (15- to 65-year-
olds) increases by around two million persons during
the period. The number of persons over 65 years,
however, only increases by about one million, and the
increase comes a bit later due to the time lags involved
in ageing immigrant populations. 
Figure 3.4 also indicates the relative size of the
population each year between the ages of 45 and 65.
This population is significant in terms of a generational
analysis of blocked youth transitions because it is this
group that holds most of the positional power in
society. Frank Musgrove’s analysis (1964) indicates that
changes in population size of this group have “knock-
on” effects for those who are younger. Briefly,
Musgrove argues that an inflated population in the 45
to 65 age group can result in increased competition for
positional power, and measures taken by the power-
holders to monopolise positions of power by blocking
the rising generation from moving into these kinds of
roles. 
This dynamic can result in frustration within the
rising generation (Musgrove’s examples are the “beat
generation” of the 1960s and the suffragettes, the new
cohort of educated women which came into adulthood
in the 1920s) leading to political activism or alienation
in the young, and increasing hostility and repression
directed towards the young by the older generation to
keep them at bay. Increased political activism is made
more likely also because young people will be “youth”
for longer. One of the major inhibitions on youth as a
political force is that they grow up, become engaged in
the economy, in the process of marrying, buying a
house and raising a family, and the stakes for political
dissent become higher. In 2015, with late marriage,
delayed childbearing and an extended life as a student
(noting that students are classically the group most
likely to generate alternative forms of political action)
we would expect an increase in young people’s political
action. The contrary indicator is that political action by
the young is also a function of affluence (Keniston
1971), and we cannot see any clear indications that
widespread affluence will be a feature of the lives of
young people within this time scale.
The above projections indicate that the 45- to 65-
year-old populations will increase in size relative to the
15- to 24-year-old population over the period 1999 to
2015. If Musgrove is right, the kind of generational
tension that he observed within his study is likely to be
evident in the year 2015. 
Projections in immigration
Immigration trends are a function of government
policy. While the overall rate of immigration has been
relatively stable over the last decade or so, a number of
factors may put pressure on immigration rates.
Demographically, the greatest concern comes from
Australia’s falling fertility rate. While a sustainable and
age-balanced population can be maintained by immi-
gration, if the natural birth rate falls too low, the levels
of immigration needed to supplement the population
may be in danger of exceeding the nation’s social,
economic and infrastructural capacity to absorb them.
At the global level, Australia is currently under a
great deal of pressure to accept increasing numbers of
humanitarian refugees as a result of conflicts in Iran,
the Balkans, and East Africa, among other places. The
process of decolonisation is still running its course, and
we would expect this pressure to be sustained if not
increased over the next decade and a half. 
Australia is in the position of being able to exercise
some choice over its levels of immigration. However,
we expect the choices to become more difficult in the
next few years as pressures on policy-making increase.
Projections in Indigenous populations
As we indicated above, the Indigenous population is
expected to grow significantly faster than the general
population over the next 15 years. Projected
population changes for the Indigenous community are
consistent across age groups and states, with a
projected increase by over one-third from the 1996
figures. A state by state analysis (Figure 3.6) shows that
the greatest population increases are expected in NSW
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(121% increase) and Queensland (92% increase).
Population increases in the other States are substan-
tially lower. The greatest growth will be in the younger
age groups with increases in the over 60 age groups
much more modest. This is indicated in Figure 3.5 and
3.6.
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1999c
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Summary
Australian population growth is expected to be slow
and steady over the next 15 years and more. It is effec-
tively controlled, on a year by year basis, through the
management of net incoming migration. Interstate
migration, therefore, is the main demographic source
of short-term changes in social, cultural and economic
scenarios. The number of young people aged 15 to 24
years is expected to be stable, and so direct demo-
graphic pressures on youth service delivery will not be
significant. However, more 25- to 30-year-olds will be
included in the youth category. Changes in the
numbers of young people are not a significant factor in
the choice of efficient youth services for the future,
although the changing age of youth service users will
be. The distribution of these services across Australia
may well need some attention. Because the ratio of
working-age persons to young people is likely to
increase, the tax base needed to fund services for young
people is unlikely to suffer serious erosion, at least not
from demographic forces (McLennan 1998).
Over the next 15 years, the proportions of children,
young people, working-age persons, and retired people
will change. The population will become weighted
towards working age and retired people. It is possible
that the problems ascribed to youth may become less
visible as the number of young people as a proportion
of the youth population declines. These changes could
result in young people becoming more valued, and
future youth services may become more valued in turn.
However, we suspect that the intensification of the
youth category due to the extension of the age range
and continued difficulty in accreditation as adult will
mean that a more positive view of young people is
unlikely to be a natural result of demographic changes.
Already a strongly multicultural society, Australia is
likely to become more so over the next 15 years, with
the trend towards more migrants coming from non-
English-speaking countries continuing. This is likely to
be intensified with increasing demands for humani-
tarian resettlement. 
The Indigenous population, young and with high
rates of fertility, is expected to grow much faster than
the general population. A much higher proportion of
that population will be children and young people
than is the case for Australia as a whole, indicating the
need for special attention in youth service delivery. 
The data indicates that conclusions drawn in other
nations in relation to a post-World War II baby boom
cannot be readily applied to the Australian situation. In
the Australian demographic context, concerns that the
relatively low number of young people must later
eventuate in a shortage of working age persons are
unfounded mainly because of levels of incoming
migration. This means that the consequences of such a
scenario – that there will be little funding raised by
taxes to support an ageing population – also appear
unlikely.
The data indicates that efficient youth service
provision in 2015 is unlikely to be shaped by primary
demographic forces such as a surge or collapse in the
number of 15- to 25-year-olds. The main factors that
are likely to shape choices for efficient youth services
are those that originate in the social, political, cultural,
economic and technological arenas.
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Introduction: education, youth and
exclusion4
The core institution established for the governance of
young people over the past 150 years has been the
public secondary school. From small beginnings in the
English public schools established for the sons of the
middle classes, public secondary schooling has progres-
sively been extended across class, race and gender
lines, and deeper and deeper into young adulthood.
The youth category in the modern world can be fairly
said to be a creation of the secondary school (Bessant
et al. 1998). 
As an institution for the control of young people,
the secondary school has been remarkably successful. It
has contained a population now excluded from the
production process, it has supplied an educated and
disciplined work force, and it has kept young people
off the streets. Notwithstanding this, the failure rate of
school is still significant, and the social and economic
penalties for the minority of young people unable to
be contained by the school are escalating (Social
Exclusion Unit 1999). 
The modern concept of youth is primarily a
function of schooling, and secondary schooling in
particular. Cross-cultural and colonial studies have
noticed the difference that the introduction of
secondary schooling made to populations that didn’t
have a “youth” category, or only a very weak one.
Introduce a high school and before your eyes, a
“teenage” population emerges (e.g. Peterson 1976). 
The shape of the youth category in the year 2015
will fundamentally be a function of what happens with
schooling. Special attention needs to be given to the
question of what happens with those young people
who are unable to construct a sustainable relationship
with school.
School and education
As a number of commentators (most notably Ivan
Illich) have noticed, schooling and education are not
the same thing. Education is one of the things that
schools do. There are lots of other institutions that
educate – like the family, the firm, the media, the
church, the peer group. There is a broad range of
opinion about whether schooling – the process of
having same-age groups of people sitting together in a
room, learning in structured ways under the instruc-
tion of a professional teacher – is the best way to
educate people, or even the cheapest. 
Schools also do a lot of other things besides
education. A major agenda for schools is also always
control. This occurs both through and around the
4 We would like to thank Assoc Prof Bill Louden, School of
Education, Edith Cowan University, for his incisive and helpful
comments on this chapter.
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curriculum. Learning that Captain Cook discovered
Australia in 1770 involves more than the retention of a
historical “fact”. It establishes the right of colonisation
by British (rather than French or German) forebears, it
relegates the Indigenous inhabitants to the margins,
and is an essential component both of the Australian
myth of origin and the narrative of nationhood. It
helps students learn how to “be” Australian, to give
loyalty to the “nation”, and to live within its
boundaries. It helps people construct and comply with
what Anderson (1983) called the “imaginary
community” of Australia.
But the process of sitting and listening (or reading
or drawing or making a diorama) is just as important.
The body becomes used to being in one place for an
extended time, to responding to bells or sirens, to
clocking on and clocking off, to permitted “non-work”
time which establishes naturally compulsory “work”
time, to completing tasks as instructed. Standard
templates of power relations (between teacher and
student, teacher and principal, student and student
leader/representative) are also digested along with
Captain Cook. 
These varying functions of the school – what we
might call the educative functions versus the discipli-
nary functions – may not necessarily be in tune with
each other. Various disciplinary techniques may make
students resistant to learning, or may contradict
components of the curriculum. The focus on order may
not be consistent with things we know about how
differently different people learn.
The modern secondary school is still fundamentally
governed according to templates laid down by the
English public schools of the 19th century, which
themselves reach back to the mediaeval monasteries of
the 12th century. There are snowballing pressures on
the school to adapt and change, in the face of transfor-
mative information technology, rapid change, and
increasingly strident demands by industry for just-in-
time, fully operational labour. The modern secondary
school grew in partnership with the factory as the
primary site of production. The factory and the
assembly-line is now increasingly obsolete as a place of
production, and schools will change in response.
Information technology will certainly be part of this
change. The obvious direction is for classroom-based
instruction to become less and less dominant as the
major means of pedagogy as computer-based learning
becomes more universal, and as course materials are
improved, standardised and more widely available. A
change like this in the mode of instruction would also
change the disciplinary environment of the school, as
the primary mode of relationship changes from face-
the-front, teacher-driven interaction to more individual
study using autonomous information discovery
learning processes. 
In turn, young people will themselves change in
response to their different disciplining. Exactly how
young people will be different is a little hard to project.
But the change from being ingesters of knowledge to
being gatherers of knowledge will certainly leave a
psychological and social imprint.
It is easy to say that schools will change. However,
the school has been a central pillar of social stability in
the West, and societies will be reluctant to embrace
radical change in how their children are to be looked
after and how their children’s futures are to be secured.
Schooling and teaching have proved remarkably
resilient. As Tyack and Cuban argue, “the story of
educational reform … is, for the most part, a story of
nervous movement from one fad to another, with little
enduring effect on teaching practice” (1995, p.290).
Certainly, it will be difficult to let go of the disciplinary
process that classroom-based instruction delivers. 
We can expect more “alternative” schools, schools
that are increasingly adaptive to new demands and
new constituencies, and increasing tension as
education authorities try to make a mediaeval structure
adaptive to the pressures of the 21st century. How both
educative and disciplinary functions will be
maintained and reconciled within whatever new
structures evolve is hard to predict. But the chances are
that we will see schools evolving, rather than being
replaced, as the primary means of disciplining the
youth population. The data, both statistical and
otherwise, indicate some of the directions that schools
are likely to take.
Existing trends in education for
young people
The statistical data collected by the Australian Bureau
of Statistics is collected separately for the 15 to 19 and
20 to 24 age groups. This age breakdown corresponds
very roughly with the different educational regimes of
secondary (typically 15- to 18-year-olds) and tertiary
education (18- to 22-year-olds) respectively. There are
significant differences in the relationship of these
groups to the education system. Far more 19- to 24-
year-olds are engaged in the work force. More are
involved in part-time education, and in mixes of work
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and education. Many more are living independently,
and are responsible for their own futures. Many of the
pressures facing tertiary education systems are
different, at least in degree, to secondary education.
However, there are substantial similarities, and
while there may be differences of degree, many of the
trends are in the same direction, whether it be in terms
of participation rates, equity issues, technology,
marketisation and privatisation, and the mix of public
and private resourcing for education. Consequences for
young people in these different age groups may again
differ in degree, but the general directions hold.
School retention rates
The baseline trend datum about young people and
education is the extraordinary increase in school
retention rates at all levels over the past 20 years. In
1984, 38% of 15- to 25-year-olds were involved in
education. By 1994, it had increased to 48.4% – an
increase of 27% over the figure 10 years earlier. It had
been even higher, reaching a peak in 1991. Year 12
retention and enrolment at university were particularly
spectacular, with Year 12 enrolment growing by two-
thirds between 1984 and 1994, and young people’s
enrolment at university by almost 80% in the same
period.
This was a result of a range of forces. High youth
unemployment rates meant that the opportunity cost
of further education was low, and many young people
considered that they would be more likely to be
competitive in the labour market with higher qualifica-
tions. Increased retention was an overt Government
policy objective. Increased retention not only reduced
official unemployment rates and increased an
individual’s chances of finding a job, but, governments
argued, a more educated work force would attract inter-
national capital to Australian shores. 
Figure 4.1 quantifies school retention rates to Year
12, and indicates gender differences between them.
Movements in participation in tertiary education
follow a similar trend, with the percentage of 15- to 
24-year-olds attending higher education almost
doubling between 1988 and 1998. 
The fundamental consequence of increased school
retention is an extension of the youth category, effec-
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Figure 4.1 Year 12 school retention rates – all Australia
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tively redefining its scope. In a situation such as the
1970s in Australia, where most young people left
school at 15 and entered the work force, and only a
small minority continued to Years 11/12 and through
into university, the process of accreditation as adult
was well under way by 17 or 18. Communities with
this pattern will generally find young people leaving
home, marrying, having children and demonstrating a
range of “adult” roles earlier, all things being equal. 
Where the typical school leaving age moves to 18,
the engagement of young people in these roles follows.
This is partly a consequence of economic necessity:
while still at school, young people do not have the
economic resources to live independently or to assert
adult roles. But it is also a function of their institu-
tional location: engagement in full-time education is a
powerful symbolic indicator of a person’s status as
youth.
The expectation that the youth category will be
pushed further up the age range is not an observation
that is restricted to educational processes. It is
reinforced by trends in employment, and in living
arrangements such as age of leaving home, and the age
of marriage and of the birth of a first child. As such, the
extension of the youth category represents the
strongest and most significant projection of this
research, and the movement with the strongest impli-
cations for service delivery. Because the social
indicators that point to this movement are deeply
interlinked, the extension of the youth category
requires an extensive discussion in its own right. This
occurs in chapter 11.
From the point of view of education and schooling,
however, a range of other observations were indicated
by the literature and/or the expert forums.
Credentialism and the inflation
of qualifications
One consequence of near-universal formal education to
18 years is that upper-secondary school graduation
becomes an expected norm for the purposes of
employment or further study. This has two effects.
First, it will place those young people who have not
successfully completed Year 12 at much greater
comparative disadvantage: effectively at the same
status as those who fail to complete Year 10 now.
Given that failure in school is highly correlated with a
range of contributing risk factors including poverty,
there is serious risk of cumulative disadvantage for
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those young people who for whatever reason have
been unable to develop a constructive relationship
with school. The bottom rung is further off the ground
than it was, and will likely move further up in the
future.
The second effect is that it contributes to an
inflation of qualifications. Part of the Federal
Government’s logic in encouraging young people to
stay at school has been the observably lower rates of
unemployment as you go up the education ladder. But
as more young people go up the ladder, unemploy-
ment rates follow them. Figure 4.2 indicates rates of
unemployment for young people with different levels
of qualification. While unemployment rates are
obviously and predictably lower for higher-qualified
people, the relativities between people with different
levels of qualification don’t change that dramatically.
The unemployment rate for graduates increased 95%
between 1989 and 1993, compared with 86% for those
with no post-secondary qualifications. The rate for
graduates dropped 60% between 1993 and 1998
compared with 63% for those with no post-school
qualifications: about the same. Relative movements up
or down are similar for graduates and those with no
post-secondary qualifications. 
One implication of this is that inflation in educa-
tional qualifications will result in higher
unemployment rates for more qualified people. Or to
put it another way, unemployed people will be much
better educated than they used to be. Expert forums
noted the possibility of a range of social consequences
of this, including increased political activity.  
Future projections
The centrality of the school in the lives of
young people
In the year 2015, if current trends continue, it is
probable that virtually all 15- to 18-year-olds will be at
school. Already, there are moves in South Australia to
increase the formal compulsory school leaving age to
18. For several years now, there has been a growing
certainty in government that the late teenage years are
to be spent in education and training: that there
should be no expectation that people should be
engaged principally in employment at this time of
their lives. We do not expect this conviction to be
easily reversed, at least not while there continues to be
an adequate supply (or surplus) of labour in the
market.
This trend involves the retention of wider
constituencies of young people that would previously
have left at the age of 14 or 15. Homelessness, periodic
detention, problematic drug use, transient lifestyles,
psychiatric illness, physical disability, membership of
cultural or ethnic groupings not well understood or
accommodated by the school, lack of parental support,
the need to support parents or other siblings, and
especially poverty may all make engagement with the
school tenuous and fragile (McLennan 1997, p.49). 
School life for many young people is not particularly
happy or productive: it is not difficult to find young
people who hate school and schools who hate them. For
a significant minority of young people, the circum-
stances of their lives may not have been conducive to an
easy relationship with schooling. Historically, legislation
was designed to expedite the exclusion of difficult young
people from school, even where they were below school
leaving age. This practice is already under pressure.
Policies such as the Students at Educational Risk policies
in Western Australia (and, indeed, the new Education
Act in that State overall) are increasingly requiring
schools to develop strategies for the retention of all
students of compulsory age. 
Difficult as this is, it becomes even more difficult if
compulsory schooling is extended to 18 years. The
frequency and variety of challenging circumstances
faced by older teenagers is greater than those for people
in their early teenage years. For example, parenthood is
rare among under-15s but significantly more common
among older teenagers. Problematic drug use, home-
lessness, same-sex attraction, imprisonment,
psychiatric illness, and responsibility for dependent
others all increase in frequency with age.
Secondary schools are currently not well placed to
deal with this range of social circumstances. Their
capacity to engage with the contexts out of which
students come to school is severely limited. In the past,
they have been able to restrict their interventions to
educational ones, and if a student was unable to meet
the requirements of school for whatever reason,
exclusion was an option. Increasingly, that involves
condemning a young person to a life on the margins,
unqualified and uncredentialled, with the mainstream
economy out of reach.
Schools are already being asked to meet these
challenges, though mostly without any increase in
resources. The question of capacity must be addressed,
both by increasing the degree of linkage between
schools and resources available more generally in the
community and by increasing capacity within schools
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themselves. Current experiments with full-service
schools seem a step in the right direction, and we will
be discussing these more fully below. 
Beyond the move to full–service schools, a greater
capacity for information and referral out of the school
context into the wider community and human service
context seems to be required. Typically, both by
training and experience, youth workers have strongly
developed professional skills in information and
referral, but have not yet found a recognised place
within the professional support teams serving
secondary schools. There are signs that this could be
changing, with some schools currently employing
youth workers as part of school pastoral teams. This is a
move towards developing an increased capacity for
information and referral which should be encouraged.
The other major change taking place in the
Australian education system is the move to middle
schools. Currently, the major division in schooling is
between primary school and high school, with young
people moving from one to the other at about 12 and
staying in high school until they are 17 or 18. The
movement to middle schools (school Years 6 to 9)
aggregates students for whom puberty is imminent or
establishing itself on the one hand, and students who
are biologically adult on the other. This has the
structural effect of separating out adolescents from
youth, and establishing the youth category even more
firmly as a group of biological adults for whom social
adulthood has not been conferred.
The school and the New Economy 
Part of the adaptive challenge for schools in the next
15 years is to learn how to adapt to the different work
environment which is now emerging. Expert forums
were particularly concerned that schools were
operating with notions of employment and other
economic engagement that belonged to the Industrial
Revolution. Current discourse appears still to be that if
you work hard at school, you will get a job. A future in
which mixes of part-time work, study and enterprise
are much more likely to be the norm have not yet
filtered through to the teaching practices of schools,
although there are some clear exceptions. The current
process of the classroom, much of which is centred
around obedience and submission, needs to be
reshaped to foster initiative, enterprise and the ability
to learn things that are not already known.
Our contributors considered that this required a
secondary schooling experience in which students were
much more strongly linked to a range of enterprises
outside the school, both commercial and community-
based (Gamage 1996). However, the relationship
between the school and the enterprise needed to be
developed in critical ways. It was not just a matter of
work experience, in which students learnt how the
enterprise worked, but a critical and educative
experience in which fundamental questions needed to
be raised and problems needed to be addressed. How
can the perennial funding crisis of this community
agency be fixed? How can this business expand its
market? How can the environmental risks posed by this
plant be minimised? How could this firm deal with its
workers so that they were happier to work there?
Participants in the expert forums were of the
opinion that schools have often been used over the last
15 years as “holding pens” for a youth cohort unable to
be accommodated in the labour market. Successful
schooling in the future will facilitate an active
engagement with the world. In turn, our commenta-
tors suggested that the next 15 years will produce
young people who are very clever indeed, able to think
independently and critically, to identify the informa-
tion they need and seek it out, and to be able to
evaluate the quality of information they receive.
Marketisation and privatisation of schools
There are also pressures currently for the marketisation
and privatisation of the school sector. Marketisation, in
which education systems are structured to create a
“market” for education in which individual schools
compete for students and for income, is already under
way in several states. Privatisation, in which
government schools are sold to private business, and
where private business increasingly penetrates the
market providing profit-driven schools, is still being
approached cautiously. However, education depart-
ments across the country have been pursuing policies
of devolution, increasing the autonomy given to local
schools. Increasing autonomy is a prerequisite, and
may well be a precursor to the privatisation of schools
in the future, in which governments take no responsi-
bility for the direct provision of schooling. 
Privatisation and marketisation of all public enter-
prises has been a major trend in government
administration over the past 15 years. We would expect
also that schools themselves will increasingly be
subject to the same processes that many other sectors
of the social infrastructure, like child care, youth work
and health care have already been through. Proposals
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for full fee paying tertiary education and voucher
systems for all levels of education, including primary
and secondary education, have been on the drawing
board for some time. 
Participants in the expert forums were seriously
concerned that marketisation would be likely to
increase inequity among young people, with long-term
effects for their futures. Where schools are able to select
their students, as is common with marketised systems,
significant advantage is gained by those students who
are already advantaged, while students from poor back-
grounds find themselves unable to get into the “best”
schools, even if they are in their local catchment area.
Lower-status schools find it harder to attract quality
staff, are less able to generate additional income by
charging fees and by fundraising, and are dispropor-
tionately populated with “problem” students. These
pressures are further intensified with the full move to
privatisation, in which schools’ continuing survival is
predicated on their ability to compete. Typically this
depends on their ability to guarantee high student test
scores. “Skimming the cream” is simply good business
practice under these conditions, and worsens the polar-
isation of outcomes for students. 
Diversification and alternatives
While it is not the only route, marketisation does open
up the opportunity for massive diversification in the
provision of education to young people. For the past
century in Australia, free, universal and compulsory
education has meant a standardised, state-provided
system, albeit with some provision for religious institu-
tions to provide schooling for those who make that
choice. Over the past few years, there has been a prolif-
eration particularly in the kinds of religious institutions
providing schooling, and in the forms of teaching and
learning utilised. Government support for private
schools has expanded relative to government schools,
and their market share has also been gradually
expanding: the proportion of 15- to 19-year-olds going
to private schools increased from 20% to 23% between
1986 and 1996 (Figure 4.4). Home schooling has grown
as an education option for many parents, albeit still
mostly at primary school levels. 
Providing that there is financial support for educa-
tional options which do not involve government run
secondary schools, we would expect an increasing
diversity in secondary schooling options over the next
15 years. In 2015, the majority of students will, as now,
attend a major high school in their local area. But for
many students, small alternative schools, religious
schools, or parent-directed schools will be a live option.
Independent schooling using electronic instruction
materials, while not a majority choice, will also be an
increasingly viable alternative for some young people.
The consensus of the expert forums was that there
was a need for students to have access to a wider
variety of education strategies than was typically
within their reach. A significant minority of young
people find standard schooling practices alienating,
irrelevant and unengaging. Others struggle with
specific learning difficulties which remain undiag-
nosed. Even if they know what is wrong, the capacity
of the standard classroom to accommodate their special
needs is typically severely limited. Cultural
background, especially for Aboriginal and Islander
people but also for Muslims and even more generally
for the children of the working class, produces tensions
between home environments and schools which
militate against success. Moving beyond “one size fits
all” approaches to secondary schooling may produce
an educational experience which is healthier, more
equitable and more fulfilling. Expert forums wanted to
encourage this kind of flexibility and diversity. The
nature of effective diversification could include:
• schools employing different educational
philosophies;
• schools allowing Indigenous students to study
together;
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• bicultural schools;
• small private schools of 12–15 students;
• workplace-based schools; and
• specialist schools.
One of the recent developments in secondary
schooling in Australia and elsewhere has been the
attempt to create an integrated environment on school
campuses known as “full-service schools” (Dryfoos
1994; Lowenthal 1996). In these models, a range of
services are available on campus or are in a close rela-
tionship with the school. Services may include: health
services, including dental services; counselling; various
welfare services, including food clubs and financial
counselling; accommodation or accommodation
brokerage; recreation; employment services, including
job placement and job creation services; and after-
hours education, including vocational, secondary and
leisure-based education. 
Full-service schools serve a number of useful
purposes. They may provide a central place for service
delivery, which increases access for most participants.
They use school resources normally left vacant after
school hours. They provide cheap office space for
community agencies in an environment where the cost
of commercial space can be prohibitive and zoning
laws make other space unavailable. They increase the
linkage between schools and the communities they
serve, and between community agencies.
There are, of course, disadvantages. The question of
who meets the administration and maintenance costs
of more intensive usage of school plant is an
immediate problem to be solved. And there is a possi-
bility that young people who are in conflict with the
school may find that other services they need are also
unavailable to them.
However, on balance, participants in the expert
forums identified full-service schools as a significant
development, and one which ought to be persevered
with and expanded. A variety of models are now well-
established in many parts of the world, especially the
USA, and while some problems and failures have been
encountered, many meet objectives that the forums
identified as being critical for productive, equitable and
effective education in the year 2015.
Technology
The increasing use of information technology within
schools and universities has already been noted a
number of times. We are sure that information
technology will not replace face to face tuition.
However, it will certainly take a larger role in the
process of instruction than it does at the moment, and
the role of face to face teachers will undoubtedly
change.
One of the consequences of the move toward IT-
based learning will (and is already) the globalisation of
education. Electronic interactive learning packages are
expensive to make, though the cost falls with every
new generation of authoring software. There is already
a global market in tertiary education, using web-based
instructional materials. While still really in its infancy,
we would expect such materials to be mainstream by
the year 2015. This is happening first at tertiary levels,
where access to computers is high, but will undoubt-
edly flow through to secondary and primary levels.
Secondary students may study a glossy, interactive,
game/simulation-based multimedia module on
Australian history written by software companies in the
USA. Five students in the same class may be doing five
different modules from different educational software
providers. This will have interesting consequences for
the “imaginary community” of Australia and for the
discipline of its people. 
The nature of current technology interfaces also
indicates that education may become more individu-
alised as it becomes more computer-based. A computer
interface socialises students differently to a teacher and
fellow-students in a classroom, often involving less
time in face to face contact with other human beings.
Provision will need to be made for experiences which
develop students’ capacity for face to face communica-
tion, social responsibility, teamwork and cooperation.
The dependence on technology raises equity
considerations also. While the vast majority of
households in 2015 will have a computer connected to
the Internet, the question must be raised about those
who don’t. The quality of household technology is also
an issue, with students from wealthier households able
to take advantage of sophisticated multimedia presen-
tations which may not be available to those with more
modest means.
Schooling and equity
Schooling, paradoxically, has always been a force both
for increasing equity within society and for estab-
lishing status distinctions. The introduction of free,
compulsory and universal schooling at the end of the
19th century was motivated significantly towards
providing all members of the common wealth with
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sufficient education to be able to participate effectively
within a liberal democracy and within the capitalist
economy to which it was harnessed. 
At the same time, the distinctions between schools
for the elite and schools for the masses have served to
entrench class division and class privilege, and to
ensure that the children of the elite continue to enjoy
advantage even in a “meritocracy”. Even within
government schools, according to sociologists of
education like Willis (1970) and Corrigan (1979), active
processes are afoot to make sure that “working-class
kids get working-class jobs”. Overwhelmingly, the
children of the middle classes do best at school, and
graduate from school to occupy the social and
economic positions reserved for their class. Research
has repeatedly shown that schools with a predomi-
nantly affluent constituency rank best in terms of
average student scores. While there are some individ-
uals who are able to use schooling to move beyond
their class of origin, at a macro level schooling
entrenches and intensifies inequality.
Gender and equity
Historically, there is little doubt that young women
have been extensively discriminated against in the
classroom: by classroom process and discipline, by
limitation of access to strategic courses, and by general
social discouragement of learning, education and the
development of intelligence in women. A great deal of
work has gone into reversing some of these trends, and
despite evidence that young women continue to be
subjected to a range of discriminatory processes both
from other students and staff, it appears that many of
these strategies have been successful. There is a great
deal of data to suggest that girls currently do better out
of the education process than boys do. They have
higher retention rates, score higher in assessments,
enter university at higher rates, and complete qualifica-
tions more often than boys do (DETYA 1999a). A
number of reasons have been suggested for this,
including, among others, the now pronounced femini-
sation of teaching as a profession. In 1998, 77.5% of
primary teachers and 53.5% of secondary teachers were
women. 
A number of educationalists have begun now to
raise concerns about the education of boys. Clearly,
standard education and disciplinary techniques do not
work well for a significant number of boys. The risk is
compounded when combined with other risk factors.
Research into gender-specific learning processes is a
prerequisite to gender-equitable education. Social and
educational remedial services for boys who have been
excluded from school would appear to be required
unless these trends can be reversed. A growing
population of under-qualified, unemployed young
men poses a range of difficulties for a society in 2015
which has not been able to successfully address this
problem. It may be, however, that technology-based
learning processes may swing the balance of gender
equity in education back away from girls because of
young men’s greater facility with the medium.
Race and equity
The major concern here is with Indigenous young
people. Participation and retention rates for people
from non-English-speaking backgrounds are not signif-
icantly lower than for other groups, and are in many
cases higher (Long, Carpenter & Mayden 1999).
The data on educational disadvantage for
Indigenous young people is unequivocal, consistent,
and serious. An extensive statistical report compiled for
the Department of Education Training and Youth
Affairs by the Australian Council for Educational
Research indicated that Indigenous young people have
lower participation rates, lower attainment, and lower
completion rates at all levels of education. Figure 4.5
indicates the extent of this.
A quarter of Indigenous young people had already
left school by the age of 15, compared with about 6%
of non-Indigenous 15-year-olds. Participation rates in
tertiary education for the general population were
three times that of Indigenous 20- to 24-year-olds.
About 10% of Indigenous 20- to 24-year-olds were
enrolled, compared with 25.8% of non-Indigenous
young people. 
The trend data indicates that the situation is not
noticeably improving. Apparent Year 12 retention rates
for Indigenous students actually fell between 1994 and
1997, both absolutely and relative to non-Indigenous
enrolments. Longer trend data is not available for
Australia as a whole, but data is available on a state by
state basis. The situation there is mixed. There has been
no clear improvement in Western Australia since 1991,
when rates did increase over the previous year. The
retention rate in South Australia fell from 24% to
19.5% between 1990 and 1997. The rate for the
Northern Territory was less than 10% in 1997, having
fallen from 13.7% in 1990. 
In contrast, in 1990 the figure for the ACT was not
that different to the NT, at 20%. But by 1997 the ACT
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had improved to 90%, almost equivalent to the non-
Indigenous retention rate. New South Wales and
Victoria also made consistent improvements.
The ACT is, no doubt, a special case. However, the
result indicates that there is nothing inherent in being
Aboriginal that means that young people do not stay
on at school. If 90% of Indigenous young people in the
ACT stay on, and that can be improved from a figure of
20% over seven years, then some improvement is
possible, notwithstanding that the situation in rural
Northern Territory presents a very different set of
challenges. 
Services needed
This discussion has highlighted a range of possible
services to address the needs of young people in educa-
tional contexts in the year 2015. Others are implicated
in the discussion, or have been indicated by the expert
forums. They include:
Full-service schools
Schools represent both a resource and an opportunity
to address equity and access questions for a range of
young people. An integrated environment should be
created on school campuses, or reaching out from
them, with a range of services available including:
health services; dental services; counselling; various
welfare services, including food clubs and financial
counselling; accommodation or accommodation
brokerage; recreation; employment services, including
job placement and job creation services; and after-
hours education, including vocational, secondary and
leisure-based education. Of course, models for full-
service schools vary, and will need local adaptation
and evaluation.
Integration with community and business enterprises
Relationships need to be developed between the school
and outside agencies. Workplace placement needs to be
a critical and educative experience in which the
student is given opportunity to become aware of
fundamental questions for the enterprise, including
tensions and dilemmas in maintaining economic
bottom lines, the nature of the environment for the
enterprise, dealing with government, staffing and
industrial issues, occupational health and safety and
other key issues. 
Figure 4.5  Primary and secondary school participation rates 1999
Source: DETYA 1999
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Training for entrepreneurship/New Economy
Teaching and learning need to be tuned to an environ-
ment which is increasingly diverse, unregulated,
fragmentary and volatile. Students need to be trained
for self-employment and autonomous work practices.
Alternatives: Secondary schooling needs to move
beyond a “one size fits all” approach to embrace alter-
natives which may include: 
• Schools employing different educational philoso-
phies
• Schools allowing Indigenous students to study
together
• Bicultural schools
• Small private schools of 12 to 15 students
• Workplace-based schools
Continued free, universal education
Marketisation is likely to increase inequity among
young people, with long-term effects for their futures.
Continued State responsibility for education is recom-
mended. States need to be vigilant about the
contribution of schooling to cumulative disadvantage
among young people from marginalised groups.
Access to technology
Students must have equitable access to information
and communications technology in their communities,
including after-hours access.
Boys
Measures need to be put in place to develop teaching
and learning processes which help young men improve
their communication and language skills.
Indigenous students
Efforts to support Indigenous students in schools need
to be maintained and extended. Schools which
specialise in serving Indigenous students should be
supported.
Relentless opportunity for success
Failure at education must not be allowed to become a
permanent deficit. Second-chance access, access to
alternative forms of schooling, and other strategies
must be employed to ensure the possibility for success,
particularly for educationally disadvantaged groups.
Conclusions
The research indicates that important as school is in
the lives of young people now, it is likely to become
even more dominant. Near-universal enrolment seems
likely for 15- to 19-year-olds, with a majority of 20- to
24-year-olds also being involved in formal education
processes. 
At the same time, the pressure is on for schools to
be able to respond flexibly to the needs of young
people in an environment where more are likely to be
involved in part-time work and a range of other
activities, and where the student population is likely to
be more diverse than ever before. Exclusion of difficult
students is less and less of an option.
Schools already know that while their job is
education, their capacity to do the job is deeply
affected by the social circumstances of their students.
Schools in the future will need to be able to engage
with these social circumstances, and to develop a
problem-solving capacity to enable their students to
remain engaged within the school environment. The
costs of failure for students, already serious, are likely
to be much worse in 2015 than now. 
Education is a two-edged sword. Measures to increase
equity can at the same time enshrine privilege and make
pariahs of those young people who they cannot engage.
Education systems need to be actively and constantly
developing strategies to engage those young people for
whom schooling is a barrier to education, and to
removing obstacles to their continued participation. A
capacity for outreach would need to be standard within
schools of the next 15 years.
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Introduction: work, unemployment
and exclusion
If schooling has been the critical institutional process
which has established youth as a population and a
social category in the modern period, formal paid work
has been the critical process for their accreditation as
adult. The nature of work, the way that work is
structured and rewarded, and the access that young
people have to formal paid work are thus pivotal to the
lives of young people and to their place in society. And
so, obviously, the services that will be needed for
young people in the future will be a function of young
people’s engagement in work in the future. 
The world of work for young people has been
changing for some time. Easy access to secure full-time
employment has not been part of most young people’s
experience now for the last 20 years, and the trends
continue to move away from that pattern. Rates of
unemployment have been persistently high, and where
work has been available, it has become increasingly
tenuous: part-time, casual, temporary. In the opinion
of many commentators, the experience of young
people is the vanguard of a deep undercurrent of
change in the way that the economy operates, the way
that people engage in work within it, and the
mechanisms of reward that are employed. 
For some, the new flexibility in the working week
has been welcome, leaving them free to pursue
education or other priorities. For others, it has meant
persistent struggles with financial security and
difficulty in building an asset base.
While full-time employment may not have been an
expectation of teenagers, most people in their twenties
have enjoyed relatively secure jobs. That situation is
changing, and changing fast. People in their twenties
are more likely to be unemployed, and likely to be
unemployed longer. Full-time permanent jobs are
disappearing for the 20- to 25-year-olds as they did for
teenagers. 
The expert forums identified two major dimensions
of the question of young people and work in the
future: trends in the rate of unemployment, and the
structure of work for young people. 
The youth unemployment crisis
The critical role of employment in the governance of
out-of-school young people is strongly reflected in the
immediate history of youth policy in Australia. Young
people’s engagement in the paid labour force has
undoubtedly been youth policy’s single largest driving
force since the economic recession of the early 1970s.
While earlier generations might have been preoccupied
with young people’s war readiness (the 1910s and
1920s), or delinquency (1950s), or political revolt
(1960s), the core agenda item since the mid-1970s has
been youth unemployment. 
FIVE: WORK AND
UNEMPLOYMENT
Levels of youth unemployment continued to climb
to a peak of 34.1% for teenagers in June 1992. They
have declined since then, with some fluctuation, but
are still only slightly better than during the 1983
recession (Wooden 1999, p.20). In 1998-99, the rates
for 15- to 19-year-olds (25.4%) and 20- to 24-year-olds
(12.6%) looking for full-time work were still signifi-
cantly higher than the average for all age groups (7.9%)
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 1999a). 
As in most other western nations, these broad statis-
tical sweeps over the employment circumstances of
teenagers ignore the high levels of variability in young
people’s circumstances, and the issues that are specific
to different groups of young people who lie outside the
mainstream for which most youth employment policy
has been formulated (Lugaresi, Jones & Frustaci 1997). 
Indigenous young people have been particularly at
risk here. At least a third of men and half the women
between the ages of 20 and 24 are neither working nor
studying (DETYA 1999b, p.29). The 1996 census
indicates that 22.6% of Indigenous males were
unemployed, compared with 12.9% of non-Indigenous
males. Unemployment rates for young women were
more equitable, but the relative figures for young
women not in the labour force match almost exactly
the unemployment figures for men. This is
compounded by living in rural areas.
However, Indigenous young people’s labour market
participation the is trending upwards. Between 1991
and 1996 the percentage of the 20- to 24-year-old
Indigenous population working full time increased
from 28.3% to 31.4% for young men and from 17.3%
to 19.8% for young Indigenous women.
Youth and the supply of labour
Understood in market terms, youth unemployment has
been a product of forces both from the supply side and
the demand side of the labour market equation.
In supply terms, there is no doubt that high levels
of youth unemployment were partly a function of
demographic forces which delivered a larger
population of young people onto the labour market in
the 1980s and 1990s. The number of registered births
per annum had increased almost linearly between 1932
and 1962 (from around 110,000 births per annum to
around 240,000 births per annum) (McLennan 1999).
Births dropped briefly between 1962 and 1971 before
forming an irregular plateau of around 240,000 births
per year. The youth population obviously follows 15 to
25 years later. 
It is important to note that as a percentage of the
total population, youth has been falling since about
1979/80, when they represented around 17.5% of the
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Figure 5.1 Full-time unemployment rate 1988–1998
Source: ABS: Labour Force Australia September 1998 ABC Cat. No. 6203.0
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population. The peak in youth unemployment rates
comes in 1992/93 even though young people as a
proportion of the population had declined to 15.7%.
Into the future, the youth population is expected to
increase slightly while youth as a percentage of the
population falls. Even though the projected figure for
2021 will fall to around 12.7%, the total youth
population is expected to increase slightly to
2,869,000. It seems to be the numbers of young people,
rather than their representation within the total
population, that is the critical demographic force in
determining unemployment rates, at least from the
supply side. And the size of the youth population will
be maintained at least for the next 15 years.
As well as the number of young people in the
population, the supply of youth labour is dictated by
the degree to which young people are involved in the
labour market. If young people are not available for
work either because they have given up looking or
because they are doing other things, they do not
feature as part of the unemployment rate.
Education has been the principal alternative to
involvement in the labour market for the youth labour
force. To a great extent, youth unemployment figures
have been able to be controlled over the last decade
through the use of a variety of incentives and penalties
to encourage young people to continue their
education. For this reason, the trend data on youth
unemployment probably tells us as much about the
level of political intervention as the underlying trends
in youth unemployment. Even independently of these
policies, the existence of high rates of unemployment
itself is an incentive for young people to remain in
school, both because of the comparative advantage
that higher qualifications give, and because there are
no jobs to go to if you leave. 
Obviously, participation rates in school limit partic-
ipation rates in employment, although a large and
increasing number of students are involved in some
way in the labour market. The data indicate that partic-
ipation rates in education are increasing and would be
expected to continue. Employment, as the graph below
indicates, is also increasing, but this is due to a rapid
expansion in part-time employment. As Figure 5.3
indicates, the involvement of young people in full time
employment has been falling away rapidly.
The graphs below indicate the trends in young
people’s share of full-time employment, and their
participation in the labour market over the last decade.
They indicate that while the numbers of young people
engaged in the paid work force may have been
maintained, their level of engagement has dropped
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Figure 5.2  Total youth population: 15- to 24-year-olds 1977–1997
Soiurce: ABS Household and population survey 1977–1997
considerably due to the increase in part-time, casual
and temporary work. This is a major feature of the
changing labour market for young people, and deserves
more extensive discussion than is appropriate at this
point. Suffice to say that there has been downward
pressure on the supply of youth labour as a response
both to diminished demand – young people removing
themselves from the market, including the pursuit of
education – and to active policies by governments to
encourage young people in this direction. 
The demand for youth labour
While the youth population was growing, a range of
structural factors meant that the demand for youth
labour was decreasing. Partly, this was a result of the
disappearance of jobs which had traditionally been
youth jobs (Sweet 1988). So jobs for typists disappeared
with the advent of the word processor and the personal
computer. Jobs for service station attendants disap-
peared as self-service fuel became standard. Low level
clerks became redundant as communications
technology improved: nobody needed message boys
any more. The shift to supermarkets deleted scores of
jobs in the retail industry as grocers, haberdashers,
bakers and butchers disappeared. While other youth
jobs have emerged – notably in tourism and hospitality
– they have not yet replaced the jobs lost in the last
wave of economic restructuring.
Partly, the reduction in demand was a result of
increasing credentialism moving jobs out of the reach
of teenagers. This was partly, but only partly, because
new technologies required higher levels of autonomy
and higher levels of training. Nursing, once an entry
position for young women, moved into the universities
and became the province of graduates. Accountancy
likewise. The public sector began employing fewer and
fewer school leavers and more graduates.
Partly, the decreasing demand for young workers
was a result of increasing competition from adults who
were engaging in paid labour at much higher rates than
had been the case. Married women, who had been
forcibly excluded from the work force through the
1950s and 1960s began to take advantage of the oppor-
tunities offered by reliable contraception, equal pay
and anti-discrimination legislation. Young people faced
other workers who were perceived as more reliable,
more secure, having greater skills and more established
attitudes to work.
It is pertinent to ask why the labour of adults is
preferred to that of young people. No doubt, one factor
is the changing nature of work. The natural advantage
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that young workers have traditionally had is the
strength and agility of their bodies. Structural changes
in the economy, especially increasing automation and
other technological changes, have been eliminating
physical jobs fast. Communicative skills have been
elevated, and adult workers, with their greater
experience and wider communicative repertoire, have
an advantage. 
However, young people are also subject to naked
discrimination, resulting from the negative public
perception of the attitudes and behaviours of the
young, including a poor work ethic. The perception has
no substantive base. Morgan and Banks recently
surveyed over 3,200 employers across all industries and
found that nearly 70% of employers rate the work ethic
of young people they have hired as the same or better
than other age groups in their workplace (Morgan &
Banks 1996, p.13).
Finally, the demand for youth labour was probably
affected by the relative gains in youth wages in the late
1970s and 1980s. The relationship between the price of
youth labour and demand for it is complex. While
economists can point to increasing levels of unemploy-
ment in periods where youth wages have gone up,
unemployment does not fall when they go down. For
example, between 1985 and 1995 the earnings of
young full-time workers declined from $320 per week
to $300 for 15- to 19-year-olds, and from $511 to $487
per week for 20- to 24-year-olds (McLennan 1997,
p.72). In the same period, unemployment rates
increased significantly. Several studies indicate that
wages are not the most important factor for employers
in making an employment decision (e.g. Morgan &
Banks 1997), and things such as discrimination appear
to be at least as significant as the price of young
people’s labour. However, it seems likely that, in some
areas at least, wage relativities have been a factor. The
serious decline in apprenticeship as a pathway for
youth employment may be one. 
All of these dynamics will continue to factor in
youth unemployment rates over the next 15 years. 
Future projections:
youth unemployment
Youth jobs
A major part of the structural change of the past 25
years has been to do with the impact of information
and communications technology. We would expect
that much of the disruption involved in the massive
structural change involved in that technological
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Figure 5.4  Labour market participation rate: 15- to 19- and 20- to 24-year-olds
Source: ABS
revolution has already been cleared. Certainly, the
economic impact of the Internet is only in its early
stages, and there may be significant further economic
restructuring as more and more of the mode of distrib-
ution moves online. E-commerce may have a serious
impact on retailing, which, given young people’s
concentration in that industry, may have a significant
impact on youth employment. However, the Internet
phenomenon is unlikely to result in the widespread job
losses in the youth labour market that were seen with
the last technological revolution. Indeed, it appears
that many of the jobs emerging as a result of the
Internet will be jobs for young people, including jobs
in distribution processes.
Unskilled jobs are expected to continue to decline.
To the extent that skill is a function of age, some
continued erosion of job opportunities for young
people without qualifications would be expected.
More broadly, the kind of economic instability that
plagued Western economies from the early 1970s
through until the early 1990s seems to have settled.
The lethal combination of high levels of inflation and
high levels of unemployment of that period seems now
substantially under control, and many economists are
predicting a long growth cycle through to or close to
2015 as the communications and information
revolution matures in an environment of economic
stability. In the longer run, the environmental limits to
economic growth and the impact of higher levels of
economic competition from developing economies will
create economic management difficulties for countries
such as Australia, but in the 15-year time frame, few
economists are predicting disaster.
Generally, we believe that the damage to the youth
labour market has mostly already been done. Some
recovery would be expected within the 15-year time
frame.
Competition from adult workers
All the data indicate that competition for jobs from
adult workers is likely to be maintained or intensified.
Both demographic forces and labour force projections
indicate that the numbers of adult workers will be
increasing. Figure 5.5 indicates a significant expansion
in the numbers of people in the work force over time. 
Substantial numbers of these workers will be prime-
age employees, representing a significant body of
competition to young workers. In particular, the partic-
ipation rates for mature-age women, who often
compete in the same labour market as young people,
are expected to rise significantly.
The age profile of these workers is also important.
In Figure 5.6, we note especially the huge increase in
the number of post-65 employees. The data indicate
that this population has a high degree of involvement
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Figure 5.5  Labour force projections to 2016
Source: Labour Force Projections, Australia 1999–2016 (Cat. no. 6260.0)
12
10
8
6
4
2
M
ill
io
n
1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 2016
in the part-time and casual labour market, often in
industries now substantially occupied by young people.
We can take this analysis further by comparing the
numbers of workers ready to enter the work force with
the numbers ready to leave it. Figure 5.7 compares the
projected numbers of 18- to 24-year-olds against the
numbers of people at retirement age: both the middle-
class superannuated retirement age of 55 years and the
more general retirement age of 65 years. 
After 2001–2002, the numbers of 18-year-olds, 24-
year-olds, and 55-year-olds are pretty similar. There is,
however, a gap between the numbers of people aged 18
or 24, and 65 years. This raises a potential problem.
There aren’t enough people at age 65 and retiring to
make way for 18- or 24-year-olds entering the labour
market. This is even without the likely increased
retention of over 65s in the labour market as a result of
increased health and life expectancy and the proba-
bility of less generous pensions with stricter eligibility
criteria. Continued blocked entry of young people into
the labour market seems likely, in demographic terms
at least. Given how central employment has been
within youth policy over the past 20 years, and the
very real implications that exclusion from the labour
market has for young people’s economic independence
and accreditation as adult, this conclusion is of the
greatest importance.
One factor which is more difficult to quantify is the
possibility of change in young people’s competitiveness
in the labour market. The comparative advantage of
young people in the labour market in 2015 is a little
hard to predict. At present, younger people have some
credential advantage because more of them have post-
secondary qualifications – a legacy of the expansion of
education from the 1980s. Fewer people in the 1960s
and 1970s had access to education in an environment
when tertiary education was for the elite. By 2015, the
educational advantage of the young will have moved
through the adult population such that the whole of
the adult labour force will have lived through an envi-
ronment of mass post-secondary education. On the
other hand, the labour of young people at present
seems undervalued, given that the price of youth
labour is low but their productivity is comparable to
that of other workers (Morgan & Banks 1997). Some
correction might be expected therefore if the market
works as it should, although prejudice is an inhibition
to such correction. As we argue below, young people
may have some advantage in the flexible work force
increasingly required in the New Economy.
Future projections:
the changing nature of work
The futures literature has identified the changing
nature of work as one of the most fundamental shifts
in Western cultural and economic life in the next 30
years. According to Alvin Toffler, the post-industrial
wave of change is the third in a series of fundamental
changes in the nature of work, of which the agricul-
tural revolution and the rise of industrialisation were
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Figure 5.6  Percentage change in the labour force for different ages of workers, 1998–2016
Source: Labour Force Projections, Australia 1999–2016 (ABS Cat Number 6260.0)
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the first and second (Toffler, in Harr 1998). The funda-
mental features of the third wave are the self-managing
nature of the new generation of automation, and the
elimination of the need for physical proximity through
the use of communications and information
technology. In other words, the machines can do
things by themselves, and they can be instructed to do
them from anywhere in the world.
A range of commentators point to the following
factors as fundamental to the shape of the New
Economy, and to the future of work within it.
Less paid work will be available. As automation increases
its reach, employing organisations need less labour.
New areas of work, especially in the area of personal
services, are expected to grow, but the mode of
employment is unlikely to be the same as in 20th
century industrial labour. 
The distribution of work will be less equal. Some workers
will have more work than they want, but most workers
will have considerably less. For as long as incomes are
tied to labour, this is expected to result in significant
inequalities of income and income security.
More workers will be mind workers. Muscle labour is the
area that is most likely to contract. Intelligent, flexible,
highly skilled communicators will be those most likely
to be in demand.
More workers will be portfolio workers. Increasingly,
people will be putting together a “portfolio” of income
earning and non-income earning activity including
permanent part-time employment, contract work, self-
employment, study or training, hobby and community
work.
Entrepreneurship will be more important as “jobs”
disappear. “In the de-jobbed world, the work will be
done by the people who have the desire and the ability
to do it” (Bridges 1995, p.141). 
The link between work and income will be dislocated. As
there is less and less paid work available, communities
need to find ways to engage their populations in
meaningful work and to ensure that their material
needs are met. However, there may not be an
immediate link between the two. Many commentators
argue for a guaranteed minimum income or, more
Youth and the future: Effective youth services for the year 2015 53
350000
300000
250000
200000
150000
100000
50000
0
x x
x x
x x
x x
x
x
x x
x x x x
19
99
–0
0
20
00
–0
1
20
01
–0
2
20
02
–0
3
20
03
–0
4
20
04
–0
5
20
05
–0
6
20
06
–0
7
20
07
–0
8
20
08
–0
9
20
09
–1
0
20
10
–1
1
20
11
–1
2
20
12
–1
3
20
13
–1
4
20
14
–1
5
Figure 5.7   Work-force entry and exit numbers
Source: ABS 322202A
18-year-olds
24-year-olds
55-year-olds
65-year-oldsx
radically, a moneyless economy. According to several
commentators, time will be the new measure of value,
not money (Handy 1994; Jones 1995; Rifkin 1995).
Occupations will appear and disappear with greater
rapidity. By 2015, many of the occupations to which
young people now aspire will simply not exist, and a
range of others will have emerged. Training and
retraining will become essential, as a rapidly-changing
technological and social environment requires fast
switching between both the content of work and ways
of working.
Location will be less important, with more workers being
outworkers. Already, a growing number of workers are
able to run their offices from home, via the laptop
computer and the mobile phone. Where face-to-face
communication is necessary, it will be unlikely to be in
either participant’s place of work. And as communica-
tion technologies move further into virtual reality,
face-to-face communication will itself become less
necessary and more a matter of choice and pleasure.
Fewer people will be employees of organisations. Or, if they
are, they will be organisations which organise people
for other organisations, rather than organisations
which themselves produce artifacts. “We are all self-
employed, whether we work in an organisation … or
outside” (Hakim 1994).
Casual, contract, part-time and task-specific employment
will increase. Workers will need to be flexible and
capable of doing a wide variety of things.
The data
Already, many of these things are true for young
people. The data indicate that the New Economy has
already started to bite for young people, and while
most still have an expectation of a job in the tradi-
tional sense, for an increasing number that expectation
is unlikely to be fulfilled until their late 20s, if at all. 
The core feature of this has been the shift from full-
time permanent jobs to part-time, casual and
temporary jobs. Casual workers and part-time workers
are not the same thing. Casual workers have been
defined as workers who “are not entitled to paid
holiday or sick leave, who have no expectation of
ongoing employment and for whom each engagement
with their employer constitutes a separate contract of
employment” (Australian Bureau of Statistics 1999c).
Casual work may be full-time, and part-time work may
be temporary. Both forms of labour, however, represent
a shift towards a more marginal engagement with the
mainstream economy and greater levels of economic
risk. 
Trends toward casualisation have been a feature of
the labour market in general: the proportion of the
labour force in casual jobs increased from 19% to 27%
between 1988 and 1998. Its effect on the youth labour
market, however, has been extreme, with the
proportion of young people in casual jobs increasing
from 39% to 65% for teenagers, and almost doubling
(17% to 32%) for 20- to 24-year-olds (ibid.). 
Within the youth population, young women have
been exposed even more. In 1988, 45% of teenage
women were employed casually. By 1998, that had
increased to 72%. Young women in the 20 to 24 age
range were employed casually at a rate of 19% in 1988,
compared with 34% a decade later (ibid.). 
The movement to part-time work has been just as
dramatic. Full-time participation rates have fallen for
teenagers: from approximately 50% to 25% for males,
and from 45% to 25% for females between 1978 and
1997 (Wooden 1999). In the same period, the share of
full-time employment increased significantly for prime-
aged adults. Part-time participation rates have
increased (approximately from 12% to 35% for males,
and from 10% to 25% for females)(ibid.). 
Looking at the proportion of young people involved
in part time employment is even more dramatic.
Around 8% of teenage men worked part-time in 1971,
and women only fractionally more. In 1997, over 50%
of teenage men were working part-time, and 73% of
women. In 1971, 2.3% of men in the 20 to 24 age
range were working part time, and 14.1% of women.
By 1997, these figures had changed to 19.4% and
35.3% respectively.
There is a close relationship between participation
in education and the pattern of employment. Much of
the increase in part-time work has gone to students –
often, it seems, at the expense of the unemployed.
Young people who have not gone on to further study
have suffered a declining employment position relative
to students. 
Wooden (1999, p.13) notes that students generally
prefer part-time work, and do not generally want more
hours of work than they have. However, part-time
workers who are not studying express high degrees of
dissatisfaction with the hours available: 65% of females
and 72% of males would like more work. This is signifi-
cantly higher than is the case for the adult work force.
Employees in casual positions are generally more likely
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Figure 5.9  Proportion of women in each age group involved in part-time employment 1971 to 1997
Source: ABS via Wooden, 1998
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Figure 5.8  Propostion of men in each age group involved in part-time employment 1971 to 1997
Source: ABS via Wooden, 1998
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than part-time employees to feel this way, and the
proportion of casual workers dissatisfied with their
hours is increasing (Australian Bureau of Statistics
1999c).
Sweet (1998) argues that low-paid, temporary and
part-time jobs have an adverse effect on the lives of
young people rather than being a stepping stone to
future employment. Casual work also involves young
people in a range of risks. The lack of sick leave and
annual leave, the insecurity of positions, and vulnera-
bility to exploitation, especially in an under-unionised
environment are among them. In the longer term, the
lack of career pathways, training and any sense of
future direction is just as worrying (Wooden 1999,
p.11). However, the movement in this direction seems
inexorable, and the issue seems rather about how the
potentially destructive effects of the New Economy on
young people should be managed. In particular, how
are young people, by their greater exposure to margin-
alised labour, to be insulated from the processes of
exclusion which may well accompany such status? And
how are those young people most exposed to economic
risk to be guaranteed sufficient means to sustain life?
How are we to avoid the economic polarisation of
young people, so that the information/communica-
tion-rich, well educated and well supported do very
well out of the opportunities presented by the New
Economy, and those without these resources struggle
with chronic poverty and its associated vicious circles
of crime, homelessness, drug use and lack of hope?
It is not the case that all young people will be disad-
vantaged by this shift to a jobless economy. Indeed, it
may present a range of opportunities for those who
may be better able to adapt to the new environment by
virtue of having never known anything else. Young
people generally have an ability to be flexible, to take
things as they come, and to be open to different ways
of seeing and doing things: perhaps a function of their
state of cognitive development, or of a lighter
investment in the status quo. But many young people
could do very well indeed out of the New Economy,
and enjoy themselves doing it.
Expert forum participants gave significant attention
to this question. They concluded that the conditions
for survival and success in the New Economy would
appear to be:
• success with educational institutions, and capacity
to continue with ongoing education and/or
training;
• adequate family or other support to tide them over
lean periods or periods where an enterprise has
not been successful;
• access to venture capital, either through financial
institutions, family, or other sources;
• sufficient skill to be able to manage an
autonomous enterprise; and
• sufficient self-confidence to be able to take on a
number of new ventures over time, and sell their
skills to a variety of buyers.
These qualities are likely to be unevenly distributed
in the youth population. Once more, our expert forums
pointed to the dangers of a “deepening divide”, where
some young people stood to do well, and others stood
a fair chance of being excluded altogether. They were
particularly concerned about the fate of young people
who were alienated from education at an early age. In
an economy that privileges mind-workers, young
people who have barely learned to read and write seem
to stand very little chance at all. The responsibility of
educational institutions to do whatever it takes to
engage these young people has been discussed in
another chapter, but it won’t hurt to repeat it here.
In addition to questions of educational disadvan-
tage, the family clearly has a crucial role to play in
determining whether a young person will be able to
negotiate the new work environment successfully.
Families who have built up capital will be in a much
better position to invest in the son’s or daughter’s
enterprise than a family living close to subsistence on a
low wage or welfare benefits. Likewise with support
through periods of change or where a venture has
failed. In fact, all the above criteria for success in the
New Economy appear to be cumulative: you are likely
to have most or all of them, or none at all. 
The year 2015
Most commentators are looking at a longer range of
sight than 2015, and social arrangements, as Marx
observed, take a lot longer to change than technological
ones. Some of the pronouncements, such as those of
Robert Theobold (1999), on the total demise of “the job”
in the sense of full-time permanent work with a single
employer seems unlikely at least within the 15-year time
frame. Corporations may find that there are significant
economies in investing in a stable, permanent core of
workers, and the pendulum may swing back in favour of
traditional employment patterns for some workers.
There are indications that this is already happening.
But even if this is the case, its seems clear that the
practice by corporations to define their core functions
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narrowly and source others out to service organisations
or contract labour will continue and gather momentum.
It seems likely that young people will be over-repre-
sented in this fluid, arguably more marginal economic
sector. Certainly the trends both in terms of the kinds of
jobs which are being created and the extent to which
young people are employed in them lead strongly in the
direction of a casualised, short-term, marginal labour
force. The younger the worker, the more likely this is to
be the case, although high casualisation rates are
climbing the age ladder year by year. Women are
currently more exposed than men, and this inequality
increases with age. While this is likely to move gradually
to a position of increasing equity, significant gender
difference may still be in place in 2015.
Work will also be a less dominant force in the lives
of the next generation of young people than it was for
their parents and certainly for their grandparents.
Work will probably not be the principal form of
people’s social connection. “What do you do for a
living?” may cease to be the primary question on
meeting someone new – the question that establishes
their class, culture, status and social location. Work will
increasingly support other things that people want to
do, rather than be the primary commitment: things
like sport, art, maintaining social connections, hobbies,
religion, travel – forms of work and play that do not
make profit.
Services needed for young people
in the area of work
and employment, 2015
Services identified by the expert forums, or otherwise
indicated by the research, include a range of services
which will be needed by all young people, and a set of
programs to engage those young people who are not
competitive in the new labour market, as well as
strategies to improve their competitiveness.
Throughout, the predominant concerns were to avoid
the position where: 
• young people could not secure an income
sufficient for subsistence;
• an unacceptably large gulf existed between those
young people who were well-positioned in the
New Economy and those who were not;
• young people were subject to processes of margin-
alisation or quarantine that involved them being
excluded (or secluded) from their communities –
out of sight and out of mind;
• young people were subject to meaningless activity
for the purposes of governance, rather than
necessary or desirable production; and
• services were punitive and/or coercive in
approach, including coerced volunteerism or civil
conscription of various kinds.
The research indicated a range of services which
would be required to enable young people to prosper in
the New Economy. Obviously, the need for such
services is not evenly distributed across the youth
population, but most of them would be required by
most young people at some time.
• Universal training and preparation for successful
jobless work needs to be available both within the
school curriculum and in the post-school environ-
ment – in fact whenever young people need it. 
• Small business incubators and supports need to be
available to help young people in the process of
generating self-employment.
• Income support models need to be reformed to be able
to deal effectively with mixed incomes, and with
fluctuating and irregular incomes. A serious public
discussion of Guaranteed Minimum Income
schemes is overdue in the light of the predictions
for work and unemployment for young people in
the future. Another option suggested was a scheme
similar to HECS, but organised as a credit to be
drawn on rather than a debt to be paid off. 
• Young people, especially those who do not have
strong family backing, need access to cheap risk
capital, perhaps on an equity basis.
• Tax systems need to be more sophisticated to deal
with the informal economy.
• The community will need to take a greater role in
the generation of non-market varieties of goods such
as recreation, in order to include people who may
be income-poor. Increasing use of non-money
forms of rewarding work at the community level
should be explored, including labour credit
schemes where access to resources is open to those
who contribute labour rather than those who pay
cash.
• Given the growing importance of education,
young people (and others) need relentless opportu-
nity to try again at education through a variety of
educational models and institutions and at all
education levels.
• Sophisticated brokerage services will be needed to
connect young people who have labour to offer
with organisations needing labour. 
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• Young people must have access to information and
communications technology. It may be that by 2015
computers will be effectively free, perhaps paid for
by resident advertising programs. If not, other
facilities will be needed: Internet cafés, 24-hour
open access computing in libraries, schools or
shopping centres.
• Youth services themselves should mirror the work
pattern of young people: be flexible, just-in-time,
mobile, service driven.
• Alternative processes for accreditation as adult, or as
citizen, need to be in place. These may include some
formal rites of passage, perhaps equivalent to citi-
zenship ceremonies.
Conclusion
Work, and the absence of it, is a key structural and
symbolic force in determining the social progress of
young people and the overall shape of the youth
category. Young people’s successful establishment
within the socioeconomic order currently depends on
their success in the world of work as income, and the
access to social life that it affords, are dependent on
paid labour. The accumulation of assets and reserves to
provide some insulation against difficult economic
times is a function not only of successful engagement
in paid labour but also success over time. 
Currently, accreditation as adult is dependent on
successful colonisation of the working world. The
present environment, with its high levels of unemploy-
ment and expanding categories of casual, temporary
and part-time work leaves the status of young people
unhelpfully ambiguous. Young people occupy a no-
man’s-land of citizenship and participation.
The future for young people appears to involve a
rapidly changing set of work practices in which the
under-utilisation of youth labour will continue to be a
problem. Market processes, the dominant means for
distributing labour in the current situation, seem unlikely
to be effective in distributing the available profit-
generating work in such a way that all members of the
community will be able to meet the requirements of
subsistence, let alone to prosper. Without appropriate
intervention, the natural mechanisms of the market seem
destined to leave us with a large population of chroni-
cally poor young people who are unable to become adult.
Already, in an environment where working hours
continue to rise for those in full-time work, the unem-
ployment of some workers is mocked by the overwork of
others (cf. Australian Bureau of Statistics 1997, p.92).
Changing work practices do offer significant oppor-
tunities for a life that is more interesting, variable and
flexible, and is able to engage in a wide variety of
economic, aesthetic, personal, sociable and family
activities. The challenge is to avoid the risk of dehu-
manisation, even for a part of the population, and to
maximise the capacity for a human life that new
structures of work offer. 
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Introduction: youth, access to
income, and exclusion
In a market-driven economy, income is a key determi-
nant of a person’s ability to participate in the range of
opportunities that the society has to offer. Or, to put
the corollary, a key determinant of exclusion. For
young people, income dictates the level of access that
young people have to services that are otherwise
available for those with the means to pay. Young
people’s income, and the gap between that income and
the services that are available for purchase on the open
market, are obviously a key factor in the kinds of
services that will be needed now and in the future. 
The current situation is that youth income levels
are significantly a function of Federal Government
policy. The major sources of cash income for young
people are wages and government income support
(usually in the form of Youth Allowance payments).
The Federal Government is directly responsible for
income support settings, including both the level of
benefit and eligibility criteria, and is also influential in
the establishment of junior wage rates, or at least the
relativity between junior rates and adult wages. 
Income settings are predicated on a range of
assumptions about:
• the productivity of young people;
• their level of need;
• their competitiveness within the labour market;
• the income settings which are likely to be most
conducive to their continuing engagement with
their family of origin; and 
• the relative desirability of work, study, training,
leisure, or unstructured free time in meeting social
goals and disciplining the individual.
In line with these assumptions, governments have
made decisions about income levels with a keen eye for
the effect that given levels or sources of income will
have on the choices young people make, with other
criteria such as presumed need and the preservation of
parental prerogatives also being at issue. As such,
income setting has been an active, and often coercive,
policy instrument for intervention into young people’s
lives. 
The application of these criteria generally results in
discounted incomes for young people, with carefully
managed relativities between youth incomes and adult
incomes, wages versus government benefits,
government benefits for study versus unemployment
allowances. Generally, these criteria work in combina-
tion. Youth wages are set low, in part to improve
young people’s competitive position in the labour
market. Government allowances are set even lower, to
make welfare dependence less attractive than wages as
a major source of income. 
The result is highly discriminatory. In fact, youth
wages and allowances remain as one of the few areas
SIX:
INCOMES
where discrimination on the basis of non-relevant
attributes (e.g. age, gender, race) remains legal. As a
result, young people are currently among the poorest
Australians in terms of wealth and income.
The actual economic position of young people is, of
course, much more complex than this. Economic
health is a function of both incomes and costs, and
most young people have access to a range of cost-
reduction measures including parentally-subsidised
food, accommodation, transport, recreation, and loan
income. A larger majority have lower costs than other
age groups because of their freedom from the responsi-
bility to support dependents. 
However, a significant minority does not have
access to parental support, parental support is
marginal, or parents place unacceptable conditions on
support. An unknown number of young people have
responsibilities for dependents which are not
recognised by eligibility criteria – including responsi-
bility for parents, siblings or peers who for various
reasons may be an economic liability. Policies which
assume lower income needs for young people based on
parental support place such young people at serious
risk of acute poverty. 
Poverty analyses based on the 1996 census indicate
that 11% of the total population was living in poverty
as defined by the Henderson Poverty Line
(Brotherhood of St Lawrence 1999). The most seriously
affected were single young people. Social security
payments to 16- to 17-year-olds were 51% below the
poverty line, 18- to 20-year-olds were 46% below, over
21-year-olds were 35% below. While most 16- to 17-
year-olds were living at home, most over 21-year-olds
were not and so had limited access to parental subsidy. 
The process of generalising about the incomes of
young people is subject to a range of complexities both
in the diversity of young people’s lives and in the
problems of collecting reliable data about them. The
question of effective youth services for 2015 requires us
to find our way through some of these complexities,
and to attempt to make some predictions about what is
likely to happen with the key variables. 
Existing trends in youth incomes
The problem of collecting data
Accurate data collection and analysis of youth incomes
is difficult. Landt and Scott (1998) draw attention to
several factors that limit our understanding of the
income status of young people.
• There is a high non-response rate in income
surveys. 
• Data collection agencies have not yet found a way
to accurately quantify the internal cash and in-
kind transfers to young people from other
members of their “income unit”. 
• Young people, like other populations, may have
access to incomes which are not recorded in the
statistics, including cash and non-cash income
from informal, illegal and “hidden economy”
sources (White 1997).5
• Youth incomes are highly volatile. Landt and Scott
(1998) found that around 30% of 15- to 19-year-
olds and 17% of 20- to 24-year-olds changed their
labour force status at least once in each six-month
period.
As a result, youth policy and service provision must
be deeply cautious about the assumptions about
income and income transfers within households. Some
income-poor young people are very well-off indeed,
because they live in rich households. Young people
who are income-rich compared with their peers can
find themselves in difficult circumstances, particularly
where they are part of a couple with dependent
children. Many young people find it hard to make a
living income. Others can be earning more than many
adults in full-time work, while still living at home
without dependents. 
Part of this variation is an enormous difference
between the income demographic of young people at
the bottom of the age range, at 15 years old, to people
at the top, at 24. People at the bottom of the range are
mostly still in school, rarely involved in full-time work,
almost all still living with parents. Fifteen-year-olds
receive on average $60 per week in income (Landt &
Scott 1998, p.8). Twenty-four-year-olds receive $417
per week on average (Beer & Johnson 1999, p.4). But
only 9% of 20- to 24-year-olds were classed as
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5 In particular, effective marginal rates of taxation for people on
means-tested government allowances are extremely high (in
some cases, over 100%) once income tax is combined with the
reduction in government allowances resulting from any increase
in earned income. For the average single 20 to 24-year-old in the
bottom 20% of wage earners, effective marginal taxation rates
are estimated at 76% (Beer & Johnson 1999, p.18). When the
loss of cost-reducing devices such as health care cards are
factored in, it becomes clear that the incentive for engagement in
cash-in-hand employment is very high for part-time workers in
receipt of Government allowances. Again, however, the opportu-
nity or inclination of young people to engage in these economies
will vary widely, with some young people making a great deal of
money from such sources and many making none.
dependent children (1995/96 data) (Beer & Johnson
1999, p.2) while 61% of 15- to 19-year-olds were in this
position (1994/95 data) (Landt & Scott 1998, p.5).
Obviously, the income status of young people
depends a great deal on their availability for income-
generating work. This depends in turn to a great extent
on their participation in education. For this reason, the
ABS draws up its tables according to the degree to
which young people are involved in study, work, or
some combination of the two.
Table 6.1 indicates the major source of cash income
for young people (i.e. what percentages of young
people get most of their money from where),
depending on their participation in study.
The table indicates that in 1992, wages were the
principal source of income for almost 52% of young
people, followed by government benefits and
allowances. Almost 20% of young people had no
income of their own. Dependence on family was
clearly greatest for full-time students, with 41.2% of
them having no personal income, which, we assume, is
only possible if they survive by intra-family transfer.
Their median income from any source was only $72
per week, compared with $325 for those who weren’t
studying. 
Family situation and living arrangements
As chapter 7 indicates, more young people at all age
groups are living at home with their parents. This is
true across the income range of young people. Five per
cent more people in their early twenties who are in the
top 20% income bracket for their age were living with
relatives in 1995-96 compared with 1992. For many
teenagers, however, there is no option. Twenty-eight
per cent of 15- to 19-year-olds were receiving no
income in 1994–95. The remainder had an average
income of only $150 per week, making independent
living difficult (Landt & Scott 1998, p.5). Increasingly,
families are being called upon to subsidise the living
costs of their young adult offspring, and increasingly,
young people have no choice but to depend on their
parents for support. This movement is likely to increase
with Youth Allowance eligibility provisions which
assume parental dependence until the age of 25 in the
case of students and 21 in the case of non-students.
Wages and salaries
Nominal youth wages, indicated by the median weekly
earnings of full-time employees, have been increasing
over the last decade. However, the wages of young
workers have declined relative to their adult
workmates. Carlton and Mobila (1997) point out that
the wages of 20- to 24-year-old men constituted 87% of
adult wages in 1985. By 1995 these had dropped to
79%. The position of young women was worse, falling
from a wage which was close (97%) to the adult female
median wage in 1985 but which fell to 89% of that
wage a decade later. This is probably due in part to
adult female median wages rising faster relative to
other groups as barriers to adult female employment
and promotion decline.
While nominal wages, indicated by the average full-
time wage, may have increased over the last decade,
the actual incomes earned by young people have
generally fallen. Since 1982, in real terms, average wage
incomes for teenagers have fallen by 6% for full-time
workers and 29% for part-time workers (Landt & Scott
1998, p.13). The effect for 20- to 24-year-olds has been
less severe. Part-time workers’ average weekly income
dropped by 7% between 1990 and 1995–96 but full-
time workers’ wages increased by 2% in real terms (Beer
& Johnson 1999, p.4). 
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Table 6.1 Main source of income for young people by participation in education, 1992
Percentages of young people in each category
Wages Own Govt Investments Other Nil/ only Median Number 
business benefits sources partner’s income ($) (000’s)
income 
Not studying 64.6 3.2 24.6 0.5 0.6 6.5 325 1391.4
Studying full time 28.2 0.7 22.4 2.6 4.9 41.2 72 1066.4
Studying part time 77.6 2.5 13.9 1.0 0.4 4.6 301 290.4
Percentage total 51.8 2.2 22.6 1.4 2.2 19.8
Government benefits and allowances
The incomes of young people whose main source is
Youth Allowance or other government income
support have been rising over the last decade.
However, eligibility has been declining. For example,
the proportion of unemployed teenagers who do not
have any income more than doubled between 1982
and 1995–96. While those on full benefits were better
off in real terms, the average income of unemployed
15- to 19-year-olds fell by 5% over the period (Landt
& Scott 1998, p.15). This trend is increasing with the
increased use of breaching provisions under Mutual
Obligation policies. Full-time students on education
allowances faced similar circumstances. The average
total income of 20- to 24-year-olds studying full time
increased by 25% between 1990 and 1994–95, and
income from education allowances increased from
$28 to $42 per week. However, there were also a rising
number of young people with no incomes at all or
incomes only from part-time work.
Inequalities
Earned incomes for males and females have moved
significantly towards a more equal earning situation
for some age groups, but continue to be different in
spite of equal opportunity legislation. The inequalities
in actual incomes are also larger than the full-time
wage differentials indicated by Table 6.2. Beer and
Johnson (1999, p.4) note that 17- to 24-year-old males
have up to 30% higher incomes (from all sources) than
females. 
The income differential increases with age.
Assuming relatively constant size age cohorts,
summing their findings across the age range of 15 to 24
translates to an average gender-based income
inequality in favour of males of 13.4% for young
people 15 to 19 years old and 15.2% for 20- to 24-year-
olds. Of the top 20% income earners aged 20 to 24,
67% are male. Of the bottom 20%, 61% are female. 
Indigenous young people are particularly
vulnerable. The mean income for working Indigenous
people in 1994 was $24,300, excluding those employed
in Community Development Employment Projects.
The figure for the general population was $27,100. And
most Indigenous people aren’t working. Government
payments were the main source of income for 55% of
Indigenous people over 15 (Australian Bureau of
Statistics & Australian National University. Centre for
Aboriginal Economic Policy Research., 1996). Labour
market participation rates for 20- to 24-year-old
Indigenous young men are about ten percentage points
lower than for others (75.1% – 85.8%). For Indigenous
young women, the difference is more than 25% (50.1%
versus 76.9%). The situation did not improve signifi-
cantly between 1991 and 1996 (DETYA 1999b). The
median income of Indigenous people was only two-
thirds that of the general population at the 1986
census (Australian Bureau of Statistics 1996b). 
Summary
A number of significant trends emerge from the data.
• The sources of income for individual young people
vary widely and are becoming more, rather than
less, diverse.
• The amount of income earned by individual
young people varies widely, even where their
sources of income appear to be similar.
• The cost and expenditure patterns of individual
young people, affected most commonly by intra-
family transfers and subsidies, varies widely.
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Table 6.2 Median weekly earnings: full-time employees
1985 1990 1995
Earnings % median wage Earnings % median wage Earnings % median wage
m 15–19 184 51 246 50 273 45
f 15–19 178 61 238 59 273 53
m 20–24 308 87 412 83 469 79
f 20–24 279 97 379 94 453 89
m all ages 358 100 495 100 594 100
f all ages 288 100 405 100 508 100
Source: Carlton and Mobila 1997, ABS Catalogue No 6310.0
• There has been a steady drop in full-time
employment with an increase in young people
studying and an increase in students working part-
time.
• Many young people have no income and depend
on their parents. The percentage of young people
in this situation is increasing. 
• Income dependence on parents decreases signifi-
cantly with age.
• Incomes of part-time and full-time workers have
fallen since 1980.
• Wage relativities between young workers and
other workers are falling and falling more rapidly.
• Part-time workers who are not studying have
incomes of around half those of full-time workers.
• Government allowances have increased over the
last decade, but eligibility criteria have tightened
significantly.
• The percentage of young people without income
has increased due to increased difficulty in gaining
access to government income support.
• The highest incomes are for those in full-time
employment, including those working full-time
and studying part-time
• Most young people in the highest income groups
are young men in their 20s working full-time in
professional or trade occupations.
• Income generally increases with age
• Young people who are neither in education nor
employment have the lowest incomes.
• Effective marginal tax rates are high to extremely
high for young people on low incomes.
• Significant gender inequities persist in youth
incomes and, apart from the youngest age groups,
have not changed significantly in the last ten
years.
Future projections
The major criteria that will determine future youth
incomes are likely to be:
Government decisions on the nature, eligibility and amount
of allowances
Movements in political ideologies around income
support are hard to predict over a 15-year period.
Current trends indicate a willingness to maintain rates
of benefit at subsistence level, but to limit eligibility by
transferring responsibility for income support to
families or individuals wherever possible. Income
support budgets have not been expanding for some
time: there may be some correction to this in the next
15-year cycle, and perhaps some increased largesse by
government. Government’s capacity to support the
payment of allowances is likely to increase, or at least
to be maintained, as the income-producing proportion
of the population is likely to remain high.
The capacity and willingness of parents to subsidise youth
incomes or defray costs
The ability and willingness of families to support their
young adult offspring will vary a great deal, as now. In
general, it is likely to be made more affordable by the
fact that most families will have only one or two
children. One of the most common income units in
the year 2015 may indeed be a two-person unit
consisting of one parent and one dependent student.
Low income families, larger families and families that
do not place a high value on education are likely to be
least supportive. These features are likely to be
cumulative: low income families are likely to be larger
and to place a lower value on education. The most
supportive families are likely to be middle-class or
higher. While we would expect slow and uneven
improvement in their socioeconomic position over the
next 15 years, young people from Indigenous families
would continue to be at high risk of poverty.
Indigenous families are likely to be least able to support
adult offspring.
Whether young people live at home or in other household
arrangements
Current government policy has sought to increase the
number of young people living at home by extending
the assumption of parental support higher into the age
bracket even though the data indicates that only 9% of
20- to 24-year-olds are in fact dependent on their
parents. It remains to be seen how effective incomes
policy will be in reconstructing the dependent relation-
ship for 20- to 24-year-olds. However, it seems that
there are other forces which lead in the same direction,
and that the trend for more young people to stay at
home for longer will continue. The increasing fragility
of youth wage incomes may make an extended
dependent relationship necessary, at least on an on-
again/off-again basis.
Particular attention will need to be paid to young
people from rural areas who are wishing to continue
their education. Not having access to the subsidies
provided by the family home will have significant
impact on their income relativities.
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Wage movements for young people, and changes in
mechanisms that determine such wage movements
Youth wages have been under downward pressure for
some time. It is difficult to see a reversal in this trend.
While the youth population is declining relative to the
population as a whole, the youth labour market is and
always has been vulnerable to competition from other
adult workers. With high and increasing participation
rates across the population, it is difficult to see young
people’s labour market position improving.
Non-market forces, like the degree of unionisation
and the existence of centralised wage fixing or other
statutory or legislative mechanisms are generally
heading in directions that decrease the level of wage
protection for young people. Even apprenticeship
systems, which have been the most regulated of wage-
fixing systems, are heading in the direction of
increased flexibility, including wage flexibility. In the
next 15 years, we would expect a static or declining
average wage rate for young people. Again, however,
this is likely to be uneven. In a rapidly-changing world,
young people who have been able to adapt to the New
Economy may find substantial economic rewards. 
The move to part-time, casual and temporary work
As we have discussed a number of times, the pressure
in terms of the casualisation of labour seems all one
way. The trend data indicates that the effect of these
forces is to decrease youth incomes. Incomes for young
people will vary widely in this environment.
Education retention rates
While the rapid increase in the numbers of young
people engaged in education has levelled off since
1993, the general trend continues to be upwards. While
the income of full-time students aged 20 to 24 has
increased significantly since 1990, all of the increase
has been in non-wage incomes (Beer & Johnson 1999,
p.7). A significant proportion of this has been due to
active intervention by governments to provide
incentives for study over unemployment. We would
not expect these increases to continue.
The effectiveness of governments in controlling black or grey
economic activity
Expected improvements in surveillance, changes in
criminal law (e.g. legalisation of cannabis) and the
move towards electronic rather than cash transactions
may well increase governments’ control over the
informal and criminal economies. In strictly income
terms, any limitation in the informal economy will
have an impact on those young people who are
engaged with it. Decreasing incomes as a result of
improved controls are likely to have an effect across
socioeconomic groups but might be expected to impact
particularly on young people from low-income back-
grounds. 
Services
As the Introduction to this chapter noted, the demand
for services in areas such as education, employment,
housing and health are significantly a function of what
is happening in the area of youth incomes. The
capacity of young people to meet their own needs
without requiring external assistance depends on their
capacity to pay, any decline in youth incomes will
require an increasing range of services in health,
housing etc. to be provided within the public or
community sectors. In an environment where the
public sector is subject to increasing disinvestment,
youth incomes will need to be sufficient to meet needs
no longer provided by the public sector. Or, the trend
in user-pays and privatisation approaches will need
serious reconsideration.
However, the discussion above does have a number
of implications for structures within which youth
incomes are provided.
Given the declining role of unions in the
workplace, and the decreasing capacity for unions to
provide services within the fragmented, casual,
temporary work environment foreshadowed by the
New Economy, young people will need access to infor-
mation and advocacy services to protect them from
breach of contract, underpayment and exploitation. 
Junior wage structures have been under challenge
for some time. Prima facie, it is unjust for two workers
to be paid differently solely because one is younger
than the other. Equal pay for equal work has long been
a primary principle of wage justice in Australia, but it
does not yet apply to young people. While there is
some logic in the claim that lower wages improve
employability for young people who generally suffer
higher rates of unemployment, we would not counte-
nance the same approach for other groups which are
subject to discrimination, such as Indigenous people.
We would expect that by 2015 junior wage structures
will have been dismantled in favour of training wages
or skill provisions. 
While many young people have the benefit of cost
reduction associated with living with their parents,
many do not. The very significant difference in
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effective income which this involves will need to be
addressed. Currently, this problem is addressed for
couples and families either through the provision of
add-on income support (e.g. family income
supplement) or through direct income tax mechanisms
(e.g. dependent spouse rebate). Similar mechanisms
could be used to provide income equity for young
people in different living circumstances to ensure that
the assumption of parental support does not result in
marginal survival conditions for young people who do
not have that privilege.
Parental support needs to be established in fact, not
presumed. Provision needs to be made for those not
uncommon circumstances where parental support is
not forthcoming.
Conclusion 
Generally, the future for youth incomes appears to be
characterised by diversity. There are general pressures
towards lower incomes, more brittle incomes, and
greater difficulty in access to income from all sources.
Incomes are likely to come from several sources for
more young people: combinations of wages (often from
several jobs), short-term contracts, government
allowances, parental support and self-employment. 
Income from any or all of these sources is likely to
fluctuate. Many young people, particularly as they get
older, may enjoy periods of affluence as they are able
to tap into a particularly well-paying contract or line of
activity. Some will establish businesses or find
economic niches which pay very well. Some will have
the kind of parental backing which will give them
access to capital, supported education, an economic
buffer in lean periods, and low cost of living structures.
Some will have an aptitude for the New Economy
enabling them to become members of a new rising
wealth class.
Most young people, however, will be poor, and
discounted incomes both from wages and allowances
are likely to extend further up the age range in the next
15 years. Young people without parental support,
whether due to parental poverty, large family sizes,
geographical distance, or breakdown in family relation-
ships are the most vulnerable. This will be intensified
where young people have been unable to construct a
successful relationship with school and other educa-
tional institutions, and who face barriers to any kind of
employment as a result. 
Of particular concern to the expert forums was the
likelihood of polarisation in effective youth incomes.
Advantage and disadvantage are likely to be
cumulative. Young people who have high levels of
family support are also likely to have competitive
advantage in part-time work due to presentation,
accent, transport and stability factors. They are also
likely to be able to cope reasonably well with formal
schooling. Young people who are able to fit
government objectives and thus to be eligible for
allowances and other assistance are at a significant
advantage over young people who may have left school
early and for whom further education is not a possible
pathway to income security. 
A long-term and not so visible problem would
appear to be those young people who do not fit
particular target groups or eligibility criteria. They are
able to get part-time work, but not full-time work, and
not enough to support themselves or move out of
home. They don’t have entry requirements for
university, or formal education is not attractive for
them. Their parents are not requiring them to leave
home, but aren’t in a position to subsidise them either.
Immediate survival is not at stake, but there is little
option of building up a career path or a long-term
assets base. In such cases, in the event of a crisis such as
a broken bone, a court case or a car breakdown, the
distance to absolute poverty is short. 
Young people who are neither in work nor in
education and training are likely to face severe poverty.
If the informal or criminal economy is not to be their
only option, creative and well supported services need
to be in place for information and referral, the develop-
ment of work and training options, and the adequate
provision of incomes in the meantime.
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Introduction: exclusion, family, and
household forms
The household in which a person lives is obviously a
key factor in determining their personal and social
health. Households provide a range of supports and
economies for people, and consequently enable people
to have enough background resources to engage
successfully in enterprises outside the household and
within it. The failure of households to support and
resource their members, whether the household is
based around a person’s family of origin, the families
they form themselves, or other household combina-
tions, has significant implications for social difficulty
and therefore for service provision. 
The core household for most young people in
Australia is their family of origin. Most continue to live
at home, and mothers and fathers continue to be the
strongest influence in their lives and their most valued
source of information and advice (Springhall 1984).
The process of negotiating autonomy within the family
and separation from it can sometimes be a challenge
for young people (and more typically their parents) but
generally conflict between young people and their
parents is reasonably short term, and confined to
reasonably minor issues such as bedroom tidiness.
Serious conflict is not common (Hollin 1988).
However, where it does occur and young people leave
home early, the acceleration in social difficulty can be
extreme. Once the family is removed from the picture,
social support structures become very thin.
The process of becoming accredited as adult is also
intimately tied up with this process of negotiating
autonomy with the family of origin. The acceptance of
adult status within the family is an important precursor
to the assumption of adult status outside it. Leaving
home, and establishing a household and ultimately a
family of ones’ own is a crucial signal to the world that
a young person is ready to be dealt with by the world
on equal terms. The points of separation from the
family are therefore important instalments on the
extended passage into adulthood that young people go
through in Australia. In current legislation and social
policy, for example, marriage and/or the birth of a
child serve as unambiguous indicators of adult status
where the age of independence can still be subject to
administrative fiat and convenience.
The family can mitigate and mediate the exclusion
that young people experience, and provide safe and
negotiated entry into the world of adulthood. On the
other hand, it may prolong dependency, denying young
people the experiences and responsibility necessary for
them to take their place in the world. Or it may eject
them early and unprotected into a world that is ready to
assume that they are deviant and dangerous, and thus
begin a career of alienation and exclusion. 
The family is changing. This is not new: the nature
of internal relations within the family, its size, compo-
SEVEN: FAMILIES
AND HOUSEHOLDS
Youth and the future: Effective youth services for the year 2015 67
sition and power structure are dynamic and responsive
to social and economic changes. Families in 1950 were
very different to families in 1850. With these changes,
the position of young people within the family, their
role, their relationships to other people in the
household, the balance of dependence and autonomy
also becomes subject to change. 
Families are also diverse. While there may be
dominant forms in a given society at a given time, on
the ground there will be a wide variety of family
structures incorporating a range of different kinds of
members, some of whom will be related, some not.
This diversity is increasing, and what dominant forms
exist are becoming less so. Young people are among
those within Australian society who are most available
to experiment with different household forms, and
may be most creative in the development of new
templates for living together. However, this process of
social experimentation can also have its costs and
tensions.
This chapter explores what is happening with
young people, their relationships with families of
origin, the households in which they live, and the
kinds of families or surrogate families which they
establish.
Existing trends in how young
people live
Who young people live with
Young people are involved in a number of different
living arrangements. The vast majority of young people
in contemporary Australia continue to live with their
parents, and this figure is increasing. In June 1997,
around 88% of 15- to 19-year-olds, and about 46% of
20- to 24-year-olds, were living with at least one
parent. Since 1982, the total percentage of young
people living with parents has increased from 61% to
66% (McLennan 1997, p.19). In particular, the
numbers of those aged 20 to 24 living with their
parents has been slowly rising, from 43% in 1988 to
48% in 1999. The rate of change has accelerated in the
past couple of years, rising as much in the last three
years as in the previous ten (ibid.).
Other living situations include living alone, living
as a couple with or without children, living in institu-
tions such as hospitals, hostels or prisons, living in
shared housing, living with relatives, and living as a
single parent. 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics has projected
these living arrangements in five-yearly stages to 2021.
Calculated by linear projection from the 1986–1996
census data, the results of this projection are repre-
sented in Table 7.1
There are a number of shifts indicated by this data.
• The number of “traditional” two-parent
households with children will decrease, and the
numbers of young people living in such
households will decrease. 
• The number of single-parent households will
increase.
• The number of young people living with a single
parent will increase. Most will continue to live
with their mothers.
• The number of young people living in group
households (i.e. with non-family members) will
increase.
• More young people will be living alone, though
most will continue to live with other people.
• Fewer young people will be living as a couple.
• Fewer young people will be living as a couple with
children. In fact, by 2016, for the population at
large, there will be more couple families without
children than with (ibid., p.2). 
• More young people will be living with a relative.
Interestingly, this particular set of projections
shows a stable trend for the proportion of young
people living with parents, in contradiction to other
data and to intuition. The figures are explained by the
fact that these numbers are projected from the 1986-
1996 trend. In the scheme of yearly fluctuations, 1986
was a high year, and 1996 a low year for young people
staying at home, particularly teenagers (McLennan
1997, p.28). 
Other data show an increased likelihood of young
people continuing to live at home in the future.
McLennan (1997, p.19) suggests that the underlying
trend for young people to stay at home is strong.
Carlton and Mobila (1997, p.38) indicate that the
proportion of 15- to 19-year-olds staying at home
increased from 84% to 89% between 1982 and 1992.
For 20- to 24-year-olds the figure increased from 41%
to 47%. Figures offered in McLennan (1999, p.28) show
an increase in the proportions of 20- to 24-year-olds
living with parents, from 43.3% in 1988 to 48% in
1999. The rate fluctuates up and down a little, but the
trend is clearly for more young people to be living with
mum and/or dad in the future, especially 20- to 24-
year-olds.
Retention of young people within the family home
has also been a direct objective of policies such as the
Youth Allowance, and we would expect such policies to
impact over the next decade, rather than the last.
Retention within the family home is also strongly
correlated with participation in education (Carlton &
Mobila 1997, p.38), and as education participation
increases, we would expect young people to stay at
home for longer.
Is retention within the family a good thing?
While the majority of families certainly care effectively
for the young people within them, it cannot be
assumed that living at home indicates that this is so.
Assumptions that an appropriate level of support is
available from within the family, or that the family
works well in other ways for the care of its members
need to be tested in practice and alternative sources of
support need to be available where the family cannot,
or will not, effectively care for the young people in its
midst. 
Of particular concern to the expert forums was the
observation that families are not necessarily very
adaptive to changing conditions. Parents, in the
absence of good information, can often assume that
conditions for young people now are pretty much the
same as when they were young, and have expectations
of their young adult children which are not realistic in
a changed environment. They may not know how to
effectively resource their offspring in an environment
which they themselves do not understand, and may
develop repressive and damaging patterns of interac-
tion in response.
Participants were conscious of the way that
increasing social and governmental demands were
being made of a structure which is smaller, has fewer
non-working hours available, and overall fewer internal
human resources. These fewer resources are being
expected to meet higher and higher economic and
social expectations in the care of family members. They
suggested that the family was becoming overloaded
and stressed, and wondered about the effects of this
not only on the health and well-being of family
members but on the rate of family breakdown itself.
Family structure
Households are becoming smaller in Australia. In 1996,
the average number of persons per household was 2.6.
It is expected to fall to 2.4 by 2011, and below 2.3 by
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Table 7.1 The living arrangements of 15- to 24-year-olds: linear projection from 1986–1996 data (Series C)
1996 2001 2006 2011 2016
% % % % %
Partner, couple+child 4.6 3.3 2.4 1.8 1.3
Child, couple 49.3 49.3 48.0 46.7 44.8
Relative, couple+child 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6
Partner, couple no child 8.3 6.7 5.5 4.5 3.6
Relative, couple no child 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7
Male single parent 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Female single parent 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.6 2.8
Child of single parent 11.2 12.2 13.0 13.7 14.3
Relative of single parent 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6
Relative 3.0 3.3 3.7 4.1 4.6
Living with family 82.8 81.6 79.9 78.4 76.7
Group households 10.3 11.1 12.3 13.3 14.5
Male alone 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.9
Female alone 1.9 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.2
Institutions etc. 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.7
Total 15- to 24-year-olds 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Skinner, T. (1999) Household and family projections Australia 1996–2021 ABS, Canberra
2021. Families will have fewer children, more people
will live alone, and the proportion of single-parent
families is expected to rise. This may have a number of
consequences. Smaller families, and single-parent
families, are more mobile. With increasing geographic
mobility, the chances of social dislocation for young
people tend to increase. Moving to new areas may
mean the loss of old friends, distance from other
family, including a non-custodial parent, and loss of a
sense of neighbourhood and belonging. The risks of
alienation, detachment from social belonging, and the
resulting anomie are significant. 
It may also be the case that smaller family size
increases the potential for conflict within the family,
and serious conflict may be more likely to trigger
leaving home. Smaller families have fewer places to
hide either physically or socially, and nowhere else to
go but to leave. The intensity of relationship and rela-
tionship expectations in households with only two or
three members may also increase the pressure on rela-
tionships within the household.
However, we would also expect countervailing
forces. All things being equal, the economics of
households with fewer children would be expected to
improve on average. Lower costs and the opportunity
for higher household levels of labour force participa-
tion would both contribute to a potential decrease in
household poverty, one of the fundamental dynamics
in the design of youth services for 2015. Having fewer
children increases the opportunity for investment in
the care and education of each child, and there is some
potential for more effective socialisation. However,
there are losses as well. Siblings are a vital socialising
influence in children and young people, and with more
one-child families, this influence is lost. Raising
children effectively will be more dependent on parental
skills than previously, as brothers and sisters will be
unable to compensate for the mistakes of parents (see
Muuss 1988, p.26ff). 
If trends in divorce and remarriage continue, we
would also expect more young people living in step
and blended families (i.e. where one or both parents
have children from another relationship) in the future.
Step and blended families are inherently less stable,
particularly for young people, than natural families.
Young people tend to leave home earlier, and conflict
is cited as the primary reason for leaving home more
often: in fact, more than twice as often than is the case
for natural families (Castles 1994, p.22).
Rates of separation and divorce have been a primary
social concern in Australia over the last 15 years, and
parental relationship breakdown clearly has a profound
impact on young people and the services they need.
However, movements in the rate of divorce have been
moderate over the last decade, only increasing from 2.4
per thousand in 1987 to 2.8 per thousand in 1997.
Average duration of marriages has not changed signifi-
cantly over the last 30 years (Castles 1994, p.12). The
change between 1987 and 1997 was a slight increase
from 7.3 to 7.7 years (McLennan 1997, p.19;
McLennan 1999, p.29). 
The percentage of divorces which involve children
under 18 is falling slightly, but still involves over half
of all divorces. It appears that the problems associated
with divorce and separation for young people will
occur at a rate similar to the present if current trends
continue. Of course, with over 50% of divorces impli-
cating children under 18 and around 30% of marriages
ending in divorce, these problems are not insignificant.
Family breakdown associated with de facto partner-
ships is harder to track, and the large and growing
proportion of relationships of this kind may indicate a
trend in family breakdown which the ABS data does
not disclose.
Young people and family/household formation
It is important to recognise, that a significant number
of 15- to 19-year-olds (15.7% and growing), and a clear
majority of 20- to 24-year-olds were not living with
their families in 1996. When youth policy or youth
services are directed to families of origin, and assume
that young people are generally residing there, they do
so at the cost of completely missing one in six
teenagers and more than half of all 20- to 24-year-olds.
Young people are actively involved in household
formation, especially after leaving school, and in
beginning households, partnerships and families of
their own. These processes are the subject of some
quite clear movement over the last 15 years.
While marriage rates are still high, it is now normal
for couples to live for a time in a de facto relationship
before formalising it in registered marriage. Young
people, when they marry, are marrying later. The
median age of first marriage for men was 23.4 years in
1971, and 21.1 years for women (Castles 1994, p.9). In
1987 the figure was 25.9 for men and 23.8 for women.
By 1997 it had climbed to 27.8 for men and 25.9 for
women (McLennan 1999, p.29). 
Marriage has always been a reasonably unam-
biguous rite of passage into adulthood for young men
and women. With more young people marrying closer
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to their thirties, and more occupying the inherently
greyer ground of de facto partnership, clear graduation
into adulthood is once again being delayed. And a
growing number of young people will never marry. The
crude marriage rate, according to the ABS, has
decreased from 7 per 1,000 in 1987 to 5.8 in 1997.
The same trend can be observed with the process of
having children. The birth rate for teenage mothers has
gone down from 5.7% of all births in 1987 to 4.9% in
1997 (McLennan 1999, p.29). In 1971 it was 11% of all
births (Castles 1994, p.13). Age-specific fertility rates  per
1,000 women have plummeted: from 55.5 in 1971 to
22.1 in 1991 for teenage women, and from 181.9 to 75
for 20- to 24-year-olds. The general trend is for more
women to have a child outside a registered marriage
(18% of all births were outside marriage in 1987,
compared with 28.1% in 1997 and rising (McLennan
1999, p.29)). It also appears that fewer young people are
marrying because of a pregnancy: the number of births
which occurred seven months or less after marriage has
decreased significantly (Castles 1994, p.13). 
Parenthood has historically been another
reasonably hard-line indicator of adult status. With the
increasing age of parenthood, the increasing number of
young people who will never have children or who will
delay parenthood until their late thirties or forties, the
acquisition of adulthood becomes more compromised
and once again more ambiguous. 
Where young people live
There are some significant differences between young
people and the general population in terms of the
kinds of housing and the terms on which they stay
there. Few young people, for example, own their own
homes: less than 1% in 1994. Slightly more have a
mortgage, at 6.2%. Most are renting (25%), boarding
(20.6%) or are living “rent free” – e.g. with parents or
perhaps partners (47%). More unemployed young
people are living rent free than others, and there is a
range of data that indicate that staying at home or
moving back there is a common response that young
people have to unemployment (e.g. Castles 1994,
p.21). It is also a common strategy for survival as a
student. Over 70% of those not in the labour force are
living rent free. 
No trend data are available specifically on housing
tenure for young people, but the trends aren’t difficult
to project from other influencing factors such as the
rate of unemployment and retention in education and
from the data on household types.
It has been recognised for a long time that housing
costs are a vital component in disposable income, and
therefore for poverty. Poverty lines, for example, have
always calculated after-housing income as well as the
more familiar income level. Young people, according to
the data, spend a high proportion of their income on
housing. Thirteen per cent of young people were
spending more than 50% of their income on housing
in 1994, and 44.8% were spending more than 25%.
Single parents were particularly exposed, with 30%
spending more than half their income on housing, and
62.2% spending more than 25% (Carlton & Mobila
1997, p.41). Young people also live in more dilapidated
housing, notwithstanding the numbers that continue
to live with their parents. In 1994, the number of
young people living in houses with five or more
problems was one and a half times the average (ibid.).
One of the most persistent and serious concerns
within the youth affairs field and the broader
Australian community has been youth homelessness.
Given that almost all our statistical data comes from
household surveys, it is not surprising that our data on
youth homelessness is exceedingly poor. The paucity of
good data is exacerbated by the fact that young people
who are homeless are often also not engaged with
other social institutions such as school and
employment, so do not feature in statistical collection
at those sites either.
The Morris Report (House of Representatives
Standing Committee on Community Affairs 1995)
came to the conclusion that there were 15–19,000
young people homeless in May 1991. The report
suggested that the number of homeless under 18 year
olds had doubled in the three years since, to 21,000 by
May 1994. Supported accommodation agencies dealt
with almost 17,000 separate young people in the six
months to December 1996, indicating a 1996 figure
seriously in excess of the total estimate for 1991. Note
that this only counts young people at services for the
homeless and is an underestimation of unknown, but
probably large, proportions. Notwithstanding this, it
still indicates that somewhere around one young
person in 150 had contact with a supported accommo-
dation agency in that six months. This is not a small
figure.
Indigenous young people
As with other areas of inquiry, the statistical picture for
Indigenous young people is quite different to that of
the general population. More Indigenous households
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are family-type households (86.6% versus 76.2% for the
general population). Extended family and multi-family
households are also more common; 6.2% of Indigenous
households were of this type as opposed to 1.2% for
the general population. Forty five per cent of all three-
family households were Indigenous. 
This indicates a significant pattern of overcrowding.
Indeed, the census indicates that Indigenous
households have almost two-thirds more people than
the general population, and rural households have
more than double: an average of six persons per
household in rural areas (Australian Bureau of Statistics
1994). The number of Indigenous households with
more than one person per bedroom is seven and a half
times the average (Australian Bureau of Statistics,
1999d).
Household overcrowding is likely to be a significant
factor in the presence of Indigenous young people in
public space. In many families, household conditions
are such that they depend on young people spending
most of their time out of the house (Sercombe 1983).
This has implications for a variety of risk factors,
including being victims of crime and being the subject
of police attention.
Trends for the future do not indicate any immediate
relief in these pressures. The Indigenous population is
young, with over half being under 20 years old, and
14% under 5. Fertility rates are high – over a third
higher than for the general population. At the age of
45, Indigenous women had on average 4.9 children
each, according to the 1986 Census. The national
average was 2.6 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 1994).
This points to a population that is rapidly growing. The
actual rate is difficult to quantify, but the Indigenous
population is expected to grow by more than 10%
between 1996 and 2001 (Australian Bureau of Statistics
2000). The attendant strains in Indigenous households
are obvious.
Consistent with this, Indigenous young people are
less firmly located in their household of origin. In
1995, less than half of Indigenous young people were
living with parents, compared with almost two-thirds
for all 15- to 24-year-olds (Australian Youth Foundation
2000). 
Many Indigenous households are also touched with
a history of dislocation and institutionalisation. In
1994, 10.3% of Indigenous people over 25 had been
taken away from their natural family. Over 90% of
these had been raised in non-Indigenous settings, and
over 60% in institutions like orphanages or missions
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 1996b). This experience
has clear implications for the development of natural
parenting skills.
Tenure patterns also differ from the mainstream.
Almost 70% of Aboriginal households are in rental
accommodation, 42% of which is public housing. More
than 21% of households said that their accommoda-
tion was unsatisfactory – usually because it was too
small or in poor repair (Australian Bureau of Statistics
1996b). 
Future projections
The data indicates that if current trends continue, it
will be more difficult in 2015 for young people to
establish themselves as adult. Symbolic indicators of
adult status such as marriage, having a child, and
leaving home are all receding further and further into
the distance. This adds to trends already noted in
employment and education, and contribute to a well
grounded belief that unless action is taken, the youth
category will be progressively redefined and expanded
up the age range. This conclusion was also supported
strongly by the expert forums.
Increased levels of family stress can be expected as a
smaller, more mobile, harder working family unit is
expected to provide more economic, psychological and
social support for young people within it. Increased
tension, and presumably higher rates of family
breakdown, may result. 
An increase in extra-family supports is projected:
more young people in care, and more resources needed
for those young people. Homelessness among young
people is expected to increase, and to impact on young
people at younger ages. Accommodation will need to
be directed towards meeting the needs of people much
younger than current services do.
Serious problems will arise in the availability of
housing. If public housing trends continue to decline
in the way they have been, a severe shortage of
affordable housing stock is predicted. Forums suggested
that all types of housing tenure are likely to be difficult
to access as affordability declines. This will have dispro-
portionate effects on young people, as demand for
limited rental housing stock increases. The effect on
Indigenous households, who are highly dependent on
public housing, will be even more critical.
If trends worsen, however, expert forums feared a
deeper polarisation in living conditions, with some
families not being able to afford housing (or, indeed,
food and other necessities) and others living in high
security luxury housing precincts. Economically well-
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established families may be able to offer younger
members significant resources, leading to cumulative
advantage in education, competitiveness in
employment, and lower living costs. Poorer families
will find their young excluded from increasingly
market-driven education, vulnerable to short-term and
erratic employment, and unable to meet the costs of a
family that is economically dependent until the late
twenties.
Under these conditions, homelessness would be
expected to increase as family breakdown and the
stresses of step and blended families make it harder for
young people to survive within family settings. The
hard-to-service end of the young homeless population
may be met with increasingly repressive forms of
governance including institutionalisation and carceral
approaches to their care.
In a worsening trend, increased stresses on the
family and the limited capacity of generational cultures
to adapt to changed environmental conditions would
result in greater reactive generational conflict.
Generations will find it harder to understand each
other, and the willingness to understand may dissipate
with an increasingly hard-line older generation. Young
people may well seek refuge from a more febrile family
and household situation by developing alternative
forms of social living, including communal and other
living experiments.
The plummeting birthrate would produce a society
in which children are scarce. Economic uncertainty,
increasing expectations of educational qualifications,
and the increased projected costs of supporting
children through to independence will mean that
many young people may choose to defer childbearing
until their late thirties or forties, have only one child,
or choose not to have children at all. Economic
recession and instability would increase as consumer
demand drops off on the back of a declining
population base and shortfalls in the supply of labour
begin to bite. An implication of this is that attempts to
meet further falls in birthrate with migration may
result in cultural tensions as immigration programs are
expanded beyond the capacity for social adjustment.
In the light of this, expert forums suggested a range
of principles that should govern effective service
delivery in order to produce outcomes which are
productive, positive and fair for young people. These
included services which promote a community which:
• is equal, 
• is healthy, 
• is safe and secure, 
• maximises freedom and autonomy, 
• is adaptive, 
• is restorative and integrative, 
• is engaging, and 
• ensures power is accountable to its constituents.
Forum participants indicated strongly that effective
planning could ensure that families were supported in
the context of local communities. Small, potentially
mobile families would need the support of a strong
wider network of households, and a healthy community
would be one in which these links were facilitated and
resourced. Forums spoke of raising children in “villages”,
whether they be urban communities, communities in a
rural setting or communities of interest. 
A healthy society would be open to new forms of
family, and willing to support experimentation with
new ways of living together. Given the centrality of
family as a support in the lives of young people, a
healthy society would see it as essential that the
supports are supported. Part of this would be assistance
for social structures like the family to change, develop
and adjust.
Different generations would be actively engaged
with one another, and actively interested in respecting,
understanding and working with difference across
generational lines. Generational payback, either from
the old to the young or the young to the old, would be
reduced or eliminated.
The overall implication is that expert forums were
not indicating that a healthy society would necessarily
be one in which “the traditional family” was supported
at all costs as the sole acceptable template for success-
fully living together. There was acceptance that the
family is already a plural institution, and that it is
likely to become more so. Consequently it is important
to support all families and households, whatever their
shape and size, to be able to do what they do well. The
critical dynamic in this is the quality of the family’s
wider social connections and support as a means of
guaranteeing resilience in an environment which was
subject to rapid change and high mobility.
Services needed
Expert forums indicated a need to pay close attention
to the range of housing options available for young
people and their families. This included attention to
the question of public housing, which is currently
being sold off in most State jurisdictions. A housing
economy with a primary focus on owner-occupiers and
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which structures economic advantage in that direction
is an economy which structurally disadvantages young
people, because they are generally not owner-occupiers.
This is intensified in the case of Indigenous young
people.
This structural disadvantage is likely to increase
with changes in employment for young people and
indeed for others in the labour market, including their
parents. Participants were not convinced of the
capacity of the private market to meet Australia’s
housing needs. A significant reinvestment in public
housing, in a variety of forms, including group and
community housing, was supported. For Indigenous
households, larger houses and more community
housing was clearly indicated.
Support for families was seen as important. Early
intervention, and open access to counselling, conflict
management and mediation were seen as important
components of this. A recognition that many families
were unlikely to be completely self-sufficient without
state and community support underwrote many partic-
ipants’ thinking. 
Prevention of destructive forms of conflict and
damaging forms of communication, interaction and
patterns of behaviour is critical. This may involve inter-
vention, or access by families to services which
improve the capacity of the family to deal with change,
tension and internal conflict. In particular, families
may need help to adapt to a changed household
dynamic in which parents are living with adult
offspring, and living with them for many years, rather
than (or at the same time as) being set up for the care
and discipline of small children.
Other programs involve rebuilding community life
so that families, whatever their size and form, are less
isolated, better connected and have access to lines of
release or healing that do not involve formal, State-
mandated intervention by professionals. A
reinvestment in community development was seen as
essential to effective family support.
This focus on social capital, on more integrated
communities as the means to healthy families was
indicated in all three scenarios. An active, supportive
community is needed whatever the future looks like.
Community development, including attention both to
the built environment through better town planning,
transport policy and environmental management and
to the social environment through active processes
which rebuild and sustain community life, is a core
strategy for the support of young people in families
and other households.
In a worsening environment, the same supports
would be needed as indicated in the “same” kind of
projection, but at a higher level. Family crisis accom-
modation would be needed, and crisis intervention
services for cases of family violence or abuse would
need to be upgraded. Quick-response rescue services for
cases of domestic violence were one of the strategies
indicated by expert forums.
On the other hand, expert forums indicated that no
services would be needed if we are able to effectively
develop the kind of community in which diverse and
healthy forms of family and household were
encouraged to develop. This may be an overstatement,
but it indicates how critical it is to build the kinds of
communities that are able to offer support to
households as part of the natural everyday rhythm of
life, rather than statutory state intervention. Family
policy is therefore community development policy.
Notwithstanding this, the data indicate that rela-
tionships will not suddenly cease to break down, and
all conflict disappear, because people live in healthy
communities. Many difficulties arise in families as a
product of personal and private factors, which,
although responsive to social influences, are not
ultimately reducible to them. This may often be
painful, and generate levels of resentment and anger
even in the best of worlds. In some cases, young people
may be left isolated by the process of breakdown, or
more typically by the process of repartnering. Access to
effective professional support under such conditions,
and ideally before the process becomes toxic, should be
part of the standard resource which any community
holds for its members. For young people especially, the
most viable option may well be to move to indepen-
dent living, perhaps with alternative personal and
economic supports in place. A range of housing stock
and household options needs to be in place to ensure
young people’s safety and health in such situations.
Conclusion
The direction of change in the position of young
people in the context of the households and families in
which they live echoes many of the features noted in
chapters on work and employment, education and
income. Young people are staying in the family home
longer. The statistical and other data indicate that the
age at which young people are able to establish inde-
pendent households is creeping closer to 30 for a large
and growing number of young people. 
The process is intensified by other factors discussed
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in this chapter such as delayed family formation,
including age of marriage or other forms of partner-
ship, and delayed childbearing. Both of these have
been part of the constellation of markers which
symbolically indicate that accreditation as adult is
imminent – in fact, they have been among the most
powerful and unambiguous of them. Their absence
indicates that accreditation is likely to become more
ambiguous and uncertain, and subject to further
delays, than at present. As we indicate elsewhere, this
was a major concern of contributors to this study.
What vague and diffuse rites of passage currently exist
are becoming even more vague and diffuse, if not
disappearing altogether.
There may be other reasons why shoehorning
young people back into the family may not be
productive. While most families adapt reasonably well
to their children’s emergent adulthood in the context
of the family home, many families are set up for the
care of dependent children and do not adjust well to
the very different requirements of dependent adult
offspring. There is a serious risk, expressed by the
expert forums, that in wanting to affirm the family and
its prerogatives, current policy may be increasing the
pressure within families beyond load limits. Policies
which facilitate the progressive, negotiated, supported
movement of young people to independent living, in
ways that maximise their continued connection with
their families of origin may well be healthier both for
young people and for their families.
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Introduction: health, youth and
exclusion
Young people in Australia are, on the whole, pretty
healthy. According to everyday medical measures of
physical good health, as shown by morbidity and
mortality rates, young people are the healthiest section of
the community. Health is, of course, broader than that.
Mahler (1981) defines health as that condition which
enables people to lead socially and economically
satisfying lives. The constitution of the World Health
Organisation (WHO) points in the same direction,
defining health as “a state of complete physical, mental
and social well-being” (World Health Organisation 1984).
The definition has also been extended to include
the political and spiritual dimensions of life
(Manaharan 1982) with the recognition that feelings of
powerlessness are basic to apathy and ill-health (World
Health Organisation 1986). It follows that exclusion,
because it creates powerless groups in society, promotes
ill health in the groups that are excluded. In this
context, there are clearly a number of risk factors that
sometimes lead to young people’s health and well-
being being compromised.
For the last couple of centuries, understandings of
health have been dominated by medical discourse. This
is true of youth health too: youth health is principally
seen in terms of medical data on illness and the
physical condition of young people, despite the
widespread acceptance of the WHO definition of
health, and the relatively minor importance of physical
health in the overall picture of youth health.
Conversely, the data on well-being is disconcertingly
thin (Moon, Meyer & Grau 1999). There are reasons for
this: data collection about medical conditions is now
routine and institutionalised. The medical profession is
dominant in health research, including designing and
implementing health surveys. And while medical data
is perhaps not the most important data set for young
people, it is critical to assessments of health for other
age groups. 
However, for young people, health is principally
behavioural and social in nature, rather than simply a
function of the body. Mostly, young people’s bodies
work well. Therefore, this chapter also gives attention
to the broader framework of well-being and risk-taking
behaviour as well as physical health. The categories are
not exclusive or independent of each other, but will be
useful when looking at current and future strategies for
effective health interventions. Young people also, of
course, live in the general Australian environment, and
are subject to the health effects of that environment,
including conditions like obesity and cancer and
everything else, though typically at lower rates than
others. However, we have chosen in this chapter to
focus on issues that are typical of young people, or
typically ascribed to them, rather than universal health
concerns from which young people are not exempt. 
EIGHT: HEALTH, YOUNG
PEOPLE AND YOUTH SERVICES
Well-being
Within the literature, several factors are considered to
be important to well-being. These include: 
• secure and supportive personal relationships; 
• hope for the future;
• feelings of self-worth;
• feelings of being needed;
• positive relationships infancy and early life;
• seeing a positive role in the world for self;
• feelings of being accepted for who you are, by
significant others; and
• basic material needs securely met.
Other factors are considered to be detrimental to
well-being, including: 
• child abuse and neglect; 
• erratic parenting, unstable family life;
• parental substance abuse;
• parental depression;
• family violence;
• maternal death before 11years old;
• rejection by family or peers;
• feeling unable to live up to expectations of signifi-
cant others;
• disability, chronic pain;
• incarceration; and
• marginalisation.
At the more concrete level, public concern about
young people’s health has mostly concentrated on the
following issues: 
• sexual health, including sexually transmitted
diseases;
• pregnancy and childbirth;
• various mental health problems arising from
societal, social and personal difficulty, including
stress, anxiety and depression;
• mental illness, including bipolar affective
disorders and schizophrenia;
• risk-taking behaviours;
• suicide;
• chronic medical conditions such as asthma;
• suicide related behaviours (parasuicide) and self-
harm;
• anorexia and other body-control disorders;
• problematic drug use; and
• accident and injury.
Many of these conditions have been considered as
medical problems, and medical intervention has
certainly been important for recovery to health.
However, several of these conditions do not have a
primary physical origin. Suicide, for example, at the
extreme negative end of the well-being continuum, is
more usually related to personal conditions than to a
physical medical condition (Watts 1997). But a recent
report, finding (perhaps a little obviously) that many
suicidal persons were depressed, therefore placed
depression as a major cause of suicide (Carr-Gregg 2000).
Existing trends in youth health
There is now a very rich stream of data on young
people’s health, thanks to the Australian Institute of
Health and Welfare’s (AIHW) comprehensive report
Australia’s young people: their health and well-being
(1999). Statistics are presented on a wide range of
health indicators, and we have used the report exten-
sively. However, we still confront the problem that
trend data is much more scarce, even within this
report, and presents limitations on projection here as
elsewhere.
Risk factors in young people’s well-being
A number of commentators have pointed to an
increase in potential stressors within young people’s
lives over the last two or three decades. The literature
suggests several reasons for what are perceived to be
upward trends in suicide, parasuicide, stress, substance
abuse, anxiety and depression.6
One idea is that the higher material standards of
living available in modern society removes hope of
future improvement, and takes away the ability of the
individual to plausibly blame their circumstances or
society in general for their plight. This increases the
likelihood of self blame. Some argue that the materi-
alism of modern society means people are valued
according to their possessions rather than their
personal qualities and that this marginalises both the
young and the poor even though their standard of
living may be above subsistence levels (Van der Gaag
1999). Intolerant or oppressive cultural norms may
make it impossible for many young people to be valued
as they are, because of racism, sexism, heterosexism, or
on the basis of disability or inferior social status. 
Another contention about societal change,
currently popular with political speech writers, is the
assertion that western culture has become neglectful of
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6 It needs to be noted, however, that the data supporting this
perception is uneven and ambiguous.
the moral dimension of life, or of spiritual or faith
issues (Australian Broadcasting Corporation 2000b).
Others have argued that young people perceive that
they no longer have a clear future role or have no satis-
factory future role available to them.
Richard Eckersley, an influential commentator on
young people’s well-being, argues that young people
have become more fearful about the future because of
their awareness of potential for global catastrophe
(Eckersley 1995). A variation on this theme suggests
that rapid social change, and high levels of geographic
mobility have a disruptive effect on social relationships
(World Health Organisation 1993). The general
extended deferment of adulthood makes young people
both more “achievement conscious” and more
“infantile” and dependent on others, leaving many
young people with a profound sense of failure. 
Lack of well-being can show itself in different ways
with different groups. Young women feature in the
statistics on parasuicide, depression and anxiety. Young
men stand out in the statistics on completed suicide.
Gay and lesbian young people are over represented in
the statistics on suicide and parasuicide (e.g. suicide-
related behaviour such as attempted suicide or
self-harm), and may be over represented in statistics for
depression (MacDonald & Coffield 1991). Aboriginal
young people are over represented in suicide generally,
including deaths in custody. This is partly because
Indigenous young people are significantly over repre-
sented within the imprisoned population, and so
constitute a higher proportion of prison deaths (Mental
Health Branch Commonwealth Department of Health
and Family Services 1997).
It is important to recognise that while many young
people may be affected by these forces some of the
time, the vast majority continue to enjoy good health
and well-being. According to Moon et al., around 90%
of young people in Australia describe their health as
good, very good, or excellent (Moon et al. 1999, p.211).
While health issues need to be addressed, the
temptation to pathologise young people as a whole
needs to be carefully avoided.
Risk-taking behaviour
Youth theorists have noted that risk-taking is often a
feature of adolescent behaviour (Elkind 1967). Risk-
taking behaviour in young people can manifest itself as
accident, injury, exposure to violence, sexual health
risk arising from choices made about sexual behaviour,
or substance abuse. 
Probably all healthy people take risks. Some
theorists suggest that experimentation and “proving
self”, pushing boundaries, rebellion against parents and
accepted social standards are part of a developmental
process that increases skill and understanding about
life for people of all ages. However, young people’s risk-
taking behaviour sometimes takes a form which
involves high risk of long-term damage to themselves
or others. 
Explanations for this apparently reckless behaviour
include suggestions that young people do not take
seriously the possibility of their own death, that they
have a kind of “immortality myth” (Elkind 1967). It
may be because they are impulsive, that inexperience
makes them unaware of likely consequences of their
actions, or they are not fully aware of what serious
injury will mean to their health and well-being in the
long term. Inexperience seems to be a common factor
in these explanations. 
It may also be that young people in vulnerable
situations accept risky behaviour because they feel they
have few safe choices in their lives. Like other groups,
they may suffer social penalties from peers if they
refuse risky activities, or may be in situations where
power differences make it hard to refuse. The difficulty
that some young women have in insisting on safe sex
is an example. 
Because there aren’t many spheres of activity in
which young people can take risks, risk-taking
behaviour for young people usually involves risk to the
body, the one site where they do have some control.
Other groups may take risks with finances (gambling,
risk investment or speculation), with relationships
(adultery or sexual adventurism), travel, careers
(resigning and starting a new career) and so on. In our
culture, the body as a site for risk is perceived as
extreme and often spectacular, and so young people’s
risk-taking seems more remarkable than that of other
groups.
However, risk-taking behaviour can have implica-
tions for morbidity and premature death in later life.
This is especially so for heavy drinking, smoking, and
drug use, but applies also to sexual health risks and
patterns of violent behaviour. 
Different groups engage in risk-taking in different
ways. Young men, on the whole, are more likely to
have problems as a result of risk-taking behaviour.
They are over-represented relative to women in almost
all areas of risk: motor vehicle accident, accidents at
work and in sport, problematic drug and alcohol use,
and violence. The main recognised risks for young
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women relate to sexual health, unwanted pregnancy,
infertility arising from sexually transmitted disease and
family and domestic violence. Homeless young people
experience higher risks of violence, drug use and sexual
health problems than the general population.
Aboriginal young people experience higher levels of
violence, teenage pregnancy, and sexual health
problems. All economically and socially disadvantaged
groups experience higher risks of violence.
Stress, anxiety and depression
There is a common perception that stress, anxiety and
depression are increasing. This is hard to confirm statis-
tically. Trends over time for comparable data for young
people are not available in many areas, although
suicide statistics are comprehensive. Reports of greater
levels of stress, anxiety and depression than previous
generations are hard to substantiate, given how
recently depression has become generally understood,
and how recently professional intervention has become
acceptable. 
Suicide
Suicide has occupied a lot of attention as a youth
health issue, partly because it has been a core proposi-
tion in social planning that suicide rates are a reliable
indicator of the psychic health of a society, and partic-
ularly its level of cohesion. In Richard Eckersley’s work,
for example (Eckersley 1988, 1989, 1995, 1999), suicide
provides evidence that Western society is in the midst
of a crisis of values in which young people no longer
are in touch with life’s meaning, and where their
visions for the future are dark and despairing. Current
suicide rates are twice or three times those of the post-
war period, indicating a crisis of confidence and a surge
of alienation. Figure 8.1, which charts youth suicide
rates since 1921, certainly looks that way, at least for
young men. 
The data is inherently problematic, because the
total figures for suicide are still very small and there are
considerable annual variations. The increase up to the
1980s may well be due to under-reporting in earlier
generations, because of severe taboos around the topic
of suicide prior to the 1980s. It is likely that many
suicides were (and still are) reported as accidental
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Figure 8.1  Suicide, Australia, 1921–1995, 15- to 24-year-olds by gender
Source: Australian Institute for Health and Welfare, National Injury Surveillance Unit, (AIHW NISU) 1997 in Mental Health Branch, 1997
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deaths. Recent figures show that youth suicide rates for
the past decade have been pretty stable (see Figure 8.2).
Certainly, there is nothing like the epidemic in youth
suicide that some commentators have been talking
about (Carr-Gregg 2000). In fact, no upward current
trend is discernable. The most recent data indicates
that suicide rates among young people are in fact
falling (Youth Studies Australia 2000).
The rate of suicide among teenagers is also lower
than for any other adult age group. The rate for people
in their twenties is marginally higher (about ten
percentage points higher than for 40-year-olds –
0.037%pa compared with 0.027%). Rates for young
people in general are lower than for 40-year-olds, and
are in the vicinity of the rate for the population as a
whole (Moon et al. 1999, p.98). 
The stabilisation of youth suicide figures, in the face
of some extreme social stressors may indicate a degree
of resilience in the youth population which is not
normally attributed to them. At least they indicate that
the youth population is not particularly morbid or
pathological, in contrast to the common public
perception (Offer 1969; Offer et al. 1988; Offer & Offer
1972). ABS data on vitality (amount of energy), the
impact of emotional health on work or daily func-
tioning, and on feelings of happiness and peace,
indicate that scores for young people are very similar to
the rest of the population (Moon et al. 1999, p.30).
Parasuicide and self-harm
While youth suicide is a statistically rare event in
Australia, other forms of self-destructive behaviour are
more common (Moon et al. 1999, p.100). Statistical
data on the changes in the rate of parasuicide, as it is
called, are much less available than for completed
suicide, and are inherently less reliable. Hospital
admissions indicate that the numbers of young people
admitted for suicide attempts have been steady
between 1990 and 1995, maybe even declining slightly.
But many more young people attempt suicide: about
17 times that for completed suicides. In 1997 around
3% of 18- to 24-year-olds said that they had attempted
suicide at some stage in the past, compared with
0.024% completed suicides (ibid.). Figures for suicidal
thoughts are higher too. It is commonly assumed that
completed suicide is the tip of an iceberg of distress
among young people that reaches deep into a large
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Figure 8.2   Youth suicide rates per 100,000 by age 1987–1997
Source: ABS Cat. No. 4102.0
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proportion of the youth population. However, this is
only an assumption, and runs against figures for
happiness and well-being among young people which
are not significantly lower than the rest of the
population. Generally, the thesis that young people are
in turmoil is not well supported by the evidence
(Springhall 1984).
Problematic drug use
Recreational drug use is a feature of our society, with
large leisure industries built around caffeine, tobacco
and alcohol.7 In this section we will deal with recre-
ational drug consumption as a whole, although as a
matter of social (and often arbitrary) decision, some
recreational drugs are illegal and some are not. Several
of the illegal drugs are not markedly more toxic than
the legal ones. 
High or constant use of any recreational drug, legal
or no, may also lead to economic, health and social
difficulties, although there are higher costs and risks in
maintaining habitual and heavy use of an illegal
substance. As a health issue, the illegality of a recre-
ational drug becomes important because it means that
quality control and monitoring of strength and purity
are not in place. The drug becomes dangerous because it
is illegal, in addition to its inherent toxicity. Drug
overdose rates fluctuate and appear to relate to changes
in drug purity and changes in patterns of drug use. 
Trends in recreational drug use are quite dynamic,
and the points at which such use becomes problematic
can also change quite dramatically. For example, over
the last five years, heroin has become more available as
a mainstream recreational drug. Because a lethal dose
of heroin is only marginally higher than a recreational
dose, deaths from overdose have increased quite
sharply in that time (Moon et al. 1999, p.119).
The trends in recreational drug use appear to
indicate that total recreational drug use by young
people is steady or declining, although the mix is
changing. The use of the legal drugs tobacco and
alcohol are steady or may be decreasing (Moon et al.
1999, pp.126,127), but use of several other categories of
illegal substances such as ecstasy (MDMA), ampheta-
mines, LSD and heroin have increased. Cannabis use is
now thoroughly mainstream, with a reasonably large
minority of Australians of all ages (but especially young
people) using regularly. Prescription drugs with recre-
ational potential such as dexamphetamine and
Rohypnol have also entered the recreational drug
market. Young people also appear to be using recre-
ational drugs of all kinds at younger ages, as indicated
in Table 8.1.
Finally, the number of recreational drugs available
is increasing, with a reasonably regular release of new
designer drugs into the market. Overall, many of the
barriers to illegal drug use seem to be disappearing, and
the wall between drug-using cultures and the
mainstream seems to have been largely broken down.
National Drug Strategy Household Survey data shows
that opportunities to use illegal drugs have increased
across almost all drugs between 1995 and 1998 (Moon
et al. 1999, p.129).
Motor vehicle death and injury
Motor vehicle deaths constitute one of the three
primary causes of death for young people (the others
being suicide and other accidental death). Motor
accidents remain the most common cause of fatality
among young people, although the figures have been
improving significantly over the last 20 years. This is
probably due to various public and environmental
health interventions, including road improvement,
anti-drink/ driving campaigns, seatbelt legislation,
improvements in vehicle safety standards and
provision of late night public transport in metropolitan
areas.
Workplace injury
Workplace accidents remain a cause of health concern
for young people. The trend data is encouraging – the
rates have fallen in recent years – but they remain
higher than for other groups within the work force
(Worksafe Western Australia 1994/95). The downward
trend is believed to be due to environmental health
policies, but may also be due to changing patterns of
youth employment away from high risk occupations or
indeed away from full-time work completely. 
Other injury
Other accidental injury includes sports injuries, which
are significant as a cause of incapacity even though
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7 The term “recreational drug use” is used to distinguish between
drug use approved for medical treatment and drugs used for
pleasure, in social situations or generally for some non-medical
purpose. The lines do become a little blurred when people self-
medicate using psychotropic drugs such as alcohol or heroin for
mental conditions such as depression.
fatality rates are low, and also can have severe conse-
quences in later life. Sporting injuries appear to be
related to participation rates in high risk sporting
activities. Accident patterns seem likely to change with
participation rates and the adoption of safety
equipment. 
Violence is another important cause of incapacity
and injury. Statistics for serious violence (murder) are
fairly steady over time on a per capita basis. There is
some evidence that violent crime may be increasing
(see chapter 9). Young men are the group in society
who are most likely to be both the perpetrators and the
victims of violence. In some Aboriginal communities
there are high levels of family violence. Currently,
initiatives are addressing this issue from within an
Aboriginal framework of intervention (Australian
Broadcasting Corporation 2000a).
Sexual health
Sexually transmitted diseases have been a central area
of concern for young people’s health, especially since
the advent of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Here, the trends
again look good. Downward trends have been noted
for new infections from AIDS and syphilis in the
general population, largely the result of targeted harm
reduction policies. This downward trend has not been
universal, however, and has not been the case in some
Aboriginal communities, where mainstream harm
reduction programs have not been particularly
successful. 
Upward trends have been reported for clamydia,
which, untreated, leads to infertility and which can
be asymptomatic in women, and also for gonococcal
infections (Moon et al. 1999, p.108). This trend has
been attributed, in part ,  to changes in sexual
behaviour, especially the average time between first
sexual experience and the establishment of long-
term monogamous relationships, which generally
increases the number of sexual partners that a
person has and therefore the risk of infection. There
is also a persistent preference for the use of the
contraceptive pill rather than condoms as a means of
contraception. 
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Table 8.1 Drug use and mean age of initiation Australia 1995, 1998 
Proportion of the population aged 14 years and over
Drug/behaviour Lifetime use Lifetime use Recent use Recent use Mean age Mean age
of initiation of initiation
1995 1998 1995** 1998** 1995 1998
Tobacco 64.8 65.4 27.1 26.4 15.6 15.7
Alcohol 87.8 89.8 78.3 80.7 17.3 17.1
Marijuana 31.1 39.3 13.2 17.9 19.1 18.7
Analgesics< 12.3 11.4 3.5 5.2 19 19.7
Tranquillisers< 3.2 6.2 0.6 3 23.8 23.4
Steroids< 0.6 0.8 0.2 0.2 18.7 21.6
Barbiturates< 1.2 1.6 0.2 0.2 18.2 19.7
Inhalants 2.4 3.9 0.4 0.8 16.1 17.5
Heroin 1.4 2.2 0.4 0.7 20.6 21.5
Methadone < 0.5 * 0.2 * 21.6
Amphetamines < 5.8 8.7 2.1 3.6 20.2 19.9
Cocaine 3.4 4.3 1 1.4 21.1 22.3
Hallucinogens 5.5 10 1.8 3 19.1 18.8
Ecstasy, designer 2.4 4.7 0.9 2.4 22.7 22.7
Injected illicit drugs 1.3 2.1 0.6 0.7 * 20.7
Any illicit 39.3 46 17 22 18.9 18.8
Source: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 1999
* not asked in 1995
< for non-medical purposes
**Recent use means used in the last 12 months.
Pregnancy and childbirth
As chapter 7 indicates, there has been a drop in teenage
births over a 25-year period and a rise in the mean age
at which the first child is born. Among the reasons for
the change are easier access to contraception and
abortion, rises in the standard of living and changes in
cultural expectations about women’s role in society,
including the “ideal” age for child bearing and the
relative importance for women of career and child
rearing. Again, however, these trends are not universal.
Patterns of childbirth for Aboriginal young women
show a younger mean age for the birth of the first child
and higher rates of teenage pregnancy than the general
community. The reasons for this are probably a combi-
nation of social exclusion and differential cultural
expectations. 
Asthma
The most common problem for which regular
medication is taken is asthma (Zubrick et al. 1995),
ahead of migraine, attention deficiency disorders and
all other conditions. Asthma rates are higher in
Australia than in many other countries. Medication
rates of asthma in teenage years fall compared with
childhood years (ibid.). There appears to be some
additional risk of asthma for those living in dusty envi-
ronments, but also some indication that it may be
triggered by lack of exposure to allergens in early
childhood. There is currently no agreement about the
cause of asthma and treatment is palliative to alleviate
symptoms. The incidence of asthma has risen over
time but now appears stable (ibid.).
Future projections
There are several concerns embedded within the
current health service environment for young people,
which if they continue in the same direction, or
worsen, may mean that the current good health of
young people may be at risk. For instance:
• Services may be fragmented further as competi-
tion policy reduces interagency co-operation. 
• The increasing trend towards “user pays” systems
may reduce access to health services for those
who need it most. 
• Health funding priorities may be skewed towards
new medical techniques rather than health
promotion and public health initiatives,
especially if they have commercial potential in a
global market for medicine. The limited funding
available is offered to patch up the sick rather
than for preventative health measures. 
• Youth health services may be absorbed into main
stream health services controlled by the medical
profession and working narrowly within a
medical model of health. 
• Compulsory treatment facilities may be
developed and extended for a range of medical
and non-medical health conditions based upon
concepts of deviance. Youth workers may be
employed in compulsory treatment units under
the supervision of medical staff.
• The public/private two-tier medical system may
increase polarisation, with choice and a safety net
for those who can pay, and a means-tested public
system for those who can not pay. Private
patients would have access to a burgeoning range
of surgical interventions without proven value,
while public patients have no choice of treatment
and a minimum provision of strictly medical
health interventions.  
• In the broader social environment for young
people, the sense of powerlessness may be exacer-
bated by the growing list of coercive policies like
work for the dole, curfews and exclusions from
public space, compulsory education until 18,
mandatory sentencing, increasing incarceration
rates and perhaps requirements that young people
may not leave home before 18 unless they are
clearly able to support themselves or are
supported by their parents.
In terms of the specific issues discussed above:
Suicide and parasuicide: Prediction in these fields is
difficult, although one would expect a rising trend if
the increase in the range of stressors discussed in other
chapters translates into young people feeling that they
have few options for a realistic and satisfying future.
Suicide rates for men, which are many times the figure
for women, are closely correlated with unemployment
rates, and expectations for future suicide rates follow
the rate of unemployment. Much depends on other
factors, particularly the general health of communities,
the resilience of young people and their sense of
belonging in society.
Problematic drug use: Trends indicate are that young
people will have easy access to a wider variety of recre-
ational drugs from an earlier age. The criminalisation
of drug use does not seem to be a major disincentive. A
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wide range of recreational drugs will be a part of
mainstream young people’s recreation, although a large
majority of young people, then as now, will be very
selective about what recreational drugs they use. These
may not be chosen from the available legal selection.
Motor vehicle accidents: It seems probable that that
further improvements in vehicle safety will be made,
including the possibility of satellite speed control
devices. In the next 15 years, recent safety innovations
such as airbags will also flow through to the second-
hand car market and be available for young people’s
use. We would expect the downward trend in road
trauma to continue.
Workplace injury: While current trends are encouraging,
there are several tendencies in the data on the future of
work that will mean that young people are less well-
protected than now. Declining unionisation and the
increase in casual, part-time and temporary work are
among these.
Sexual health: With the trend towards an increasing
number of sexual partners due to the increasing
amount of time that young people are sexually active
but single, sexually transmitted diseases will continue
to be of concern. With increasing globalisation, the
emergence of new diseases or new strains seems likely.
General health risks: There may be an increase in risk
from infectious diseases with the increase in travel and
transport and the emergence of strains of disease agents
which are resistant to current treatments.
Effective services
General services for maintaining the health and
well-being of young people
Measures to improve inclusion
From the discussion above it is clear that a supportive
community has the capacity to increase well-being
among young people. It makes good sense to invest in
services which build the capacity of communities to
accept, include, and resource their young people –
particularly vulnerable groups of young people such as
same-sex attracted young people and young Indigenous
people. A society more tolerant of difference would
reduce the likelihood of individuals and groups facing
social exclusion and marginalisation. 
Anti-discriminatory legislation around gay and
lesbian employment and an equalisation of the age of
consent for heterosexual and gay and lesbian young
people would be one step towards creating a more
tolerant and accepting society. For Indigenous young
people, reconciliation is clearly high on the agenda,
and may counter some of the effects of racism and
dispossession of Aboriginal people. 
Youth work and well-being
Youth work plays a role in promoting well-being
among young people both through direct service
provision, as, for example in youth accommodation, in
integrating the services provided by other agencies and
in working in an “educative” manner with the young
person to improve their assertiveness, self-esteem or
interpersonal skills. Youth workers work directly with
young people to help them to overcome their feelings
of apathy and powerlessness. 
Youth workers are also able to make contact with
young people who are hard for other agencies to
contact, and may have opportunities to work with
groups of young people around issues of self-esteem
and individual support. This encourages peer support
networks and helps young people develop problem
solving and interpersonal skills in a social context.
Advocacy and information-giving roles have the
potential to provide young people with access to
political mechanisms, helping to overcome feelings of
powerlessness.
The capacity for youth work practice to be
mobilised to improve health outcomes for young
people is not always fully exploited. For example, the
section on “community services” in the AIHW report
does not mention youth work as a service (Moon et al.
1999). 
Safe places 
The social exclusion factors most relevant to risk-taking
behaviour appear to be social marginalisation and
poverty. The poor and the marginalised have fewer
options in their lives and are likely to have access to
fewer safe options. For example, homeless young
people are more at risk of violence because they have
no access to safe accommodation. The homeless young
person also has more limited access to legal
employment and may resort to forms of illegal
employment that increase their risks of violence or
sexual disease.
Safe places are essential in these instances.
Accessible youth and women’s refuges and drop-in
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centres, go some way to reducing risk for some groups
of young people. 
Medical services 
In some cases the best result to improve health
outcomes lies with medical trauma services, including
accident and emergency departments and paramedical
services, including ambulance services. Trauma services
are at present unevenly spread. The closure of rural
medical services in recent years might be expected to
impact negatively on the health of young people in
rural areas who have suffered a medical emergency. 
General practitioners are the most frequently
contacted medical specialists. Young people use GP
services for routine testing or because of illness, minor
injury or for contraceptive advice, although some
groups such as homeless young people are more likely
to use hospital outpatients or emergency department
for advice and information. 
Youth health services, where they exist, provide
young people with non-judgmental advice on medical
and contraceptive issues. In some locations young
people are able to self -refer to detoxification programs.
Issues about the effectiveness of medical services for
young people include whether young people are able
to access to appropriate free services in their locality
and whether they can be assured confidential advice.
However, mainstream services are not always “young
person friendly” and this may deter some young people
from using medical services. Programs developed by
the Australian Medical Association for the professional
development of GPs are currently addressing these
concerns.
There are particular concerns about young people’s
access to medical services in country areas. For
example: 
• there may be no choice of service provider; 
• specialist services may be unavailable; 
• confidentiality and non-judgmental attitude may
be more difficult to assure; and 
• there may be no “bulk billing” service available to
young people.
Harm minimisation and health promotion 
Public health measures that reduce affects of accidents,
like safety equipment in sports and seatbelts in cars, are
an important part of harm minimisation strategies.
Examples of this approach include the AIDS campaign,
and harm minimisation drug strategies. Broad adoption
of harm minimisation strategies, particularly for illegal
behaviour, has been limited by the fear that discussions
about harm minimisation may be interpreted as
condoning undesirable behaviour. In the current envi-
ronment, harm reduction appears to be regarded with
suspicion in some quarters as a primary health
promotion strategy despite its apparent effectiveness in
curbing the spread of HIV/AIDS.
Health promotion campaigns and abstinence
There are a number of health interventions which
advocate abstinence as a key strategy for reducing the
consequences of risk-taking behaviour. Examples
include media campaigns directed at young people that
encourage them not to engage in sexual behaviour (for
example the “true love waits” campaign in the US),
anti-smoking campaigns, campaigns against drinking
and driving, anti-drug campaigns. Abstinence
campaigns are unlikely to be successful with popula-
tions that already engage in the risky behaviour. In the
absence of other approaches, they run the risk of
keeping vital information from those who most need it. 
Health information workers and health promotion
Examples of these approaches include health education
programs in school and community settings. The main
issues for this approach are to ensure that the informa-
tion is presented in appropriate form and that young
people have access to the information. New
technology, in the form of web pages offers some inter-
esting possibilities for young people who have access to
the Internet. However, while information is clearly
essential for people engaging in risk-taking behaviour,
the availability of information does not necessarily
correlate well with behaviour change. This is especially
so if the information does not tally with young
people’s existing information – for example, if it is
unnecessarily alarmist about activities that have a finite
but small risk attached.
Environmental change and health promotion
Examples of this approach include:
• banning cigarette advertising;
• replacing tobacco sponsorship with Healthway
support of youth events as “smoke and drug free”;
• banning smoking in enclosed spaces;
• seatbelt legislation;
• air quality legislation; and
• alcohol sale restrictions in some Aboriginal
communities.
This approach is considered to be effective on some
issues because it may not require individual behaviour
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change. It is limited when, to be effective, the environ-
mental change requires some behaviour change. For
example, seatbelt legislation requires cars to be fitted
with seatbelts, but behaviour change is required to
ensure that people actually use the seatbelts when they
are provided. Not all issues are amenable to this
approach.
Effective services in the issue areas discussed above
may include: 
Suicide and parasuicide: Decreasing exposure to risk
factors is clearly part of any strategy for youth health.
Non-custodial alternatives in juvenile justice would
reduce the opportunities for death in custody. There is
some evidence that completed suicides increase with
ease of access to lethal means and for copycat suicides.
As a public health measure therefore, the potential of
the 1997 gun buyback to take guns out of the equation
should not be let go of easily. The risk of cluster
suicides has already been addressed by voluntary media
reporting restrictions on suicides and to monitor the
presentation of suicide in dramas and television soap
operas (Mason 1990). While the evidence that media
portrayals of suicide increase suicide rates is not strong,
caution is probably well-advised.
Problematic drug use: Current overemphasis on criminal
enforcement is ineffective and counterproductive to
health outcomes. The reality that a wide range of recre-
ational drugs will be available to young people needs to
be recognised. Young people need to be trained in
decision-making about their selection of drug of
choice, especially about which recreational drugs
constitute an acceptable risk in health and well-being
terms. Accurate and balanced information is essential,
and well-researched strategies for harm minimisation
are a part of this. 
Fear campaigns are likely to be counterproductive.
While they may deter young people who are not in
contact with use of a drug, they tend to undermine the
credibility of information sources in the eyes of young
people who see non-deleterious use all around them.
Increased support for best-practice models for drug
rehabilitation where use has become problematic are
an important part of the equation. Youth specific
services which maximise young people’s access are also
indicated. 
Motor vehicle death and injury: Further restricting young
people’s access to motor vehicles in an attempt to
decrease their exposure to risk factors presents
unacceptable costs in terms of exclusion, given that
participation in most Australian communities is
heavily personal-transport dependent. Increasing the
reach and frequency of public transport may, however,
pay off significantly in terms of road trauma. Other
services may include significant increases in training,
and especially, given increased school retention, the
availability of driver education and training in schools.
Availability of learner permits at younger ages and the
availability of trainer training for parents may be an
important part of this strategy.
Workplace injury: With the decline of unions, the state
must take an increasing responsibility for the
maintenance of safe work places. Effective legislation
with appropriate penalties, the availability of employee
advocates to insist on safe workplaces, strict laws about
victimisation of workers who complain about unsafe
working conditions, and the vigilant maintenance of
workers compensation seem essential.
Conclusion
Young people in Australia currently enjoy very good
levels of health and well-being, and many of the
indicators of health show a stable or improving trend.
These trends are likely to continue, particularly if
advances in diagnostic and preventative medicine
continue. However, there are a number of environ-
mental and social pressures that increase levels of risk
for young people, and translation of these factors into
young people’s general levels of well-being may
compromise current standards. In particular, care
should be taken about approaches to young people’s
health that deal with problems primarily in categories
of deviance, whether moral or criminal. Such
approaches deny young people access to effective
means of health, in the fear of condoning the
behaviour in question. 
Rather, we need to equip young people to make good
choices on reliable information, and to have access to
ameliorative or rehabilitative services when problems
emerge. There has been an increasing trend for research
to address questions of resilience, the factors that enable
a person to maintain health, rather than on risk alone.
Further research in this direction is important.
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Introduction: the justice system,
young people, and exclusion
The power to criminalise and punish certain sections of
the population is one of the most direct tools of
governance and control available to the state. Crime
and punishment has a special place in the life of a
society that began as a penal colony. In the British
“eliminative” project during the last two decades of the
18th century, “most of the people transported to
Australia … were young men in their late teens or
twenties with convictions for property offences”
(Rutherford 1998, p.121). Since then, the trend has
been towards “those seen as core members of the
dangerous population confined, warehoused, stored
away, and forced to live their most active years as
consumers of control” (Christie 1993, p.171).
The punishment of young offenders in the last two
decades of the 20th century has been “not simply a
measure against serious crimes but more generally a
measure of elimination of those likely to continue to
commit small crimes” (Radzinowicz & Hood 1986,
p.485). As the move in the late 1990s towards
mandatory sentencing in the Northern Territory and
Western Australia indicates, repeat offending, particu-
larly against property – however trivial – now attracts
punitive governance and exclusion by the state. 
Over the years, priorities and practices which the
state has used to achieve the governance and control of
young people have been diverse and often contradic-
tory. Since the early 19th century, state responses to
the youth problem in Australia have swung between
welfare and justice, control and care, treatment and
punishment. These responses have carried “an array of
overt and covert meanings which construct youth and
crime in particular ways and which have crucial impli-
cations for the lives of young people and the way in
which they are positioned within social relations”
(Macmillan & Brown 1998, p.54). 
Up to the mid-19th century, young people (and
often children) were treated much the same as
“adults”. They were held directly accountable for their
actions, prosecuted by conventional (adult) criminal
courts, and punished accordingly. No separate records
were kept about their involvement with the criminal
justice system, nor were there any services noticeably
dedicated to the factors underlying such involvement.
Between 1850 and 1970, penal policies shifted
towards modified magistrates’ courts to provide
summary (and therefore quicker) justice for children.
From the establishment of Reform Schools in Britain in
1854, and the first Children’s Court in South Australia
in 1890, most state responses within this period
favoured the construction of young people as a
separate category requiring “care” and “protection”
“because of their immaturity, vulnerability and impres-
sionability”. This culminated in the diversionary
schemes of the 1960s, such as the WA Children’s Panel,
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introduced in 1964. These approaches weren’t aimed at
reducing the extent of state control over young people.
Rather, they “sought to extend the capacity of the state
to intervene in young people’s lives by expanding the
grounds for coercive intervention to include certain
non-criminal behaviours … believed to be indicative of
future delinquency or propensity to offend’”
(O’Connor 1997, p.231).
In the last 20 years policies have changed to
privilege views of “justice” where a “more traditional
form of justice” with its emphasis on due process of
law, combative lawyering and punishment became
dominant (Naffine 1993). In the 1990s, most states and
territories in Australia incorporated a more retributive
approach in their youth justice laws. Concerned
mainly with community protection (narrowly
construed as locking away young offenders: see Omaji
1997a), and with individual accountability, these laws
significantly limit courts’ ability to take account of the
context of action in their decision making.
The new focus on retribution was evident, for
example, in Western Australia’s Crime (Serious and
Repeat Offenders) Sentencing Act 1992, Queensland’s
Juvenile Justice Act 1992, South Australia’s Young
Offenders Act 1993, and Western Australia’s Young
Offenders Act 1994. In the last five years of the century,
this trend intensified through legislation like Western
Australia’s Criminal Code (Amendment) Act 1996 that
introduced mandatory detention for young offenders
convicted for a third time of home burglary. The
Northern Territory’s Juvenile Justice Amendment Act
(No.2) 1996 also introduced mandatory imprisonment
for offenders who commit a range of property offences
twice or more. And, by the Sentencing Amendment Act
(No 2) 1999, the NT government extended mandatory
sentencing to violent and sexual offences. 
All of these provisions permit courts to sentence
juveniles 16 years of age and over to adult prison, for
periods ranging from a maximum of three months in
Western Australia to two years in Queensland. The
trend towards more exclusionary forms of governance
has also come through in the use of curfews, street-
clearance operations, and “zero tolerance” policies.
They illustrate a deep inconsistency in state policy
towards young people which treats them as adults in
crime but as children in citizenship. 
There are, however, several alternative movements
in the administration of justice in Australia.
Approaches such as restorative justice and human rights
watch represent a counter movement to the retributive
justice programs with which Australia entered the new
millennium. Since the victim-offender conferencing
initiative commenced in the city of Wagga Wagga,
NSW in 1991, several jurisdictions in Australia have
adopted approaches pioneered in New Zealand in
developing “alternative systems” for dealing with
young offenders, using restorative justice philosophy.
South Australia moved in this direction for certain
kinds of offences and offenders in 1993; Western
Australia in 1994; and NSW in 1997. Proponents are
hopeful that these systems will correct the punitive and
crime-generating features of the traditional criminal
justice treatment of young people, but the jury is still
out (Strang 2000). 
The actual and symbolic use of state power in crimi-
nalising and punishing young people has been a major
force in how young people are defined and serviced,
and what the future holds in Australia for them, both
as offenders and victims. The nature and extent of
youth crime is a significant reality in itself. But it is the
trends in the processes of governance and exclusion,
including criminalisation, apprehension, prosecution,
punishment and restoration by the state, that are more
important in determining trends in youth crime and
the justice-related services the next generation of
young people will require.
Existing trends in youth crime
Traditionally, crime trends have been seen as a
function of the proportion of youth in the total
population. For instance, one study found that during
the two world wars several countries in Europe also
recorded a significant drop in crime rates – attributed
to the fact that most of their young men were overseas
(Mukherjee 1997). Commenting on the Australian
crime trends between the 1850s and the 1970s,
Mukherjee notes that
during the two wars, offences against the person and
good order offences declined substantially. These are
offences committed predominantly by young males. A
significant proportion of such young males were in the
defence forces at this time. (Mukherjee 2000, p.50)
At the time, commentators such as Walker and
Henderson (1991) argued that the strong increases in
property crimes in Australia during the early 1970s
were related to demography. As the 10 to 17 age group
was expanding, so also was the increase in the violent
crimes as this cohort moved into the 18 to 24 year
group. In the 1990s, in those States where the number
Youth and the future: Effective youth services for the year 2015 87
of young people arrested for serious offences declined,
the youth population was also declining. In Western
Australia, for example, the number of juveniles among
the distinct persons arrested by police declined from
6,321 (16.4%) in 1990 to 3,006 (8.3%) in 1996, before
rising slightly to 3,132 (9.0%) in 1998 (Ferrante,
Fernandez & Loh 1999, p.46). 
However, Australian experience challenges the idea
of a simple direct relationship. Many of these crimes
kept up their momentum for most of the 1980s and
early 1990s when the population of the 10- to 24-year-
olds was in fact in decline. Also, in a 20-year period
from 1973–74 to 1994–95, the total number of reported
major violent and property crimes and
arrest rates for young people (males in
particular) increased (Table 9.1), while the
proportion of young people, especially
under-18s, declined from 35% to 25.4% of
the Australian population. During this
period, juveniles as a proportion of all male
arrests for serious assaults increased from
about 9% to over 14%. For girls, the arrest
proportion increased fourfold, from 4% to
18% over the same period. For all youth,
the arrest rates for serious assault, break,
enter and steal, motor vehicle theft and
fraud, increased gradually, peaking in 1992-
93 (Mukherjee & Graycar 1997, p.47). Table
9.1 shows the trend for the first 15 years of
this period.
Further, during this period of population
decline, the number of persons in juvenile
corrective institutions per 100,000 of the
10- to 17-year-old population increased
from 577 in 1992 to around 780 (an average
of 37 per 100,000) since 1996. The number
of persons held on remand, as a percentage
of the total number of persons in juvenile
corrective institutions, also increased from
21.4% in 1981 to 42.6% in 1998 (Carcach &
Muscat 1999). 
Clearly, there is a relationship between
youth demographics and the rate of youth
crime, but the relationship is complex.
Categories of people subject to exclusionary
processes are routinely over-represented in
crime statistics, so it is no surprise that
young people are too. Again, the degree of
their criminal involvement is likely to be a
function of their exclusion.
Different States have marked differences
in incarceration rates. Table 9.3 illustrates the variation
between the jurisdictions in Australia in relation to
juvenile incarceration. 
The number of young people involved in criminal
activity is and will continue to be small. Most of these
will be first-time offenders, and most will be involved
in minor property offences. However, the trend data
indicates a “hard end” of severely alienated young
people who may well continue to be responsible for a
rising trend in more violent crimes. The size of this
group in 2015, and the degree of their alienation, may
well be a function of policy settings in place between
now and then.
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Table 9.1   Involvement of juveniles in serious crimes cleared in Australia,
1973–88 (Rate per 100,000 population)
Year Serious assault Robbery Break, Motor vehicle 
enter & steal theft
1973–74 18.5 24.3 1030.2 467.5
1974–75 23.0 23.1 1098.3 446.3
1975–76 24.7 25.4 1145.8 456.3
1976–77 23.5 20.2 1072.4 479.2
1977–78 27.9 20.0 1189.5 505.0
1978–79 36.3 21.0 1219.6 453.9
1979–80 44.7 28.0 1307.8 592.8
1980–81 45.8 27.1 1425.7 556.0
1981–82 47.7 29.0 1391.4 586.6
1982–83 51.2 32.3 1423.9 531.5
1983–84 68.3 37.7 1431.1 579.1
1984–85 70.8 38.9 1487.2 599.2
1985–86 76.5 55.1 1393.8 527.7
1986–87 90.7 58.0 1561.1 500.3
1987–88 109.7 46.7 1650.5 569.0
Source: Adapted from Mukherjee and Dagger (1990) 
Table 9.2 Rate of juvenile involvement in serious crimes in Western
Australia, 1991–1997 (per 100,000 population of Juveniles)
Year Serious assault Robbery Break, Motor vehicle 
enter & steal theft
1991–92 93.02 41.01 1907.39 747.15
1993–94 115.64 63.48 1622.93 664.82
1995–96 126.42 80.15 1803.30 472.77
1996–97 218.18 117.99 2374.27 680.30
Source: Adapted from Australian Institute of Criminology database
Gender and youth crime
Youth crime in Australia remains essentially a male
phenomenon. Although the gap between rates of
involvement by males and females in crime has been
narrowing since the late 1980s, young males are, on
average, six times more likely to commit serious crimes
than young females. Figure 9.1 illustrates gender differ-
ences in relation to robbery during the late 1970s and
most of the 1980s. Inter-jurisdictional data for 1991–1997
show that these differences did not change much.
The number of females charged with an offence
during the 1981–1998 period increased, but this did
not translate into an increase in incarceration as it did
for young males. The offences committed by young
women seem to be less serious than those of their male
counterparts; and females had reduced recidivism rates
or took a longer period to re-offend. In fact, the rate of
detention for young women generally declined from
17.2% in 1981 to 6.3% in 1998. This decline was driven
mainly by the trends in NSW, Victoria and
Queensland. Western Australian and South Australian
figures remained relatively stable over the period.
The narrowing gap between the rates of male and
female involvement needs to be taken seriously. The
needs of young female offenders are not currently a
priority, and that will need to change.
Indigenous youth
The national rate of incarceration among Indigenous
young offenders is on the decline: from 538.2 per
100,000 in 1993 to 406.6 in 1998. 
However, compared to the rate of incarceration for
non-Indigenous youth (20.66 per 100,000 in 1993,
21.99 per 100,000 in 1998), this hardly makes a dent in
the over-representation for Aboriginal young offenders
in custody. The seasonally adjusted data for the last
quarter of each year within this period show that the
over-representation ratio in fact increased from 16.2 in
1993 to 18.5 in 1998 (Carcach & Muscat 1999, p.24).
The census of persons in juvenile detention taken on
30 June 1998 shows that the ratio of Indigenous to
non-Indigenous young detainees ranged from 7.8 in
the NT to 31.8 in WA (Ferrante et al. 1999, p.118).
Indigenous young people are also being imprisoned at
an earlier age. In Queensland, for example, 56% of all
13-year-olds and 81% of all 14-year-olds detained are
Aboriginal (Lincoln & Wilson 2000, p.211). Although
this Report adopts the “15 to 24 years” definition of
youth, it would be remiss not to acknowledge the
complications in service provision/delivery that
populating our jails with children under 15 years will
introduce.
Regardless of how these data are viewed, 
the process that results in over-representation of any
segment of the community in the penal system gives the
state a false sense of achievement and ultimately will
only undermine community safety. (Beresford & Omaji
1996, p.15)
Existing trends in the victimisation
of young people
Often, the focus on youth crime overlooks the crimino-
logical fact that young people are the most likely age
group to become victims of serious crime (including
robbery, theft, physical and sexual violence) (Halstead
1992). Research shows that during the 1993–97 period,
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Table 9.3   Juveniles (10–17 years) in corrective institutions, 1992–1998
(per 100,000 relevant population)
Year NSW Vic Qld WA SA Tas NT ACT Aus
1992 38.88 10.34 20.06 46.49 33.25 8.79 127.06 26.80 28.55
1993 46.40 10.23 22.68 51.59 38.45 15.83 102.71 16.15 32.19
1994 54.77 12.89 24.93 64.31 36.42 17.59 57.45 24.27 36.89
1995 57.83 14.87 35.06 49.33 24.44 17.51 74.78 37.77 38.33
1996 49.33 13.98 34.44 50.41 51.64 45.38 56.14 18.91 37.66
1997 51.39 14.11 24.94 51.97 47.83 40.20 89.38 43.75 37.11
1998 48.01 13.22 33.61 62.65 30.93 33.52 103.53 30.39 37.01
Source: Carcach and Muscat (1999, p.12)
15- to 24-year-olds consistently had the highest victim-
isation rate for personal crimes. In 1993, the rate was
7.9%, about 75% more than the next most victimised
group (25- to 34-year-olds at 4.5%) (Mukherjee &
Graycar 1997, p.26). In 1997 the victimisation
prevalence rate for 15- to 19-year-olds was the highest
at 10.6%, with males in this group having a rate of
12.3% and females 8.7% (Mukherjee 2000, p.55). 
Carcach (1997) found that over a seven-year period
(1989–96), 28% of the 2,415 victims of homicide
incidents were aged below 25 years. Male victims
outnumbered females by around 2 to 1. The 18- to 24-
year-olds had the highest risk of becoming victims,
mostly from “stranger homicides”. One-sixth of the
victims had a previous criminal record and about a
third of the victims had high levels of blood alcohol at
the time of their victimisation. 
Other notable findings of this study include:
• Most youth victims of homicide belong to the
same racial group as their victimisers.
• Most young people become victims as a result of
altercations/revenge homicides and in the course
of other crimes such as robbery, sexual assault and
arson.
• Many victims died from homicide incidents at
their homes and pubs or related environments.
• Youth involvement in homicide, as victims and
offenders, is remarkably the result of lifestyle and
routine activity patterns, involving high risk
places.
It is important to note that most of these deaths
happened in conditions indicating intense social
exclusion. Evidently opportunities for meaningful
participation have been diminishing for our youth over
the last ten years so that a risky lifestyle becomes
attractive, and the balance of risk slight. This, however,
compounds the tragedy rather than mitigates it. As
Adam Graycar observes, “the killing of a young person
represents the loss of many years of potentially
productive, active life …” (in Carcach 1997).
Future projections
The decline in the size of the 15- to 24-year-old cohort
as a proportion of Australia’s population will generally
continue at least for the next 15 years, although this
trend may be reversed completely or significantly
reduced if the upper age limit for young people shifts
to 30 years as we predicted earlier. The Indigenous
youth population is rising, however, and may present a
different pattern of crime and punishment. Research
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Figure 9.1   Involvement of juveniles in robbery in Australia, by gender, 1978–1987
Source: Mukherjee and Dagger (1990, p.75)
shows that Australia “faces the strong prospect of an
increase in the number of young Aborigines getting
into trouble with the law” in the years ahead (Beresford
& Omaji 1996, p.16). It has been projected that:
because of high birth rates and a resultant greater
proportion of Aboriginal youth, it is anticipated that
there will be a 50 per cent increase in ATSI imprison-
ment by 2011 based on 1992 estimates. (Lincoln &
Wilson 2000, p.216)
As we have argued, it is imprudent to forecast a
single direction for the level of youth crime based
simply on the projected movement in population. The
relationship is complex, and much depends on what
happens between now and 2015. Young people most at
risk of becoming victims or perpetrators of crime in
2015 are now between one and five years old. Their
life-chances, more than their numbers, may well
determine the extent to which they will get involved in
crime down the track.
If things continue as they are, youth crime in
Australia in the next 15 years is likely to retain the
characteristics that it displayed at the close of the 20th
century and in the first year of the new millennium.
The overwhelming majority of it was not serious. All
things being equal, youth crime will generally still, 
• be non-violent in nature;
• be more likely to be directed at property;
• not be organised;
• when drug related, predominantly involve the use
of cannabis;
• be committed predominantly by young males;
• remain flat or continue the downward movement
it had begun in the mid-1990s, especially with
regard to the rate of property offences; and 
• be transient, obedient to the proposition that
young people “grow out” of crime.
However, for the current trends in state responses to
this type of youth crime to continue means further
exclusion for young people in the year 2015. Although
there has been a gradual turn in official opinion and
policy in Australia since the 1990s whereby govern-
ments began to pursue preventive interventions on a
larger scale, the traditional exclusionary approach of
treatment and control, using the police, courts and
corrections, remains the cornerstone of most state
policies (Omaji 1997b). Even if the press and the
public’s appetite for punishing the young remains at
the 1990s level, juvenile justice policies and practices
of today will deny active citizenship to more youth in
2015.
To this must be added the generational effects of
higher rates of imprisonment during the 1990s. By
2015, many of the children of those imprisoned during
the 1990s will be teenagers. The experience of having a
parent who has been imprisoned would be expected to
increase propensity for criminal engagement.
If conditions deteriorate, we would expect the
current dialogue between the media, the state and a
community’s fear of crime to intensify and sharpen, to
“condemn a little more and understand a little less”
(John Major, quoted in Mail, Sunday 21 February
1993). Media sensationalisation of youth crime will
balloon, taking advantage of the ongoing view that
“the potential for community outrage regarding some
aspect of the criminal justice system is a subversive
sleeper in every election campaign” (Fairall 2000, p.37). 
As politicians pander to this media “cash-in”,
feelings of insecurity (fear of crime) will increase and
private citizens (individual or corporate) will respond
by creating more “locations of trust – small bubbles of
security in an insecure world”, such as gated communi-
ties, private police forces, secure apartments, public
buildings and car parks. Such security bubbles will
further “use exclusion of those who are believed to be
potentially threatening to reduce fear and risk” (France
& Wiles 1998, pp.68-9). Young people, who on present
form will bear the brunt of this exclusion, could be
expected to react by feeling further marginalised and
angry; and respond by increased delinquency and
violence in a larger proportion.
Following a totally “market-driven” approach, come
2015, the state in Australia will abdicate its special duty
of care to young offenders by handing over most
segments of the juvenile justice system to the private
sector. Prisons, run privately for profit, will create an
inertia of powerful vested interest in keeping prison
populations high and keeping services within them at a
minimum.
Young people will find that “the pathways to
adult status and autonomy are … replaced with
extended forms of dependency” (France & Wiles
1998, p.67).  The rank of youth as a “surplus
population” or a “human residue” of the economy
will swell (Jamzorik 1995). Unemployment will be
much more concentrated among school-leaver age
groups – “precisely the age groups who are most
liable to turn to crime out of idleness and boredom”
(Walker & Henderson 1991, p.3). Delay in their
financial independence will greatly enhance the frus-
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trations normally felt by adolescents anxious to
begin life as adults. 
Accelerated drug use, as both a reaction to exclusion
and as a survival strategy, would be expected. The trade
in illegal drugs may well escalate. The homicide and
gun use associated with an illegal but highly profitable
drug economy may make an increasing impact, as it
has in the USA since the 1970s with “guns and
violence accompanying the introduction of crack
cocaine and the increase in the neighbourhood drug
markets” (Redding 1998). If we choose the same route
in the administration of juvenile justice as the United
States has, Australia, by 2015, can expect to mirror this
experience.
In a deteriorating environment, punitive
approaches to crime will intensify and manifest in:
• the extensive use of mandatory sentencing, zero
tolerance, and curfews for young people;
• the lowering of the age of criminal responsibility.
At present, the minimum age for criminal respon-
sibility in NSW and in most other Australian
jurisdictions is 10 years. In Tasmania and ACT it is
7 years and 8 years, respectively. All these are
already lower than in New Zealand where a child
under 12 years is not considered to be criminally
liable for his or her actions (Boni 1999). The
current debate in the US about how to deal with a
six-year-old who shot dead his class mate may, in
this environment, have local currency also; and
• the abolition of juvenile justice. Again there is
now a growing push in the US for the juvenile
justice system to be abolished, and for young
people to be dealt in the same way as adults. The
existence of a separate children’s court in that
country is now “under the most severe attack it
has experienced” since its inception (Wundersitz
2000, p.103). While this not yet a matter for
public debate in Australia, a worsening scenario
may see this “American disease” afflicting
Australia in the next two decades.
The entire turn for the worse will leave in its trail
more young people with “no hope, no fear, no rules
and no life expectancy” (Gest & Pope 1996). In the
words of Professor John DiIulio, there will emerge in
Australia many “chaotic, dysfunctional, fatherless,
Godless and jobless settings where … self-respecting
young [people] literally aspire to get away with [crime]”
(ibid.).
However, things could go differently. Where the
media and the state seek to influence the society at all,
it could be to generate a greater understanding of the
structural and psychological conditions under which
youth exclusion occurs. Rather than reducing its
responsibilities, the state could, as a matter of policy,
assist young people to find pathways to active citizen-
ship. 
Operators of public space and private space for the
public could see young people as bona fide users and
agents of advancement. 
Damaging drug use by young people could be rolled
back, as resilience and protective factors increase. More
efforts could be made to remove the criminogenic
properties of work: that is, the kinds of employment
that may be damaging to young people’s personal
development in ways that breed criminal behaviour.
The lessons of the Industrial Revolution, and the
eventual emergence of protective legislation such as
the British Health and Morals of Apprentices Act 1802
should not be forgotten.
The focus in dealing with crime at all levels, but
especially with young people, could be on restoration
of broken or violated relationships and on re-integra-
tion of the offender. A paradigm shift towards
“re-integrative” justice would lead to positive measures
that involve full mobilisation of all possible resources,
including the family, volunteers and community
groups, as well as schools and other community insti-
tutions, for the purpose of promoting the well-being of
the juvenile, with a view to reducing the need for inter-
vention under the law (UN Beijing Rules 1.3). Policies
would be based not only on responsibility, but also on
restoration and reintegration for young offenders.
Such a turn for the better would entail the
Commonwealth Government following up its 1991
initiative, when the Federal Government started
funding nine youth crime prevention projects in six
States, as part of the Australian Youth Initiatives Grants
Scheme, and developed a $100 million Youth Justice
Strategy to redress some of the conditions that cause
youth crime.
Services needed
With regard to services, a note about our premise is in
order. We agree with Coventry, Muncie and Walters
(1992, p.9) that responding to crime, whether it is for
prevention or punishment, “should not be the initial
justification for social intervention and the provision
of structured services which address the life conditions
of disadvantaged young Australians”. As the British
Youth Council (British Youth Council 1993, pp.19-20)
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asserted, youth crime “is simply the most tangible
representation of the marginalisation and disaffection
[ala exclusion] felt by young people in society”. The
views of the state and the views they construct
thereupon are the focus of this section.
If current trends continue, youth crime in 2015 will
call for more:
• specialist or targeted services in relation to
recreation, personal development and community
integration; 
• positive alternative activities for “at risk” youth;
• school support programs;
• alcohol and substance abuse programs;
• mental health services;
• services that break the cycle of youth victimisa-
tion;
• custodial rehabilitation programs such as
education/vocational training services; 
• advocacy services, and 
• post-release support services such as accommoda-
tion and linkage to training/employment services
to ease offenders back into society.
According to David Faulkner, “solutions to the
[current] problems of crime have to be sought by
inclusion within the community itself … by providing
opportunities and hope for young people and not by
exclusion from it” (quoted in Rutherford 1998). He is
right.
In a worsening environment, effective services that
are required to deal the consequences of a wholesale
dis-investment in youth are a bit like trying to defuse a
time bomb. Whether public policy follows a conserva-
tive line, opting for tougher prison terms and law
enforcement tactics, or a liberal one, of prevention
plans that merely entrench existing exclusionary
constructions of young people, it seems that most of
the services for young people will be custody-based and
“eliminative” in purpose. There may be a relapse into
“boot-camp” approaches to service design and delivery.
The underlying philosophy will be structural power
and constraint as opposed to social relations and inner
motivation.
However, in a more rational and inclusive scenario,
the benchmark of services must embody a multi-
systemic, family preservation, home-based, intensive
wrap-around service model designed for and in consul-
tation with young people. It must reject a new penology
that is focused primarily on narrow community
protection and “management of the risk associated
with particular groups and locales” and, instead,
institute a solidarity project with a nation-wide program
of political incorporation and cohesive service
provision as its centre piece. 
Britain adopted the former approach in the 1980s
and 1990s, and her reliance on “market” mechanisms
for the allocation of services led to the impotence and
withdrawal of youth services. A widening gap between
rich and poor, fanned by the flames of commercialism
which, for many, set unattainable targets, gave rise to
the social exclusion of a significant group of young
people (Ledgerwood & Kendra 1997, p.ii).
France, on the other hand, took the latter approach
during the same period. Using the philosophy of “a
new relationship between citizen and state”, the
French central government mobilised resources to link
the youth (defined as citizens), the community and the
state. This approach had three main features. 
1 It adopted a contextual view of youth crime and
found social dislocation at the root of the
problem.
2 It targeted with precision neighbourhoods and
young people for special service delivery.
3 It vertically integrated the machinery for
delivering “community safety” (including
specially created Youth Centres) with the political
system – linking them all the way to the top, with
the Prime Minister chairing the National Council
for the Prevention of Delinquency.
The strategy vastly improved the political participa-
tion and input from people on the social margins as
excluded groups were increasingly given a stake in the
society. This in turn led to significantly lower crime
rates (Pitts & Hope 1998).
Australia’s solidarity project on effective services for
youth in the future has to be radically different in
content and delivery from most current practices. It
should, among other things, seek to:
• establish a single cabinet level youth justice
agency;
• establish a national college for the training of
youth leaders;
• develop community mentoring programs (linking
a safe, stable adult with each high risk factor
youth);
• provide support services for youth facing loss,
grief, and post-traumatic stress;
• increase the number of after school programs;
• promote peer delivered mediation services; 
• provide effective community reintegration
(aftercare and transition) programs for young
offenders released from detention; and
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• increase recreation/meaningful pre-employment
services.
In terms of typology, the project must aim to
ensure that there are: 
• capitalisation-of-strength services (learning to cope
with difficulties; e.g. Strengthening Families
strategy in New Zealand);
• remediation services – services of sufficient power,
intensity and duration that have the potential to
achieve positive outcomes with “at risk” adoles-
cents (In New Zealand these are called
“Wraparound” services and include Family Start
and Social Workers in Schools programs); and 
• pre-emptive or capacity-building services (strong
mainstream generic services in education, accom-
modation, health, employment, recreation,
personal development and community integra-
tion).
Conclusion
The administration of juvenile justice is a key institu-
tional factor in the lives of young people. Situated as it
is at the point at which young people come into
conflict with the norms and rules of adult society, the
justice system has the capacity to repair damaged rela-
tionships, resolve conflict, educate, socialise. It also has
the potential to further alienate and damage, to create
an environment of suspicion and fear, to entrench
resentment, to erode respect.
Currently, it seems that juvenile justice administra-
tors are conscious of these choices. Both lines of action
are present in current practice. On the one hand,
authorities are increasing police intervention with
young people in public space by extending or consoli-
dating police move-on powers or through “zero
tolerance” policies. Mandatory sentencing is in place or
on the agenda in most jurisdictions. Penalties have
been increased. Street clearing exercises, including
youth curfews, have been introduced, at least selec-
tively. A substantial private policing and prisons
industry has already emerged. The industry is already a
major employer, and will become more influential with
governments as it grows. If crime is big business, the
new security industry is even more so.
At the same time, a number of jurisdictions have
introduced programs based on restorative justice
principles, including the very successful family confer-
encing program in Western Australia. The success of
such programs is already putting pressure on authori-
ties to expand them and broaden their reach.
(Sercombe 2000). Diversionary programs have been
expanded. Formal cautioning has kept many young
people out of the court system. Alternative forms of
punishment, including home detention, have been
introduced. Community policing is increasingly seen as
core policing work at least by senior levels of police
forces in Australia. Drug courts, with a different and
more flexible approach to the vexed question of illegal
drug use, are being considered in a number of jurisdic-
tions.
This ambivalence indicates that we are, at the turn
of a new millennium, at a crossroads in the area of
crime and punishment. Services in the area of crime
and punishment for the year 2015 very much depend
on what we do now. There is no doubt that many of
the conditions for a criminogenic society (i.e. one that
breeds crime) are currently in place, and are intensi-
fying, especially for Indigenous young people. Many of
the young people currently being put into prison under
mandatory sentencing or drug laws will be parents of
teenagers in 2015. For the next generation, whose
parents have already been in prison, the resistance to
lawlessness is already substantially broken down. Many
families have lived with long-term poverty and unem-
ployment, often across more than one generation. The
gap between rich and poor continues to widen. 
The design of responses to crime can either increase
the propensity for crime or decrease it. Current trends
indicate a widening gap in youth crime and in our
responses to it. A more severe and excluding regime is
intensifying criminality among those whom the
community has been least able to engage. A smaller
number of young people are being prosecuted for more
offences and more serious offences. Paradoxically, first-
time offenders and less serious offenders are being
effectively diverted from the criminal justice system,
and criminality generally is declining among the
young. The challenge for effective service delivery is to
extend the reach of restorative justice to serious and
repeat offenders, to those most alienated from the
common wealth. If this can be done successfully, we
may well enjoy more safety, and security will mean
what it should: confidence, peace, and a more open
society. If we fail, we will inherit a more dangerous
society, and increased security will simply mean more
locks, more bars, more guards.
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Previous chapters have outlined the trends in arange of spheres that shape the lives of youngpeople. It is not the intention within this chapter
to repeat or to summarise those conclusions: we have
left this job to the Executive Summary to this Report.
But we have noticed that many of these trends
converge, across employment and work, family and
household, education, crime and justice, and health. In
this section, we bring together some of the underlying
dynamics that will shape the position of young people
in Australia, their relationship with the parent society,
the social environment that is impacting on them, and
the form of services that may best serve their interests
in the year 2015. Recommendations arising from these
global conclusions are included.
The social environment: trends for
the youth category to 2015
1: The extension of the youth category
The youth category exists in the space between
biological adulthood and social acknowledgment, or
accreditation, of adult status (Seig 1976; Sercombe
1996). The evidence indicates that we are currently
witnessing a transformation of the youth category as
fundamental as the establishment of the modern youth
category in the latter half of the nineteenth century
and its extension to “teenagerhood” in the immediate
postwar period. The trend is that the youth category is
once again being extended. 
While the reality is often complex and contradic-
tory, it is true to say that prior to World War II, many
young people began to take on adult roles in their early
and mid-teens often leaving school at 13 or 14. They
married young, and started families by their early 20s. 
In the postwar period, with the extension of the
compulsory school leaving age to 15 or 16,
employment, wage-earning and other adult roles were
delayed until the later teenage years, creating for the
first time a distinctive youth culture. Still, however,
their exit from the youth category tended to be swift,
relatively unambiguous and complete by the early 20s.
Employment was readily available, and most young
people had left school by the age of 15 without jeopar-
dising their futures. Economic independence came
with employment, and relatively early marriage and
birth of the first child followed. 
In the current environment, the category is
expanding in both directions. Biological adulthood is
coming marginally earlier, and accreditation as adult is
coming significantly later. At the turn of the century,
the age of social adulthood corresponded fairly closely
to the age of biological adulthood: both happened
pretty much around 18 to 20 (Potts 1990). Currently,
both because of earlier onset of puberty and the delay
of adult accreditation, the gap is somewhere around
five to ten years. 
TEN: ADDRESSING YOUTH
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Over the next 15 years, school retention until the
age of 18 is expected to become universal, and post-
secondary education the norm. Full-time stable
employment is expected to be out of reach for most
young people until their late 20s or early 30s, if at all.
Family formation will be deferred until the early 30s or
later, both in terms of permanent partnerships and
having children. Many may never acquire these
symbols of adult status. The gap between biological
adulthood and its social accreditation is expected to
stretch out to 10 to 15 years. Youth status is likely to
last around five years longer, and the youth category is
expected to embrace twice as many people as it does
now.
Diagrammatically, we could model this as in Figures
11.1 and 11.2.
Following our argument that youth is function of
the exclusion of biologically adult members of a society
on the basis of age, the graphs display, in symbolic
form, predicted changes in who gets counted as youth,
and to what degree. There is, of course, no precise
index of “youthness” that we could use to generate
technically accurate charts of this kind: Figures 11.1
and 11.2 are nothing more than a diagram. However,
they do serve to illustrate how the youth category is
expected to change over the next 15 years.
We have argued previously that the categorisation
of a person as “youth” is a matter of degree. At the
moment, the point at which the tension between
young people’s biological adulthood and their
exclusion on the basis of age (and so the degree to
which they are implicated in the youth category) is at
its peak would be somewhere around 16 or 17. This
tension is lower in younger age groups: while the
degree of exclusion is high, the degree of adulthood is
low. At the other end of the scale, the tension also
declines, up to about 25, as greater powers and respon-
sibilities are conferred with age. Thus their adulthood is
high, but exclusion is lower. 
Trends for the future, on this model, would indicate
a longer, more intense engagement in the youth
category from around 14 through to around 27, and a
deeper tail through to the early 30s.
Consequently, although the youth population is
expected to decline as a proportion of the overall
Australian population, the proportion of the population
likely to be regarded as youth is likely to increase signifi-
cantly.
This may result in an exaggerated juvenilisation of
young people, of people who are “24 going on 16”.
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Figure 11.1  Tension between adulthood and exclusion: present
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Certain areas of concern, like some risk-taking
behaviour, disengagement from social institutions,
property crime and illegal drug use, may be a function
of what Talcott Parsons (1942) called the “moratorium
on responsibility” structured into the youth category,
as well as a reaction to exclusion from responsible
social roles. To the extent that this is the case, we
would expect the total number of people engaged with
such activities to increase, and to be from older groups. 
Some problems may also be compounded. For
example, teenage populations are not significantly
implicated in violent crime, but young men in their
20s are. Peak rates for property offences, however, do
lie with younger age groups. If higher rates of
offending move up the age scale, as seems structurally
likely, property offences may be aggravated by an
additional element of violence.
2: Increasing ambiguity
Many of the classic authors in youth studies (e.g.
Eisenstadt 1988; Mead 1939; Seig 1976) have argued
that the existence of a youth category in any culture
need not be problematic. Under the right conditions,
the youth category can make a strong and positive
contribution to social processes. The conditions for a
functional youth category, according to Eisenstadt
(1988), are:
• that youth have a clear role;
• that youth institutions (youth organisations,
youth services, schools, etc.) are integrated with
other social institutions, and articulate with them;
and
• that the process of graduation from youth is clear
and unambiguous.
Arguably, none of these conditions apply in
contemporary Australia. Youth institutions are
typically segregated from other social institutions. In
addition, a positive role has not really been found for
young people. Rather, they have been dealt with as a
kind of social and economic expansion joint, used to
carry the strains of economic restructuring and social
change. Policies around young people have mostly
been about containment, rather than a clear social role
with appropriate rites of passage.
The process of graduation is hopelessly arbitrary,
uncertain, anomalous, ambiguous. Legal ages of
majority start kicking in at 15 (the end of compulsory
schooling in most States) and kick irregularly, inconsis-
tently and erratically without any consistent logic
other than budgetary convenience until the age of 25.
Social and customary rites of passage start their slow,
cumulative and ambiguous ascent to adulthood at
around 13 (with the achievement of “teenagerhood”
and enrolment in secondary schooling) and reach
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Figure 11.2  Tension between adulthood and exclusion: 2015
some vague terminus in the late 20s or early 30s with
permanent employment, marriage, mortgage, and
parenthood.
The trend is for these indicators of adult status to
become more ambiguous, not less so. Employment, a
powerful signifier of adulthood, becomes less so as
work becomes increasingly casual, temporary and part-
time, and the capacity to economically support
themselves and others becomes increasingly fragile.
Leaving home will be later and often temporary,
dependent on mobility and economic circumstances.
Marriage, if it happens, will be preceded by many years
of a more indeterminate cohabitation. Having children
will happen later, and may or may not happen within
a permanent relationship between the child’s parents.
All the traditional signs indicating that adulthood is
ready to be bestowed on the person are already losing
definition, stretching, breaking up, or disappearing.
The linear transition to adulthood will increasingly be
a historical curiosity for all but a few young people.
These trends seem set to continue over the next couple
of decades.
3: Increasing complexity
As a result of these and other trends, the process of
accreditation as adult is becoming more complex and
indeterminate. More is required of young people to
“make their lives”. Continuing marginalisation in the
work force, multiple jobs, the requirement for ongoing
training and lifelong education, increasing mobility,
and less stable personal relationships make for a
lifestyle that is more transitional and fluid, and where
destinations are not guaranteed. Most young people
deal with this complexity and indeterminacy very well,
and may prefer it (Murphy 2000). Their capacity to do
so, however, is a function of the resources they have at
their disposal, especially family backing, access to
resources, and their own strengths and abilities.
4: Polarisation
Many of the current trends in the labour market and in
other fields indicate that some young people will do
very well out of the changing circumstances. Their
skills and aptitudes will be well suited to the New
Economy; they will be technologically astute, sophisti-
cated communicators, able to sell themselves and their
services in a volatile market, able to be enterprising, to
identify opportunities and to know how to take them.
They will have been intimate with information and
communications technologies since childhood, and
have the access to capital, often from their families, to
integrate technologies into their work. They will be
well-networked, having maintained connections with
equally able schoolmates and fellow-professionals. 
For young people who have left high school
without really being able to read, who have given up
on the struggle of living with reconstituted, frag-
menting, highly mobile or under-resourced families,
who are members of already marginalised populations
(especially Indigenous populations) or who are stuck in
jobless outer suburbs or country towns, things may be
more difficult. Continuing education will be harder for
people who were unable to negotiate it successfully the
first time. Access to capital will rely on the judgment of
commercially driven financial institutions, and the
barriers to entry into markets will be higher. 
Clearly, the trend is for this gap to widen. Across
the issues and institutions we have discussed, both
advantage and disadvantage are cumulative, or as
Matthew’s Gospel puts it, “Whoever has will be given
more, and will have an abundance. Whoever does not
have, even what they have will be taken from them.”
(Matthew 13:12). Discussion of a permanent underclass
of youth who have never had jobs, who live perma-
nently on welfare and the proceeds of the black
economy has been going on for some time (White
1989). Current dynamics almost without exception are
leading in the direction of greater inequality and polar-
isation, not less.
This all appears to be heading towards a set of
circumstances that involve more risk, more difficulty,
and greater exclusion for young people. However, it is
important not to translate this into a general pathology
of youth. Young people mostly will cope, often with
creativity and resourcefulness, with the challenges that
life and society place in front of them. But their
capacity to do so becomes more stretched with the
height and number of barriers they must surmount. 
This is especially so where multiple exclusions
compound each other. For some young people, it is
easy to succeed, and while it may become more
difficult in the future, the bar will still be low, and the
disincentives for failure will be high. For others, the
opposite will be the case. The challenge of making it in
the New Economy on the resources at their disposal
will be high, the cost of trying and not succeeding will
be prohibitive, and it will be easier to passively, but
pragmatically, accept a place in the underclass. This is
also the classic picture of a criminogenic society. It is in
this equation that youth policy, and the services that
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flow from it, can make a difference: either for better or
worse. 
A foundation for youth policy 
in 2015
Rites of passage and the status
of the youth category
Effective youth services for 2015 need to be embedded
within a clear and well thought-out policy framework
which removes the ambiguity of the status of youth.
Across policy areas, policy makers need to pay
attention to how the youth category is to be consti-
tuted in policy, and how the relation between young
people and the rest of society is to be shaped. The
policy framework needs to rest on a solid foundation of
understanding about the position of young people in
society, both in terms of analysis of their current
position and a vision for what that position should be.
Within the youth category itself, policy needs to
address the question of polarisation, of the cumulative
advantage and disadvantage that results when other
categories of exclusion like race, socio-economic
background, cultural difference and gender are
amplified by the dynamics of the youth category. 
Essentially, there are two options here. One is to
work progressively to eliminate youth as a legal status,
as has happened with most statutes regarding race and
gender. This would involve the establishment of a
single point of passage – from childhood to adulthood.
Prior to this age, people would be legally children, with
none of the rights of adulthood but also none of the
expectations. They would be eligible for children’s
concessions for transport or entertainment, but would
also not be entitled to drive, to purchase and consume
alcohol, or to vote. They would have a legal claim on
their parents for support. After this age, they would be
eligible for adult wages and government benefits, be
assumed to be independent, but also be responsible for
their own debts and the fulfilment of contracts, and
subject to adult sentencing processes at law including
imprisonment. Discrimination on the basis of age
(including for employment purposes) would be illegal,
as it is currently on the grounds of race or gender.
This position has much to commend it. It is
consistent with what we know of young people’s intel-
lectual capacity post-puberty, and with general liberal
democratic principles on civic rights and responsibili-
ties, which establish that discrimination is legitimate
only where there are relevant grounds. In the case of
voting, for example, the only relevant ground is the
capacity to reason, on which young people are as able
as any other section of the population. In the case of a
licence to drive, it is about the ability to drive compe-
tently and with due care. 
The critical question is at what age adult status is
conferred. Theoretically, according to the liberal
democratic tradition, the principle of universal adult
franchise means that it should be conferred at
biological adulthood or close to it – somewhere
between 14 and 16. Such a position is, however, a long
way from current policy and practice in Australia, and
would require some radical shifts and interventions to
make it stick. 
Present practice would probably lead towards
conferring an absolute and unambiguous age of
majority, but later. Current discussions in Britain are
considering nineteen as such an age (Social Exclusion
Unit 1999). A later age, however, still suffers from the
problem that there are no grounds in principle for
many of the areas of exclusion that young people live
with between 14 and 19. It would have the advantage
that it is a minimalist position; that it would involve
few radical changes to current practice, but would still
put a limit on the arbitrary decisions about the age of
majority that continue to proliferate in the current
policy vacuum.
The other possibility is to institutionalise youth as a
legal status, with clear roles, rights and responsibilities
and a clear and consistent position before the law,
rather than the not-adult/not-child status they
currently hold. This would involve the establishment
of two legal points of passage: one from childhood into
youth, and another from youth into adulthood. The
rationale is that while there is no evidence to indicate
that young people’s inherent capacities are inferior to
those of other adults, the reality of inexperience and
the increasing social, cultural and economic expecta-
tion of citizens justifies the establishment of the youth
category as a protective and preparatory status. This
position is already anticipated by the establishment of
the Youth Allowance, and is generally consistent with
current practice.
If this is the case, however, policy needs to be
thought through on a whole of government basis to
eliminate the “Catch 22” situations which currently
plague the position of young people (Jones & Bell
2000). So for example, while the Youth Allowance
currently assumes that young people will be dependent
on their parents until the age of 25, they have no legal
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claim for support if parents fail to meet this expecta-
tion, especially if they continue to live in the family
home. There are no provisions, as there are with child
support, for a standard formula for transfers of income
within the family, especially from parents to adult
children. 
The institutionalisation of the status of youth could
establish some rationale for ages of majority that need
to be conferred progressively through the teenage
years. Entry into the status would need to be unam-
biguous, and carry with it a range of important
freedoms and rights – including, we would argue, the
right to vote. Other rights could be granted progres-
sively through to the conferring of unambiguous and
absolute adult status, from which point all discrimina-
tion on the grounds of age would be illegal. We would
recommend formal state recognition of the conferring
of adult status, similar to a citizenship ceremony, to
recognise the new citizen’s place in the
Commonwealth of Australia. 
We would stress, however, that each age of majority
that is delayed beyond biological adulthood represents
an act of exclusion, however well-meaning. Exclusion
on the grounds of protection or preparation may be
justified, but in each and every case, the case for
exclusion must be rigorously made. Paternalism, while
often necessary, is not always in the interest of the
subject population. And under certain circumstances,
there should be provision for authorities to grant adult
status before the specified age: for example, if both
parents of a 17-year old are killed, and the person is
living independently. Or an entrepreneurial prodigy,
already on the way to making their second million. 
A possible framework might be:
Rights conveyed at entry to youth status (somewhere
between 14 and 16):
• To vote, but not compulsory
• To leave school
• Allowances paid to the young person, but means
tested on parent’s income
• To live independently
• To accept full-time employment
• To consent to sex
• To apply for a learner driver’s permit
• Legal claim on parental support
• To sign contracts, but with guarantor or sponsor 
• Youth concession for public transport, recreation,
etc.
• State support up to adult levels if parental support
is not forthcoming
• Offending dealt with by a youth court separate
from children’s courts and adult courts
• Training guarantee
• Consent for medical procedures 
• Right to marry with parental consent and support
• Entry to “MA” rated entertainment
• Training wage paid
Rights conveyed progressively during youth status:
• Right to purchase legal recreational drugs such as
tobacco and alcohol
• Right to be on licensed premises 
• Eligibility for a driver’s licence
• Ability to sign contracts
• Entry to “R” rated entertainment
Rights conveyed at adulthood (somewhere between 18 and 23):
• Right to marry 
• Voting compulsory
• Allowances paid at adult rate and free of parental
means test
• Assumption of economic autonomy
• Subject to adult courts and sentencing
• Adult wages paid
• All other rights 
The balance between rights being conferred on entry
to the youth status and conferred at some point during
youth depends on the nominated age of entry. If it was
decided that the age at which youth status is conferred
is 14, certain rights such as being on licensed premises,
or signing legally binding contracts, might be deferred
to 17 or 18. If the nominated age is 16, it might make
sense for more rights to be conferred at the point of
entry rather than progressively. 
The Social Exclusion Unit’s report Bridging the Gap
(1999) also recommended issuing a Youth Card to
young people, similar to the Senior’s Card issued in
several states, which would entitle them to discounts
for a range of services such as transport and entertain-
ment. Similar measures could be initiated in Australia.
Recommendation: That State and Federal Governments
establish the status of youth in legal and policy terms, with
clear and consistent rights and responsibilities, and which
balance obligations and privileges, benefits and penalties for
young people.
Service delivery: the role of the professions
The data looks forward to a future that is more
uncertain, more fragmented, and in which core social
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institutions are more temporary, diverse and fluid.
They circumscribe an environment for young people
with a high risk of increasing division and polarisation
in life chances for young people, a future in which
relative ease for some young people is in contrast to the
deep struggle of others, financial success and prosperity
to long-term poverty, and easy welcome to persistent
exclusion. 
Consistently, expert forums identified the need for
linking services: advocacy, brokerage, information,
referral. Of course, core service delivery agencies must
also be part of the picture, otherwise there is nothing
to link young people to. But in a more fluid and
fragmented environment in which the dangers of
multiple exclusion are extreme, young people must
have the means of effective contact with mainstream,
generic and specialist youth services. Of necessity, if
services are to engage those most at risk of exclusion, a
strong outreach component is an essential part of this
profile. There is clearly a role for all professions within
this, and a clear need for capacity-building to embrace
these styles of service delivery. In particular, according
not only to expert forums but several reviewers of the
Report, the capacity of youth workers to effectively
address these concerns needs conscious development,
given that these kind of linking and advocacy roles
have typically fallen most directly within their ambit. 
Compared with many European countries, youth
work as a specific practice is undeveloped in Australia.
Widespread government support for youth work
practice has been available really only in the last 25
years, and on an ad hoc basis through labour market
programs, supported accommodation, and a range of
other funding programs. Although proposals for an
Australian Youth Service, modelled along the lines of
the National Youth Service in Britain have been floated
from time to time (e.g. Kirby 1984), youth work is still
an emerging profession, in the process of developing a
clear self-consciousness and idea of its role. No accredi-
tation process for youth workers is in place in any
Australian State, and recruitment and training for
youth workers continues to be haphazard. Several
States and the Territories have no tertiary training
capacity for youth work professionals, and reviewers
have indicated that because of the uneven develop-
ment, training and capacity current among youth
workers, their ability to move into the roles that young
people will be looking for in the year 2015 cannot be
assumed.
The projections for effective service delivery in the
year 2015 require a ready supply of skilled professionals
adapted to working in informal settings, initiating
contact with young people, making assessments of
their needs and capacities, and facilitating linkages.
While the development of youth work as a profession,
including recognition of the youth work role and
training for youth workers, is substantially the respon-
sibility of practicing youth work professionals,
institutional recognition and support would pay
dividends. Concerted training of other professionals to
help them in these new kinds of roles will also be
important.
Recommendation: That State and Commonwealth
Governments support the development of professional youth
work practice, including effective training, and its recogni-
tion and utilisation within service delivery to young people,
as well as training for other professions to work within a
more flexible and diverse environment.
Conclusion
The position of young people in the year 2015 depends
critically on the policy settings that are in place for
them between now and then. Current trends indicate
that unless proactive steps are taken to channel the
forces of change in different directions, we face a trans-
formation in the youth category as significant as any
that have happened in the last century. 
In particular, we will be facing an extension of the
youth category to the point where the gap between
biological adulthood and the granting of adult status
looks like stretching out to 10 or 15 years, or perhaps
even more. Each such extension, while it conveys some
freedoms on young people in terms of relief from
responsibility, also contributes to a structure of disen-
franchisement. Political reaction to this
disenfranchisement, whether in terms of overt political
dissent, subcultural tension, or “pragmatic apathy”, is a
predictable result. Behavioural adaptation to an
extended juvenile role may not always produce
responses that are productive either for the individual
young person or the community as a whole.
The need for intensive policy work on establishing
an unambiguous and absolute age of majority is
indicated by these trends. Data on the inherent
capacities of young people (see Melton 1983) indicates
that a single point of graduation from child to
adulthood is possible and consistent with liberal
democratic traditions. Given the current situation, and
the proliferation of ages of majority across different
issues and jurisdictions, young people deserve at
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minimum a two-point process which establishes youth
as a clear legal status with unambiguous rights and
responsibilities. The establishment of the appropriate
ages of majority, with attendant rites of passage,
deserves serious policy consideration.
The data also indicate a trend to the polarisation of
wealth and other forms of advantage/disadvantage
within the youth population, and for this polarisation
to be cumulative, persistent, and transmitted between
generations. Without effective policy settings to
counteract this trend, beginning now, Australia faces a
situation in which a significant proportion of young
people may never be able to participate effectively in
social processes, whether political, cultural or
economic. The costs of this, both in human terms and
the costs of service provision for seriously disadvan-
taged young people and for the families that they will
eventually form, are likely to be prohibitive. Policy
needs to be directed towards making the liberal
democratic claim of equality of opportunity at least an
arguable approximation of the truth .
It has been the persistent public position of parties
from all persuasions that youth are the future of this
country. However, policy and service delivery have not
always honoured them as such. Too often, the force of
effort has not been to create opportunities for young
people to move smoothly into their place as full
members of the common wealth, but to keep them in a
kind of holding pattern until things get better, or more
convenient. Youth as an experience has been for too
many young people an exercise in frustration, rather
than a process in which the world opens up to them
and the adult world welcomes them into its
frameworks of power and responsibility. 
Almost 50 years ago, S. N. Eisenstadt argued that for
the youth category to be functional, there needed to be
a clear role for young people, that youth institutions
needed to articulate with and be integrated into other
key social institutions, and that there needed to be a
clear process of graduation into full adult status. It is
clear that none of these criteria are met in Australia at
the beginning of the 21st century, and that the trends
lead further away from their fulfilment. Young people
have coped amazingly well with the structural and
social adjustments of the past 30 years, in spite of the
fact that even these minimum requirements have not
been in place. 
The easiest way to predict the future, as the proverb
goes, is to create it. The point of a futures study is never
to predict what 2015 will be like. It is to set up the
principles for action now. With the assistance of the
range of informants, partners and reviewers who have
contributed to this Report, we believe that some of
these principles and directions are clear. The question
of whether young people will be more productive,
healthier, politically and socially engaged in 2015, of
course, depends not on what we do then, but what we
do now.
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As we indicated in the Methodology, expertforums were asked to project three possiblefuture scenarios for young people, on the basis
of the data presented and their own observations and
expertise: a better future (“the good”); a future that was
significantly worse for young people (“the bad”) and a
future that was pretty much an extension of current
trends (“the much the same”). The chapters of the
Report, in varying degrees, reflect this approach.
There are clearly strong implications for policy and
for effective service delivery in all three of these. Expert
forums clearly had a view that whether the future was
better or worse for young people was significantly a
function of the policy settings in place. And the kinds
of services that would be possible as well as necessary
were different in each case.
The expert forums dealt with the three scenarios
slightly differently. The “much the same” scenario was
organised similarly to this Report, with reflections on
the situation in work, households, education and so
on. Descriptions of the “good” scenario and the “bad”
scenario were much more addressed in terms of themes
and principles.
Many of these reflections inform our analysis in the
individual chapters, especially our conclusions for
effective youth services, and so there is some risk of
repetition. However, we were concerned that the
distinctiveness of the contribution from the expert
forums not be lost in the process of melding it with
our other sources of data: the literature, the statistical
material, and the work of the research team itself. 
1: The good
Principles and themes for a society which dealt well
with its young people included:
Equality: Young people would have access to a living
wage which would allow them to support themselves
economically. There would be means to address big
disparities in income. The good society would not
allow discrimination on the grounds of age for wage,
employment, housing or other such opportunities.
Health, education, transport and housing would be
collectively provided rather than being solely a
function of the private market in order to ensure
equality of access. There would be mechanisms in
place to ensure young people’s access to capital for
business ventures and self-employment.
Freedom/autonomy: Young people would be in a
position to be self-determining and self-reliant, with
the resources to make choices about their lives and
their primary relationships. There would be flexibility
in moving between alternatives, with the opportunity
to experiment and to find a place. Young people would
be resourced to deal with change, to embrace it, and to
overcome fear of change.
AAppendix 1Reflections of the expert forums:
future scenarios
Engagement: Young people would see themselves and be
seen by others as active citizens. As a legitimate
constituency rather than a “target group”. They would
be politically aware and involved, not only in the
process of electoral politics but in the politics of their
own lives: of educational institutions and other
processes that affect them directly.
Representations would be sought by all decision
making processes in which young people had an
interest, and participation would be seen as a normal,
automatic part of decision making, rather than a
special provision. They would be involved in the
design and thinking stages, rather than a tacked on
consultation at the end. This would be more than a
“junior” parallel to political processes. Young people
would not just be seen in terms of their “future” or
“potential”. Society would invest in them because of
what they offer now. And young people’s interest will
be recognised not only in the classically “youth” areas,
but across a wide range of decision-making.
The hostility and suspicion that frequently accom-
panies young people’s involvement would be replaced
by respect for young people’s expertise and their
opinion. Leadership would be encouraged. Young
people would be liked – social processes would be
naturally youth-friendly.
Culture-building: A healthy future for young people
involves an aesthetic life as well as a functional one.
Technology would be engaged towards creative ends,
with the acceptance of aesthetic indicators of value as
well as money, efficiency and function. Young people
would be encouraged to be creative, and the arts would
be supported. The traditional access that young people
have had to travel and cross-cultural experiences would
be extended to sections of the population who have
not had such opportunity. Young people would be
actively engaged with building national, community
and personal identities.
Diverse: “The good” society is one in which differences
are tolerated, respected and celebrated. It is an inclusive
society, multicultural in form, open to new forms of
family and relationship, and to emergent spiritualities.
It recognises the need for change in the ways we think
and speak in response to a changing world, and is open
to new ways and new words in which what is
important in human interactions are preserved and
transformed. The project of reconciliation with our
Aboriginal past and with Indigenous people in the
present will have made significant advances. The idea
of the “mainstream” will be much broader than now.
Accountable: A corollary of young people’s more active
citizenship will be that Governments and other
decision-making bodies are more accountable. This will
not primarily be about arms’ length criticism, but rather
a greater sense of collective responsibility, arising from
an increased connection with government and a more
open relationship with authorities. The media would
have a stronger sense of the way it shapes society, and
the responsibility it carries for the way populations,
events and social processes are constructed. 
Adaptive: Australia in 2015 will be a dynamic, rapidly
changing society, regardless of policy and planning
between now and then. Young people will be trained
and supported to change, develop, and adjust to
changing circumstances and demands. Education
systems will be flexible and diverse, focusing more on
strategy, frameworks, and ways of thinking and
problem solving rather than learning content for its
own sake. They will encourage adaptation and enable
students to deal with fear: changing courses or
directions will be facilitated and respected. Learning
will be future-centred, while not ignoring history and
heritage. People will not expect to ever finish their
education. Along with lines of access to capital, young
people will be educated and intelligent about capital.
Supportive: In the context of rapid change, support and
stability become ever more important. In spite of its
greater vulnerability, family will be more central to
young people’s life chances than it is even now. There
will need to be programs which support the support
systems like family. Work needs to be done also in
creating or restoring communities. Regardless of where
people live, it should be possible to raise children in a
“village”. Reinvestment in community development
and careful planning of the built environment seems to
be pivotal in this process. A supportive network is
essential to building resilience, a theme now often
expressed in youth affairs as well as broader contexts. 
Integrative and Restorative: Many of the components of
an inclusive society have already been mentioned, such
as the acceptance of multiculturalism and the
importance of community development. A premium
would be put on people’s social skill: their negotiation,
conflict management, and ability to communicate and
to listen. “The good” would mean that intergenera-
tional hostilities, including resentment, payback and
suspicion, would be reduced. Intergenerational partner-
ship would be encouraged. Young people would feel
that they belong.
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Such a society would pay close attention to the
initiation of its young into full citizenship. Negative
initiation through burdens and penalties would be
reduced, being replaced by a consistent and clear
process of acceptance as adult. 
In the area of justice, adversarial and alienating
processes would be progressively replaced by restorative
justice principles which focus on the broken relation-
ship and the recognition and reparation of damage
rather than the broken law and the obligation to the
state. Imprisonment would be rare, with diversion the
norm. There would be a keen appetite for better ways
of doing juvenile justice, based on reintegrative and
restorative processes. Recreational drug use will be
significantly decriminalised.
Safe and secure: Crime rates will have declined as a
function of decreased alienation, and better ways of
dealing with crime. A decrease in personal violence will
result from better social connection and sense of
community. Despite a more dynamic and fragmented
labour market, people will feel that they are safe
economically. Core incomes will be secure, there will
be more full employment, more security in
employment, and less casualisation. Flexibility in the
work force will have been reconciled with the rights of
workers and the need for a secure income.
Healthy: The “good” will be clean. Health will be
improved, and health care will be distributed according
to need, rather than income. Primary healthcare will be
free. There will be a quantum improvement in supports
for young people with mental health difficulties.
Understandings of health will be integrated across a
range of professions and disciplines including planning
and housing. There will be a range of flexible housing
options. High rise blocks of flats will be seen as a
historical curiosity.
2: The Bad
Expert forums identified the following features of a
society displaying a serious deterioration in conditions
for young people.
Polarised: This kind of society would exhibit a large and
growing gap between rich and poor, with a growing
underclass. Educational experience may be founda-
tional here. Increasing privatisation and decreasing
public funding for schools could see young people
from low socioeconomic backgrounds attending
inferior, poorly staffed and equipped schools while
wealthy students have access to well-resourced private
institutions. The quality of education would be
dictated by the ability to pay. Full fee paying secondary
and tertiary education would contribute to this.
Intergenerational poverty and wealth would be institu-
tionalised. 
This division would be cemented in separate
housing precincts, with the wealthy living in high
security housing precincts for the rich. Living in a
wealthy area, going to wealthy schools, access to
finance and capital, competitiveness in applying for
jobs would be part of a picture of cumulative
advantage. The corollary, cumulative disadvantage,
would follow.
Recognition of the effects of such disadvantage, and
attempts to address it, would be eroded. Support for
marginalised groups would be withdrawn, except
through charities and private benefaction. The welfare
system would be seriously cut, with an increase in
absolute poverty, including poverty among working
people. Some would find it hard to afford housing,
food, and basic living. 
Equal opportunity gains around gender, class,
ethnicity would falter and reverse. Racism and inter-
group suspicion increase, and tolerance for sexual
preference and other differences would collapse. A legal
system based on the ability to pay would see higher
rates of incarceration of young people from margin-
alised groups and those on low incomes. Effective
equality before the law, already under threat, would
lose all semblance of possibility.
Dependent: Current exclusionary provisions for young
people would be extended and intensified. Participants
saw an increase in the voting age as possible,
dependence on family and government until well into
the 30s as likely. Longer compulsory engagement in a
variety of institutions, especially schools, was seen as
likely. Young people would mostly be excluded from
employment as a result both of structural factors and
stigmatisation. Young people’s sane behaviour would
be increasingly psychiatrised. They would decreasingly
be seen as a population with rights.
Over-controlled/under-controlled: Participants forecasted a
crisis in the balance of social control in this kind of
society. On one level, harsher penalties, tighter
policing and strict law and order directions would
result in the adoption of policies such as zero tolerance
and curfews for young people. The cycles of alienation
involved in this approach to order would result in
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increased levels of violence and other crime.
Participants predicted an escalation in the means of
violence, including an entrenched gun culture.
Participants saw this society as being increasingly crim-
inogenic.
At the same time, approaches which are not based
on cooperation and consent are not able to effectively
contain people’s behaviour, and escalate the degree of
resistance in subject populations. This dynamic may
produce increasing lawlessness in suburbs and ghettoi-
sation in central city areas, even in the face of
escalating control. Increased gang formation was likely
along with attendant gang warfare. At the extreme,
participants saw the possibility of complete social
collapse and effective, if not actual, martial law, with
civil controls increasingly being taken on by the
military.
Carceral: Mandatory sentencing and other forms of
penal escalation and net-widening would lead to a
cycle of policies involving increased rates of imprison-
ment, especially for young men but in increasing
degrees for young women also. A rising proportion of
young men would be dead or in prison by the age of
20. Vulnerable populations, such as Indigenous,
migrant or other ethnic minorities would be of especial
concern. Fears were held for those young people with
mental health problems, who may find their psychi-
atric condition is criminalised. Institutionalisation, the
standard response to difference in such a society,
would be used also for other non-criminal matters,
such as homeless people, particularly the “hard end”.
Work: High levels of unemployment, with polarisation
not only in access to paid work but consequent
extremes in income were forecast. Work conditions
would decline, with decreasing controls over health
and safety in industry and greater competition among
workers, and the progressive exclusion of unions and
other workers’ organisations. Trade cycles of boom and
bust would be endemic and intensified with laissez-
faire approaches to economic management.
Health collapse: Poverty is perennially an indicator of
poor health outcomes, and forum participants’ vision
of this kind of society forecast a range of deteriorating
health conditions. Increasing infant mortality, infanti-
cide and other death rates in childbirth were predicted.
Life expectancy among the poor declines, even in the
face of vastly improved expectancy for those with
means. Reduced quality in public health, e.g. water
supplies, would predicate increases in infection, plague,
and other epidemics, including HIV. Environmental
degradation would lead to increases in respiratory
ailments among young people, and increasing toxicity
of the environment. Suicide rates would be expected to
climb. Inaccessible health care would lead to increased
rates of disability. Drug use would increase in real
terms, and harmful use becomes more difficult to
control as the range of drugs available proliferates.
Drug use is even more seen as a criminal matter, not a
health issue. 
3: The much the same
Generally, the expert forums were not optimistic about
the future for young people in Australia if many of the
present trends continue. In fact, their vision for a
future in which things were much the same as they are
now, except 15 years on, has a lot in common with the
negative future outlined above. Present trends,
projected along a straight line, also indicated a society
in which young people were increasingly dependent
and excluded from significant social roles, a society
increasingly polarised between rich and poor, in which
cycles of poverty, crime, and imprisonment worked in
self-reinforcing cycles, and in which the State was
increasingly authoritarian and unaccountable. 
The data from the forums came in a form that
much more closely followed the categories through
which the body of this Report is organised – through
the frames of work and employment, family and
household, education, crime and punishment and
health, with minor variations. Participants were also
interested in the way that services would be delivered
in the future, particularly in the administration of
funding for services, including accountability
provisions.
Expert forums paid special attention to the relative
position of young men and young women, and the
possibilities with respect to gender in the future.
Gender issues were certainly not expected to disappear,
with both power and identity issues still on the agenda.
Participants painted a complex picture. Young women
were expected to improve their position, as more
support services for young women became available,
and their relative advantage in educational qualifica-
tions flowed through to their position in the labour
market. But the improvement might only be relative,
an effect of “cashing down” due to equally exploitative
entry level jobs, and casualisation may continue to
affect young women more than young men. 
There may be a significant change in gender roles,
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as the cultural shift driven by the gender politics of the
late 20th century is natural and normal for the next
adult generation. There may even be a reversal of
gender disadvantage, as young men begin to pay for
the fact that they do less well at school than young
women in an increasingly information and communi-
cation-driven economy. Young men risk further
alienation. Already, they have structurally fewer
choices, including having a baby. 
Other issues raised by the forums included:
Work: Employment would continue to be central in
most people’s lives, and for its importance to intensify.
They saw an economic environment with natural
selection pressures which would produce a narrow
technological industrial “economic man”. Participants
expected work to become more demanding and to be
done under more difficult circumstances. A work envi-
ronment organised by individual contracts, in an
environment of continued high unemployment would
lead to poorer wages and conditions, security and
safety and increased worker competition. Jobs would
continue to be destructured favouring just-in-time,
short-term, casual work contracts.
For many young people employment prospects
would continue to be poor. The experience of the
1980s and 90s makes second or third generation unem-
ployment likely. Increased technology, leading to a
decreased demand for labour, and increasing skill
requirements may make up to 30–60% of the
population unemployable. Many young people won’t
ever expect to work or be able to. For some, the limit of
their work experience will be volunteerism and
recreation activities.
Family and household: There would be an increasing
expectation of families to care for their adult offspring,
as well as elderly parents and family members with
disabilities or mental illness. Projections indicate
increased levels of family stress as the limit to family
load-carrying capacity was approached and in many
cases exceeded. Levels of tension within the family
would rise as adult offspring, disenfranchised by lack of
income, struggle to find role and autonomy while
under their parents’ roof, while parents struggle to
understand their sons’ and daughters’ lack of economic
progress and independence. Well supported young
people will have more choices, unsupported young
people will be worse off than at present.
Continued high levels of family breakdown and
reformation, and attendant levels of conflict, would see
an increased number of kids in care and increased
resources needed to cater for them. The age of children
at the point of family breakdown is also an issue, with
alternative accommodation needed at much younger
ages. 
There may be a growing crisis in the availability of
housing as owner-occupation, the dominant form of
housing tenure in Australia, became less affordable. In
fact, all types of housing tenure would be harder to get.
The trend towards dismantling the public housing
sector and the shortage of private rental housing would
make rental housing scarce and expensive. Rent
increases would be expected to follow, impacting
particularly on young people who are heavily exposed
to movements in the rental market.
Education: The prognosis for education is contradictory,
with again widely unequal outcomes expected for
different populations of young people. In a communi-
cation-rich environment, young women are expected
to increase their comparative educational advantage,
with young men’s comparative position sliding.
Budgetary constraints would be expected to produce a
deteriorating public education sector, with an increas-
ingly profitable private education sector for those who
can afford it.  
Generally, participants expected a swing to more
conservative education approaches, with a stronger
emphasis on disciplinary rather than educative aspects
of schooling to cater for parents’ fears for their
children’s economic futures and insecurity about their
social risk. However, the general increase in time spent
in education may produce a population of young
people who are extremely clever. It raises the question
of what they do with it – whether the rising population
will turn their learning towards the pursuit of self-
interest, towards social responsibility, or to cynical and
alienated counter-cultures. 
Law and order: Trends towards increasing alienation
would be expected to result in increased levels of
violence, especially youth violence. Some participants
expected that children’s current engagement with the
symbolic violence of video games could translate into
greater capacity for violence in later years. Trends in
justice systems indicate increased incarceration of
young men, and prison experience has its own part to
play in cycles of violence. With improving technology,
more intensive surveillance of citizens’ behaviour
seems likely. 
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Political commitment: There is a contradictory picture
for young people’s political engagement. On the one
hand, the experience of disenfranchisement and the
increasing concentration of political power would be
expected to lead to lower political participation and
“pragmatic apathy”, perhaps for the majority of young
people. But the existence of an educated, under-
engaged youth/student population would mean that
political activism would be unlikely to disappear,
finding expression not through the parliamentary
process or mainstream party politics, but through
underground politics, direct action, and counter-
cultures. With the rapidly changing environment, and
the likely development of a strong generational
consciousness on the part of young people, youth
politics may involve a polarisation between a conserva-
tive mainstream, a radical alternative, and a passive
and apathetic middle ground.
Community: The research anticipates a number of forces
tending to further erode the depth and extent of
community networks and community organisation.
Urban drift and the consequent rural depopulation will
continue to make rural Australia more marginal
socially. Even in larger centres, the transience of the
population (and of young people in particular) will
make the development of integrated, healthy and
secure communities difficult to sustain, resulting in
increased individualism, isolation and the potential of
increasing suicide. Space becomes increasingly
commodified and privatised: fewer and fewer resources
are in communal hands. Walled, high security housing
estates for the wealthy, and blighted welfare suburbs
for the poor, intensify social distance. Decreasing
community involvement, or “opting out”, results from
increased individualism, the increasing dominance of
the market as the primary way of organising human
relations, and the sheer pressure of a more complex
and demanding work environment. The decline of
organic forms of community increases reliance on State
provision for social needs that communities would
ordinarily provide. Trust in social support systems
declines. 
New forms of community, corresponding with the
information and communications revolution and the
New Economy, are yet to develop and are unlikely to
be in place in 2015 without significant intervention.
Identity, both personal and social, becomes increas-
ingly fractured.
Services: Current movements towards the marketisation
of youth services are expected to continue, with youth
services increasingly being provided by private firms,
and Governments providing fewer services themselves
due to outsourcing. A larger role for local Government
is expected, however. Services will be more fragmented
and competitive, with increased risks of exclusion,
particularly for hard-to-serve client groups.
Government demands for accountability from non-
government and private providers are expected to
intensify, while resources decline. Pressure on ethical
youth work practice results. The gap between need and
social policy already present in the 1990s continues,
and social support systems are put under increasing
strain. Youth services become less creative, and more
institutional, and continue to be reactive rather than
proactive.
Competition for social provision between the gener-
ations becomes an issue, with resources redistributed
from the young to the aged. The growing political
power of the aged, and the continued disenfranchise-
ment of the young, means that youth services are less
than equitably catered for in budget decisions. The
current gap between policy-makers assumptions about
how young people live and the actual facts of their
lives is not expected to diminish.
Health: Expert forums predicted a higher incidence of
mental health problems if current trends continue –
especially stress related problems, depression and prob-
lematic drug use. Obesity would be a growing problem
among young people. In the face of increasing
demands from the elderly, young people’s share of the
health dollar declines.
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Participants who were unable to attend, but whoreceived the materials and were invited to givefeedback, are included in italics.
Western Australia
Back, Kylie
Youth Worker (mainly rural and remote areas)
Bell, Collin
Futurologist
Boyd, Stuart
Manager, Freo Youth Service
Bridgland, Jude
Chair of AYPAC 1999
Carvosso, Helen
President of NUS (WA)
Chadwick, Rona
Training (CYTS)
Daniels, Gerard
Ethnic Liaison Police Officer
Ferguson, Ken
Futurologist
Hall, Andrew
Manager, Wanneroo Youth Accommodation Service
Mapstone, Rod
Youth Worker (Education)
Rajan, Paul
Director, Westrek
Thai, Minh
Youth Worker, Balga Detached
Victoria
Bamblett, Alf
Aboriginal Community Service
Cassar, Nicole 
Victorian Aboriginal Health Service
Cooper, Ian 
Centre for Adolescent Health
Crosbie, Jamie 
City of Moreland Youth Service
Griffin, Clare
YACVIC young spokesperson, Victorian Association
of Young People in Care
Guerra, Carmel
Coordinator, Ethnic Youth Issues N’work
Hall, Richard
Youth Service Coordinator, City of Knox
Harrison, Fee 
City of Monash Youth Services, Chair of Regional 
Youth Committee
AAppendix 2Expert forum participants
Holdsworth, Roger
Youth Research Centre, Connect Student Newsletter
Holmes, Simon 
Victorian Aboriginal Health Service
McKenzie, David
RMIT Youth Research Centre
Pocock, Julian
Secretariat for Aboriginal & Islander Child Care
Sparks, Val
YACVIC
ACT
Bavinton, Tim
Member of Youth Coalition, Program Manager of 
service assisting male survivors of sexual abuse
Billing, Don
Office of Youth, ACT Dept Ed. & Comm.
Bui, Veronica
YWCA – AXYS Outreach Worker
Callan, Michelle
YWCA – Program Manager
Dilkara, Simone
Coordinator, Junction Youth Health Service
Earl, Mel 
Fairburn, Katrina
Barrister/Solicitor
Harrison, Linda
Belconnen Youth Centre – Administrator and Youth
Worker
Hunter, Meridith
Youth Coalition of ACT – EO
Rick, Viviene
Office of Youth ACT Dept Ed. & Comm., Services 
Program Manager
Sattler, Kim
South Australia
Adams, Roxanne
Australian Association of Young People in Care
Bishop, Vivian
Inner North-East Youth Service
Bradbury, Joanne
Youth SA
Davey, Kym
Youth Affairs Council of SA Executive Officer
Deslandes, Anne
Youth Roundtable Representative
Handshin, Mia
Youth Roundtable Representative
Hanson, Greg 
YOUTH SA (policy)
Hassan, Tirana
Adelaide Central Mission
Jung, Sabine
Macdonald, Sarah
YACSA 
Nam, Frank
Director of Aboriginal Youth Service
Nam, Fred
Kumanera Aboriginal Youth Service
Raifs, Claire
COPE
Thomas, Jeff
City of Charles Sturt
Tschirren, Ria
Inner City Youth Service
Voorenndt, Wendy
Plaza Youth Centre
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